Bateman v. Crum
| Decision Date | 23 January 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 41419,41419 |
| Citation | 186 Kan. 1,348 P.2d 639 |
| Parties | David D. BATEMAN, By and Through His Father and Legal Guardian, Bertrand D. Bateman, Appellant, v. Charles Edwin CRUM, a Minor, By and Through His Father and Natural Guardian, Edwin E. Crum, Appellee. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident resulting in judgment for defendant, the record is examined and it is held that the trial court did not err (1) in refusing to set aside the answer to special question No. 7, (2) in overruling plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground that the answers to the special questions were inconsistent with the general verdict, and (3) in holding that the general verdict was supported by the evidence.
John F. Stites, Manhattan, argued the cause, and Richard D. Rogers, Manhattan, was with him on the briefs, for appellant.
Charles S. Arthur, Manhattan, and Arthur S. Humphrey, Junction City, argued the cause, and Charles D. Green, Manhattan, was with them on the briefs, for appellee.
This was an action for damages arising out of an automobile accident. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.
The petition alleged that plaintiff (appellant), David D. Bateman, was driving his automobile west on U. S. Highway No. 24, approximately one mile west of Manhattan, at about 3:00 p. m., and Louise Pence [not a party to this action] was driving her car east on the same highway; that she started to pass the car of defendant (appellee), Charles Edwin Crum, which was parked parellel to and on the south side of the highway in front of his home, headed in an easterly direction, when defendant, in a negligent and careless manner, drove out onto highway No. 24, causing Mrs. Pence to swerve to the left side thereof, where her auto collided with plaintiff's automobile. The petition further alleged that plaintiff received permanent and progressive injuries and damages which were the direct and proximate result of the negligent acts of defendant in driving toward the highway so as to cause Mrs. Pence to reasonably believe there was immediate danger of a collision, in failing to give any proper signal or warning to any approaching vehicles that he was about to enter onto the highway, and in driving onto the highway when Mrs. Pence's auto was in such close proximity as to cause immediate danger of collision which was the cause of her driving her auto to the left lane of traffic, where she struck plaintiff's automobile.
Defendant's answer, insofar as pertinent, denied plaintiff's allegations and alleged that the collision was proximately caused by the concurrent negligence of Mrs. Pence in driving her auto in the left lane of the highway and of plaintiff in failing to turn his auto aside when he saw or could have seen Mrs. Pence driving in the wrong lane. Plaintiff replied with a general denial.
On the issues thus joined, the parties presented their evidence and the cause was submitted to the jury under the instructions of the court, and at the same time certain special questions were submitted for the jury's consideration, to all of which there was no objection by either party. The jury returned into court its general verdict as follows:
'We the Jury, impaneled and sworn, in the above-entitled cause, do upon our oaths find for the defendant.
'That even though the forward motion of the Crum car constituted a potential hazard, it is the belief of the Jury that the proximate cause of the accident was Louise Pence.'
[The italicized portion of the verdict was in the handwriting of the jury and not a part of the form submitted by the court.]
At the same time the jury returned the answers to the special questions submitted by the court:
'1. Do you find defendant guilty of any negligence? Answer: Yes, contributory.
'2. If you answer Question No. 1 in the affirmative, state what the negligence of defendant consisted of. Answer: Starting his car in motion.
'3. Do you find that David Bateman was negligent in any respect contributing to the collision? Answer: No.
'4. How far to the north onto the shoulder could David Bateman have driven his car safely? Answer: Because of condition of shoulder he could not have driven on it with safety.
'5. Could David Bateman have turned north onto the shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision with the Pence vehicle? Answer: No.
'6. What prevented David Bateman from seeing Louise Pence on the wrong side of the road in time to have turned aside to avoid the collision? Answer: Time element.
Following the overruling of plaintiff's post-trial motions, he appeals, contending that (1) the court erred in not striking the answer to special question No. 7 on the ground it was a conclusion of law and in contradiction of the answers to special questions Nos. 1 and 2, (2) the answers to the special questions were inconsistent with the general verdict, and (3) the verdict was contrary to the evidence.
The record reveals that on the day of the accident the weather was rainy and cloudy, highway No. 24, which runs east and west and 'up and down,' was blacktop and wet and the shoulders were muddy, and at...
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Henderson v. Kansas Power & Light Co.
...See, also, the recent cases of McKinley-Winter Livestock Commission Co. v. Fletcher, 185 Kan. 637, 347 P.2d 248, and Bateman v. Crum, 186 Kan. 1, 348 P.2d 639, which are directly in point. Nowhere does the plaintiff argue that he made any request for special questions concerning contributor......
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Schenck v. Thompson
...a question of law where all the evidence upon which a party relies is undisputed and susceptible of only one inference. (Bateman v. Crum, 186 Kan. 1, 378 P.2d 639; Kendrick v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 182 Kan. 249, 320 P.2d 1061; Railway Co. v. Columbia, 65 Kan. 390, 69 P. 338, 58 L.R.A......
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Anderson v. Blackfoot Livestock Commission Co.
...always a question for the jury. It becomes a question of law only where the facts are agreed upon and are not in dispute.' Bateman v. Crum, 186 Kan. 1, 348 P.2d 639. In Mason v. Hillsdale Highway Dist., 65 Idaho 833, 154 P.2d 490, this court stated as follows: 'The rule derived from the fol......
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Taylor v. Johnson
...has arisen as to whether the judgment entered by the trial court in this case is consistent with the very recent case of Bateman v. Crum, 186 Kan. 1, 348 P.2d 639, 641. The Bateman case involved an automobile collision on a state highway in which three automobiles had a part. Plaintiff was ......