Bateman v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah., 8457

Citation7 Utah 2d 221,322 P.2d 381
Decision Date28 February 1958
Docket NumberNo. 8457,8457
Partiesd 221 E. Allen BATEMAN and State Board of Education, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF the STATE OF UTAH, Defendants and Appellants.
CourtSupreme Court of Utah

E. R. Callister, Atty. Gen., H. R. Waldo, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Richards & Bird and Dan S. Bushnell, Salt Lake City, for respondents.

CROCKETT, Justice.

This case arose originally as a suit for declaratory judgment by the University of Utah against the State Board of Examiners and the State Finance Commission. The dispute between the University and those defendants was dealt with in a prior opinion. 1 The State Board of Education intervened to determine its rights relating to both the University and the defendants, the issues between the University and the Board of Education have been resolved by stipulation. There is no dissonance between the Board of Examiners and the Commission of Finance in this action. Their interests being parallel, for the purpose of this decision, we will proceed upon the assumption that the Commission of Finance is the statutorily created administrative arm of the Board of Examiners and consider the rights of the Board of Education relative to it. These parties are hereinafter for brevity referred to simply as 'Examiners' and 'Education.'

Reduced to its simplest terms the dispute is this: Education claims authority to administer the State Department of Education and school system without let or hindrance from Examiners; whereas the latter Board claims authority to examine and approve or disapprove of proposed expenditures, and to exercise general supervisory control of salaries and personnel practices of the Board of Education. 2

Both parties advance plausible arguments in support of their claims to authority based on their respective constitutional origins and legislative implementation. Resolution of the problems presented will be facilitated by examining the constitutional foundation and the statutory structure of the authority of each separately.

The constitutional authority of Education is found in Article X which provides for the establishment of a uniform system of public schools within the state, defines of what it shall be comprised, and in Section 8 thereof vests 'general control and supervision of the Public School System * * * in a State Board of Education, consisting of the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and such other persons as the Legislature may provide. * * *'

The language of Article X sheds little light as to just how the authority of Education should relate to Examiners or to other state departments, nor can any help be found from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, as there is no indication that the matter was ever considered or discussed. However, there was rather extensive discussion as to whether the Superintendent of Public Instruction should be an elective or an appointive position. Considerable sentiment was expressed as to the undesirability of having it directly responsive to political pressures. 3 This attitude reflected in the statement of Delegate Carl G. Maeser, who said, 'I would like to see that office removed as far as possible away from politics.' 4 The important responsibilities and the necessity of high qualifications of the superintendent were also stressed, 5 and it is also true that there was no suggestion or intimation that the superintendent or the Board of Education might be subject to the control of Examiners.

The general purpose thus stated in the Constitution of establishing and maintaining a public school system is implemented in statutes which quite fully set forth the powers and duties of the superintendent and of the Board of Education.

Section 53-3-2 provides in part as follows:

'The state board of education shall be charged with the administration of the system of public instruction, and with general superintendence of the district schools of the state and of the school revenue set apart and appropriated for their support. * * *'

Section 53-3-7 provides:

'The state superintendent with the approval of the state board of education shall prepare and submit to the governor to be included in his budget to be submitted to the legislature, a budget of the requirements of his office including the expenses of the state board of education, for his own and other salaries and wages, office and travel expense, equipment and repairs necessary for carrying out the duties imposed upon the superintendent of public instruction and the state board of education * * *.'

Section 53-3-8 provides:

'The state auditor shall transfer to the state general fund from the uniform school fund to the credit of the state board of education the amount designated by the legislature for the operation of the office of the state superintendent and the state board of education, * * *.'

Section 53-2-8 gives the Superintendent authority to appoint subordinates and fix their salaries:

'The board may appoint such assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants, clerical workers, and other employees, as in the judgment of the board may be necessary to the proper administration and supervision of the public school system. The salaries of such assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants, clerical workers and other employees, shall be fixed by the board and shall be paid from money appropriated for that purpose.' (Emphasis supplied.)

If the above statutes and constitutional provisions stood alone and could be given literal application, there would be no difficulty in determining the scope of the powers of Education. However, when we look at the over-all picture of our law, difficulty is encountered because, as will be seen, these powers are overlapped by others conferred upon Examiners. 6

The Board of Examiners was created by and its authority is rooted in Section 13, Article VII of our Constitution which provides:

'Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General shall constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners, * * *. [specifies duties] They shall, also, constitute a Board of Examiners, with power to examine all claims against the State except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law, and perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law; and no claim against the State, except for salaries and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon by the Legislature without having been considered and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners.'

The question of importance is the extent of the authority conferred by the language, '* * * with power to examine all claims against the state.' This phraseology has given rise to much concern over the reciprocal powers and interrelationships of the departments of our state government. In the first place, we think that the word 'claim' was used in its broadest connotation and we recognize that it is susceptible of a variety of meanings: ranging from a moral claim; or the seeking of legislative largesse; or asserting a privilege; to asserting rights to compensation for property or materials furnished, or salary for services rendered, to the state. But the pivot of the controversy has devolved upon the term 'to examine.' On the one hand, Education espouses the view that the power 'to examine all claims against the state' merely denotes an auditing function; and on the other, Examiners takes the position that it confers plenary power to examine into the advisability and necessity of any expenditure or proposed obligation of the state.

The first facet of Education's argument against the power claimed by Examiners is that the framers of the Constitution envisioned Section 13, above quoted, as legislative in nature, intended to be subsequently modified and controlled by legislative enactments such as the statutes conferring powers on Education. They emphasize that such was the plain import of its first clause, 'Until otherwise provided by law, * * *' which they insist modified the entire section. Without going into the detail of the arguments pro and con on this facet of the subject it is readily seen that attempting to give that proviso application to each of the subsequent parts of the section gives rise to some difficulty grammatically. I. e. it would read: 'Until otherwise provided by law, * * * [they shall] * * * perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law.' Absent knowledge of the facts concerning its adoption, the most natural meaning would be that it applies only to the first sentence dealing with the membership of the Board of State Prison Commissioners, and by parallel reasoning, to the second sentence relating only to the membership of the Board of Examiners.

Education points to the constitutional convention in support of its reasoning that the entire section was intended to be subject to future legislation. Sections 12 through 15 establish various administrative agencies: Section 12, the Board of Pardons; Section 13, the State Prison Commissioners and Board of Examiners; Section 14, Insane Asylum Commissioners; Section 15, Reform School Commissioners. At the Convention, a motion was made to strike all of the sections on the theory that they dealt with legislative matters. During subsequent debates, in which section 12 was most often mentioned, delegate Thurman observed:

'I do not see why this matter cannot be left to the Legislature. Of course, this leaves the matter where it is now, but it gives to the Legislature the right to create a board such as is here named, or any other kind of a board of pardons. * * *

Mr. Varian. Mr. Chairman, taking the propositions in their order, I would suggest, in speaking to the substitute offered by my friend from Utah County, that there is no reason why we should not leave it to the Legislature. * * *' 7

and at the final reading, first Section 12 and then Sections 13, 14 and 15, were each amended by...

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