Bass v. Leatherwood, 14–6321.
Decision Date | 04 June 2015 |
Docket Number | No. 14–6321.,14–6321. |
Parties | Myron BASS, Plaintiff, Karen Mobley; Lawrence Everett Reed, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Tom LEATHERWOOD, Register of Deeds, et al., Defendants–Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Myron BASS, Plaintiff
Karen Mobley; Lawrence Everett Reed, Plaintiffs–Appellants
v.
Tom LEATHERWOOD, Register of Deeds, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
No. 14–6321.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
June 4, 2015.
Karen Mobley, Germantown, TN, pro se.
Lawrence Everett Reed, Memphis, TN, pro se.
Virginia P. Bozeman, Germantown, TN; Frank Reid Olson, Cobb, Olson & Andrle, Atlanta, GA; Frankie N. Spero, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings, Nashville, TN; Klinton W. Alexander, Baker Donelson, Nashville, TN, Jay A. Ebelhar, Baker Donelson, Memphis, TN; Elizabeth A. Cash, Memphis, TN; Reid Stephens Manley, Burr & Forman, Birmingham, AL; Zachary David Miller, Burr & Forman, Nashville, TN, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before: COLE, Chief Judge; GILMAN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
SUTTON, Circuit Judge.
Karen P. Mobley and Lawrence Everett Reed filed a pro se complaint on behalf of the Karen Mobley Gunn Estate and the Lawrence Everett Reed Estate, respectively. They contended that various financial institutions fraudulently transferred real estate properties in Shelby County, Tennessee, and failed to follow proper procedures for selling properties encumbered by outstanding liens. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that a nonattorney cannot appear in court on behalf of an artificial entity such as an estate, even though Mobley and Reed claimed that they were the sole beneficiaries of their respective estates. On appeal, the financial institutions have again moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because Mobley and Reed each signed the
notice of appeal as the “Authorized Representative” of the estates. R. 82; see 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
Federal law allows parties to “plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. In 1997, the Second Circuit interpreted this language to impose a barrier on pro se litigants wishing to appear on behalf of “another person or entity,” including a corporation, a partnership, a minor child, or “an estate ... when the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the litigant.” Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir.1997). The court reasoned that “appearance pro se denotes (in law latin)...
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Bass v. Leatherwood
...788 F.3d 228Myron BASS, Plaintiff,Karen Mobley; Lawrence Everett Reed, Plaintiffs–Appellants,v.Tom LEATHERWOOD, Register of Deeds, et al., Defendants–Appellees.No. 14–6321.United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.June 4, 2015.788 F.3d 229 Karen Mobley, Germantown, TN, pro se.Lawrence E......