Bassett v. Beam

• Citation: 4 Idaho 106,36 P. 501
• Parties: BASSETT v. BEAM
• Decision Date: 09 March 1894
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

36 P. 501

4 Idaho 106

BASSETT v. BEAM

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 9, 1894

MARRIED WOMEN-SEPARATE PROPERTY-IMPROVEMENTS.-Under the statutes of Idaho a married woman may contract for improvements upon her separate property, and a debt so incurred does not come within the inhibitions of section 2498 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho.

(Syllabus by the court.)

APPEAL from District Court, Latah County.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

James W. Reid and James W. Poe, for Appellants.

Except in special cases, as under the sole trader's act, a married woman cannot by contract create a personal liability against herself in any form. The rights of married women, as to their separate property and their power over it in Idaho depend mainly on the statutes in force in this state. If the defendant, Mrs. Beam, could make a contract whereby the encumbrance of an attachment lien could be placed upon her separate property, the very object and purpose of the Idaho statute would be nullified. (Idaho Rev. Stats., secs. 2498, 5850, 5860; Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 368, 85 Am. Dec 133, and authorities there cited; Platte's Property Rights of Married Women, sec. 20, pp. 42-44; Cochran v Collins, 29 Cal. 120; Smith v. Greer, 31 Cal 478; Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 242; Butler v. Baker, 54 Cal. 178; Brickell v. Batchelder, 62 Cal. 623; Terry v. Hammond, 47 Cal. 32; Friedburg v. Parker, 50 Cal. 103; Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 558, 6 Am. Rep. 624.) Sections 2498, 3220, and sections 5850-5860, inclusive, are to be construed together, and it seems to me, that if they mean anything, they signify that a married woman cannot contract in any other way so as to bind her separate property than is provided in section 2498 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho.

Philip Tillinghast, for Respondent.

A general demurrer addressed to the whole of the complaint should be overruled if some portion of the complaint states a cause of action. (Fleming v. Albeck, 67 Cal. 227, 7 P. 659.) "Whenever the provisions of the statute are general, everything which is necessary to make such provisions effectual is supplied by the common law and by implication." (Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 327.) The only conflict of authority seems to be, as will be seen in the case of Yale v. Dederer, 22 N.Y. 45, whether or not a married woman's separate property can be holden for an indebtedness created by her, not for the benefit and improvement of her separate property, but as surety. We here cite to the court the leading cases upon this question in the United States. (Yale v. Dederer, 18 N.Y. 265, 72 Am. Dec. 503, and note; Yale v. Dederer, 22 N.Y. 450, 78 Am. Dec. 216, and note; Deeming v. Boyle, 18 Kan. 353; Todd v. Lee, 15 Wis. 365; Cartan v. David, 18 Nev. 317, 4 P. 61; Dale v. Robinson, 51 Vt. 20, 31 Am. Rep. 669; Garvin v. Watkins, 29 Fla. 151, 10 So. 818; Warren v. Freeman, 85 Tenn. 513, 3 S.W. 514; Ballin v. Dillage, 37 N.Y. 38.)

HUSTON, C. J. Morgan and Sullivan, JJ., concur.

OPINION

HUSTON, C. J.

The defendant Maud F. Beam, a married woman, made a contract with plaintiff, by the terms whereof the plaintiff agreed, for the consideration therein expressed, to erect certain buildings and make certain improvements upon a tract of land, the separate property of said Maud F. Beam, situate in Latah county, Idaho. The complaint alleges the performance of the work by plaintiff in accordance with the contract, the refusal of the defendant or her husband (who is made a party defendant to the action) to pay therefor, and demands judgment for the sum claimed to be due. The defendants demurred to the complaint, generally and specially, and, the demurrer having been overruled, filed an answer setting up various defenses. A trial was had before the court, with a jury, and verdict rendered for plaintiff. From the judgment entered upon said verdict this appeal is taken. The only question raised by the record is the sufficiency of the complaint, in stating a cause of action.

It is contended by appellants that under the statutes of Idaho a married woman is incapable of making an obligatory contract. This contention is predicated upon section 3220 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: "All persons are capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound mind and persons deprived of their civil liberty"--and section 2498 of the Revised Statutes, which is as follows: "The husband has the management and control of the separate property of the wife during the continuance of the marriage, but no sale or alienation of any part of such property can be made, nor any lien or encumbrance created thereon, unless by an instrument in writing signed by the husband and wife, and acknowledged by her upon an examination, separate and apart from her husband, as upon a conveyance of real estate." Counsel contend that a married woman comes under the class defined in section 3220 as "persons deprived of their civil liberty." While, as an exhibition of masculine courage, this proposition may elicit our admiration, as a legal conclusion, based upon the statutes of Idaho we are unable to give it recognition. If it ever was the intention of the legislature of Idaho to deprive the married women of this state of their "civil liberties," they have prudently avoided giving it expression in any of their enactments, as the following provisions of the statutes would seem to indicate:

"Sec 2495. All property of the wife, owned by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, bequest, devise or descent is her separate property."

"Sec. 2502. The earnings and accumulations...