Batdorff v. Farmers' National Bank of Reading

• Citation: 61 Pa. 179
• Parties: Batdorff <I>versus</I> The Farmers' National Bank of Reading.
• Decision Date: 11 May 1869
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

61 Pa. 179

Batdorff versus The Farmers' National Bank of Reading.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

February 19, 1869.

March 4, 1869.

May 11, 1869.

February 19th and March 4th 1869.

Before THOMPSON, C. J., READ, AGNEW, SHARSWOOD and WILLIAMS, JJ.

Error to the District Court of Philadelphia: No. 251, to January Term 1869.

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T. R. Elcock (with whom were T. Cuyler and F. W. Hughes), for plaintiff in error, cited as to the first three specifications, Whitney v. Ferris, 10 Johnson 66; Tuttle v. Cooper, 5 Pick. 414; Jennings v. Ester, 16 Maine 323; Nelson v. Lloyd, 9 Watts 22; McPherson v. Rathbone, 7 Wend. 216; Collyer on Partnership, § 776; Lenhart v. Allen, 8 Casey 312. As to the 4th, 3 Phillips on Ev. 435; Cooper v. Dedrich, 22 Barb. 516. As to the 7th, 2 Phillips on Ev. 905; Patchum v. Ins. Co., 3 Kernan N. Y. 268. As to the 10th, Balt. & Ohio Railroad v. Hoge, 10 Casey 214. As to the 11th, Nieman v. Ward, 1 W. & S. 82; Parker v. Donaldson, 6 Id. 132; Selin v. Snider, 11 S. & R. 319; Relf v. Rupp, 3 W. & S. 21.

R. P. White and Daniel Dougherty, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered, May 11th 1869, by THOMPSON, C. J.

The exceptions to the admission in evidence of the deposition of James L. Nutting, are, so far as anything has been disclosed, all unfounded. The first was general, to the entire deposition. Portions of it were unquestionably testimony, and this would overrule the general objection. If it were evidence for any purpose, as against a general objection, it was admissible. The 2d and 3d exceptions to it, of which the specifications of error are predicated, need not be considered. These assignments of error are totally irregular, and I may add, are without merit, if we at all comprehend them. In view of the nature of the testimony, there was nothing wrong in admitting evidence of the relation existing between the defendant and the Seltzers, as far back as proposed. It might be a means of explaining their relation at a later period. The investigation involved questions of fraud by the defendants and the Seltzers, against creditors, and in such cases great latitude of investigation is allowable. There is no error in the particulars complained of so far. The 5th assignment is not so easily disposed of. It is predicated of a refusal to permit the witness, Sallada, to be asked the following question on cross-examination, — "Are you a creditor of C. A. & A. M Seltzer?" The counsel proposed to follow it, if answered as they expected, with another, "to show that the witness had an interest in the question in controversy, in securing his claim, through making Batdorff liable for Seltzer's debts." The proposition was to show a state of facts from which a jury might be justifiable in inferring a bias in the mind of the witness against the defendant, and therefore to affect his credit. To show bias on behalf of the witness was the right of the defendant, if he could. In Cameron v. Montgomery, 13 S. & R. 128, it was held that the party against whom a witness has testified, may show anything which might in the slightest degree affect his credit, and the judgment in that case was reversed, because the court below refused to allow the witness to be asked, "whether the plaintiff did not buy (the witness's) property at his (the witness's) instance." "It was a circumstance," said Tilghman, C. J., "which might show that the witness was under obligation to him, and this might have had some effect on his evidence, by exhibiting a bias." We cited and approved this rule in Ott v. Heighton, 6 Casey 451, and reversed in that case because it had been disregarded on the trial below. If the witness had himself a claim against the Seltzers, and was called to sustain a claim by a creditor, which was to be secured only by making Batdorff a partner with them, was it not possible, nay, likely, that he might feel a bias for a result which he might suppose would strengthen the probability of success in his own case? It was proper to let the jury consider this in weighing his testimony, and this could be done only by asking the question. It should have been allowed, therefore, and if it disclosed an interest in the question, it would be for the jury to say whether that had any influence to bias, or color his testimony, or not. They would credit him fully or not, just as they would consider him clear of bias or otherwise, in giving testimony. The rules of evidence are the results of experience, and it is best to stand reasonably strictly by them. It is not easy to say how a voyage may end, if the departure is on a wrong course. This error we think sustained.

We are also of opinion that there was error in overruling the offer which constitutes the 6th assignment. As we understand it, it was material, in answer to the plaintiff's testimony, tending to show, that after the sheriff's sale of the machinery of the Seltzers in 1861, and purchase by Batdorff, that the business was carried on for the joint benefit of the Seltzers and Batdorff. The offer was to show that the real estate of the Seltzers,...