Batchelor v. Batchelor, 50772

• Decision Date: 17 October 1978
• Docket Number: No. 50772,50772
• Citation: Batchelor v. Batchelor, 585 P.2d 1120, 1978 OK 135 (Okla. 1978)
• Parties: James Dan BATCHELOR, Appellant, v. Nancy Louise BATCHELOR, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1120

585 P.2d 1120

James Dan BATCHELOR, Appellant, v.Nancy Louise BATCHELOR, Appellee.

No. 50772.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Oct. 17, 1978.

Appeal from the District Court of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma; William R. Saied, Judge.

In this case, we are asked to review the actions of the Trial Court taken in an action involving the termination of support alimony upon remarriage.

Despite the fact that both the Property Settlement Agreement and the consent Decree involved specifically designated the payments involved to be support payments, and despite the fact that Appellee had remarried, the Trial Court, based upon evidence outside the four corners of the instruments involved, found that it was the intent of the parties that such payments not terminate upon remarriage.

Holding that the instruments involved clearly expressed the intent of the parties, that the payments involved were support payments, and that, under such facts, the Trial Court is not free to look beyond the instruments to determine the parties' intent, we reverse the action of the Trial Court, and hold that the payments terminated upon remarriage.

REVERSED.

Robert S. Baker and Jerry L. Salyer, Oklahoma City, for appellant.

Arnold D. Fagin, Warner E. Lovell, Jr., Fagin, Hewett, Mathews & Fagin, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

BARNES, Justice:

Here, the parties entered into a Property Settlement and Support Agreement which was incorporated by reference into the Decree of Divorce.The pertinent provisions of the Property Settlement and Support Agreement are:

"Whereas, it is the desire of said parties finally and for all time to settle and determine their respective property rights together with any and all other rights and claims now existing, or which might exist, including the right to future support of First Party by reason of the marriage relationship.

"III.SHARE OF FIRST PARTY

It is hereby agreed that the said First Party shall receive as her full share of the property the following, which First Party hereby accepts as a fair and equitable property settlement:

"V.PERIODIC PAYMENTS

Second Party shall pay to First Party, Twenty-Four Thousand Two Hundred Dollars ($24,200) as support, over and above the property settlement, to be paid as follows:

"VIII.COMPLETENESS

The legal and practical effects of this Agreement in each and every respect and the financial status of the parties have been fully explained to the parties, and each party acknowledges that this is a fair Agreement and is not the result of any duress or undue influence by either party upon the other or by any person or persons upon either party, and each party further agrees that This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties and that there are no representations, promises, warranties, or covenants other than those expressly set forth herein.

"X.DISCLOSURE

Both parties recognize and admit that there has been a full and complete disclosure to one another of any and all assets owned by either or both of the parties to this Agreement." (Emphasis added)

The pertinent provision of the Decree of Divorce provided:

"III.That the parties hereto have approved and executed an Agreement entitled 'Property Settlement and Support Agreement', whereby they have settled their mutual claims concerning the division of jointly-acquired property, both real and personal, of which either or both of them are seized, possessed, or owned, support, separately-owned property, and payment of the debts of the parties.This signed Agreement has been presented to this Court and examined and this Court finds that the said 'Property Settlement and Support Agreement' is fair and reasonable, and the same is hereby approved and adopted."

It is to be noted that no mention was made concerning remarriage of the wife and its effect on the payment of support alimony.The Appellee remarried, and the Appellant terminated his support payments.

The Appellee then brought this action in the District Court to force the Appellant to continue making the support payments provided by Paragraph V of the Agreement, but Appellee took no action within ninety days, under 12 O.S.Supp.1976, § 1289(B), ¹ for a determination that support was still needed.

The Trial Court found in favor of the Appellee and ordered to the Appellant to resume support payments.The Appellant then brought this appeal from the Trial Court's order.

The sole issue presented is whether a consent divorce decree, which clearly distinguishes support payments from property settlement, is subject to the termination-of-support-on-remarriage provisions of 12 O.S.Supp.1976, § 1289(B), where there was no waiver of the statute by the parties.The Trial Court held that where a consent decree provides for periodic payments for support, said payments do not terminate upon remarriage of the recipient in the absence of a provision for their termination in the agreement or decree of divorce.

The Trial Court and the Appellee rely on Stuart v. Stuart, 555 P.2d 611(Okl.1976), while the Appellant contends that Stuart, supra, is not applicable.

We agree with the Appellant that Stuart, supra, is distinguishable, and that the...