Bassett v. DeRentis, 80-183-A
| Decision Date | 09 June 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-183-A,80-183-A |
| Citation | 446 A.2d 763 |
| Parties | Alton W. BASSETT et ux. v. James DeRENTIS. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
On December 9, 1975, Alton W. Bassett (Bassett) and his wife brought this action in the Superior Court against James DeRentis, the tax assessor of the town of Foster (the tax assessor). The complaint alleged that the tax assessor had wrongfully assessed the Bassetts for certain items of personal property that they did not own. The Bassetts sought the abatement of such assessment. The case was heard by a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury. After the hearing, judgment was entered for the tax assessor. The parties are before us on the plaintiffs' appeal from such judgment.
The essential facts are as follows. Bassett owns and operates a campground in the town of Foster. He also owns and lives upon property that is located a short distance from the campground. During the camping season, from the beginning of May until the end of September, patrons park their trailers and campers on Bassett's campground and use his facilities. Bassett receives a fee for the use of his facilities during the camping season. During the off-season, Bassett allows patrons to leave their campers or trailers on the property located near his home. The movement of the vehicles from the campground is otherwise accomplished by the owners and is done to prevent vandalism. Bassett neither receives direct monetary compensation for the accommodation nor assumes any responsibility for the vehicles.
Over the years Bassett and the tax assessor have developed various informal methods for taxing the campers and trailers on Bassett's property as of the end of each calendar year. In 1973, the first year the tax assessor was serving in such capacity, Bassett furnished the tax assessor with a list of the actual owners and the makes and models of the campers and trailers. In 1974, the tax assessor's second year, no list was furnished by Bassett; instead, the tax assessor went to the Bassett property and conducted an inventory of the vehicles. He found many on his list to be repeats from the previous year. In both years the tax assessor attempted to tax the true owners directly.
In 1975, the tax assessor, evidently dissatisfied with his rate of collection on the campers and trailers, altered his method of assessment. He taxed Bassett personally for the thirty-two campers and trailers on his property as of December 31, 1974. The $1,509 personal property tax assessment is the subject of Bassett's abatement action.
In his bench decision, the trial justice found that a bailment existed between the owners of the campers and trailers and Bassett, even though Bassett received no direct monetary compensation for the accommodation. The accommodation was sufficient to establish Bassett as a person acting in a contractual representative capacity for the owners. The trial justice also found that "actual legal ownership of [the] trailers and campers was unknown to the tax assessor." The trial justice then applied his findings to the terms of G.L.1956 (1980 Reenactment) § 44-4-10 and concluded that the statute authorized the tax assessor to tax Bassett for the thirty-two campers and trailers. The trial justice therefore refused to abate the personal property taxes assessed as of December 31, 1974.
Although § 44-4-10 does provide a means by which personal property can be taxed to certain classes of persons in possession of such property when the true owners are unknown to an assessor, we are of the opinion that the section does not aid the tax assessor in the present case.
In construing a statute, this court has as its function to ascertain the intent of the Legislature and to effectuate that intent whenever it is within legislative competence. In re R. J. P., 445 A.2d 286 at 287 (R.I.1982); Great American Nursing Centers, Inc. v. Norberg, R.I., 439 A.2d 249, 252 (1981); Gott v. Norberg, R.I., 417 A.2d 1352, 1356 (1980). In addition, it is presumed that the Legislature will not enact a statute that leads to an unreasonable result. Berberian v. Berberian, 111 R.I. 394, 395, 303 A.2d 370, 371 (1973); Wilkinson v. Harrington, ...
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Ray Reedy, Inc. v. Town of North Kingstown, C.A. No. WC 2007-0664 (R.I. Super 6/8/2009), C.A. No. WC 2007-0664.
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