Bastidas v. Good Samaritan Hosp. LP
| Decision Date | 15 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 13-cv-04388-SI |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | J. AUGUSTO BASTIDAS, Plaintiff, v. GOOD SAMARITAN HOSPITAL LP, et al., Defendants. |
Now before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's fourth amended complaint ("4AC"). This motion is scheduled to be heard on March 18, 2016. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument and VACATES the hearing. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part defendants' motion to dismiss.
The Court set forth a detailed factual background in a prior order in this case. See Dkt. No. 56 at 1-3.1 In brief, plaintiff is a Colombian-born medical doctor, specializing in surgical oncology. 4AC ¶¶ 43-47. Following a complicated surgery at Good Samaritan Hospital that resulted in the death of a patient, plaintiff's surgical privileges were limited or suspended and plaintiff was subjected to peer review proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 56-90. The Board of Trustees of Good Samaritan Hospital issued its final report on plaintiff's case in January 2013, recommending that plaintiff be proctored for a number of surgeries prior to regaining his surgical privileges. Id. at ¶ 87.
On September 20, 2013, plaintiff initiated this action, naming as defendants Good Samaritan Hospital LP, Samaritan LLC, Good Samaritan Hospital Medical Staff, an unincorporated association, and individuals Steven Schwartz and Bruce Wilbur (collectively, "GSH defendants"), and GSH's parent company HCA, Inc. ("HCA"). Dkt. 1. The complaint alleged that defendants discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and denied him due process in privileging and peer review proceedings, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. On December 2, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss the initial complaint. Dkt. 25. On December 23, 2013, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint ("FAC") alleging the same violations of law. Dkt. 39. On January 20, 2014, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's FAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 43. The GSH defendants argued that plaintiff failed to allege that defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race or retaliated against him for engaging in a statutorily protected activity, under Section 1981, and that GSH was not a state actor under Section 1983. Id.
On March 13, 2014, this Court granted the GSH defendants' motion to dismiss in its entirety, see Dkt. 56, ruling that: (i) plaintiff had not met his burden of alleging that his suspension was racially motivated; and (ii) plaintiff had not met his burden of establishing that GSH, a private hospital, was a state actor. Id. at 6, 9. The Court granted plaintiff leave to re-plead his racial discrimination claim under Section 1981, but dismissed his due process claim under Section 1983 with prejudice. Id. at 10.
On April 16, 2014, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint ("SAC") pleading racial discrimination and, for the first time, retaliation under Section 1981. Dkt. 60. On May 12, 2014, defendants moved to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 63. The GSH defendants argued that the SAC failed to allege that defendants intentionally discriminated against plaintiff, and that several of the alleged incidents of discrimination did not involve adverse employment actions. Id. at 13-18. The GSH defendants also argued that plaintiff's claim of retaliation was inadequate because he failed to plead that he engaged in protected activities opposing unlawful employment practices. Id. at 19-20.
On July 7, 2014, this Court granted the GSH defendants' motion to dismiss the SAC, without prejudice. Dkt. 80. (The Court dismissed defendant HCA from the case entirely). Id. at 6-8. The Court ruled that plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege facts supporting a claim of racial discrimination under either a disparate treatment theory or a retaliation theory. Id. at 4-5.
On August 6, 2014, plaintiff filed his third amended complaint ("TAC") alleging racial discrimination and retaliation under Section 1981. Dkt. 83. On September 10, 2014, defendants moved to dismiss the TAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 84. Defendants argued that the TAC continued to make disparate treatment allegations that the Court had already held to be insufficient or irrelevant, and that the added allegations comparing plaintiff to other surgeons were insufficient to support an inference of disparate treatment. Id. at 15-19. Defendants also argued that plaintiff's claim of retaliation was inadequate because the incidents he alleged to support the claim lacked an adverse employment action, a causal link, or both. Id. at 19-25.
On December 8, 2014, this Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the TAC as to the claim for disparate treatment, with prejudice, and dismissed three out of four claims for retaliation. Dkt. 93. But the Court denied the motion with respect to a single claim for retaliation based on the allegation that defendants failed to institute a proctoring program for plaintiff following the January 2013 final decision of the Board of Trustees, despite plaintiff's many requests. Id. at 8. Specifically, the order found that the failure to institute such a program was an adverse employment action, as it "establishe[d] a bar to plaintiff regaining significant privileges," and thus was "likely to deter a reasonable employee from engaging in protected conduct." Id. The Court also found that plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to establish causation, because the protected activity necessarily "include[d] the ongoing prosecution [of the present matter] — which includes, among other things, amending the complaint on three separate occasions." Id. Defendants were therefore on notice that the Court considered the prosecution of this case to be a protected activity, and that any alleged retaliatory acts following the filing of this complaint having to do with a failure to timely institute a proctoring plan, or limiting Dr. Bastidas's surgical privileges, would be carefully scrutinized.
On August 31, 2015, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the evidence showed that plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action and that there was no evidence of a causal link between the lawsuit and defendants' failure to institute proctoring. Dkt. 118. Plaintiff opposed, arguing for the first time that defendants engaged in retaliatory conduct when they failed to update the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB)2 from October 2009 following the incident that resulted in the patient's death. See Dkt. 121-4 at 20-21 as compared to Dkt. 83 at ¶ 78 (only mention in TAC). The NPDB report stated that the "Basis for Action or Finding" was "INCOMPETENCE," that the action was a "SUMMARY OR EMERGENCY" revoking of clinical privileges, and that the duration was "INDEFINITE." 4AC ¶ 91. The hospital was initially required to file the report pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(1), but it failed to update it within 30 days following the completion of the peer review proceedings ending in January 2013, as was its statutory duty pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 60.5. 4AC ¶ 91-92. Defendants' reply brief did not respond to the content of plaintiff's newest allegation, instead arguing that it was not properly pled in plaintiff's TAC. Dkt. 127-4 at 6-8.
The Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs clarifying the proper causation standard to be applied to assess the viability plaintiff's prima facie case. Dkt. 126. Plaintiff's supplemental brief included additional allegations of retaliation following his filing of his September 2013 complaint. Dkt. 137.
Since the Court had identified the September 2013 filing of the complaint in this case, as well as the "ongoing prosecution [of the present matter] — which includes, among other things, amending the complaint on three separate occasions," Dkt. 93 at 8, to be protected activities, the Court found it prudent and in the interest of justice to permit plaintiff to once again amend his complaint to include his remaining allegations of retaliation. Dkt. 138. The Court was mindful of defendants' concern regarding receipt of sufficient notice of the content of plaintiff's complaint. Id. Thus, the Court was careful to point out that it would not entertain any further allegations of retaliation from plaintiff following the filing of its November 16, 2015 order permitting the amendment, and that plaintiff would not be granted further leave to amend his complaint. Id. The then-pending summary judgment motion was dismissed as moot. Id.
Plaintiff has now filed his 4AC. Dkt. 140. The Court finds that two of plaintiff's allegations plead sufficient facts to sustain a cause of action for retaliation.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This "facial plausibility" standard requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to "more than a sheer possibility that a Defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While courts do not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics," a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 555. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "While legal conclusions can...
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