Bateman v. State

Decision Date07 January 1971
Docket NumberNo. 6,6
PartiesPerry Clyde BATEMAN v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Joseph Casula, Riverdale, for appellant.

James F. Truitt, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Arthur A. Marshall, Jr., State's Atty., and Howard S. Chasanow, Asst. State's Atty., for Prince George's County on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before ANDERSON, MORTON and MOYLAN, JJ.

MOYLAN, Judge.

The appellant, Perry Clyde Bateman, was convicted in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County by a jury, presided over by Judge Ralph W. Powers, of two separate murders in the second degree.

On appeal he raises four contentions:

(1) That the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury on the subject of voluntary intoxication,

(2) That the trial court committed reversible error by not instructing the jury on 'heat of passion',

(3) That a question put to a witness by the prosecutor constituted reversible error, and

(4) That the trial court committed reversible error in commenting on defense counsel's closing argument.

At approximately 2:30 a. m. on December 14, the appellant was awakened by a telephone call which turned out to be a call to a wrong number. At that point he discovered that his wife, who had gone out earlier to purchase a six-pack of beer, was not yet at home. He thereupon drove by several traverns in the area as well as the homes of several friends searching for his wife. He ten found his wife's car parked on Greig Street in Seat Pleasant and upon recognizing the car proceeded up to a second floor apartment wherein he heard his wife's laughter. He stood outside the apartment for a few minutes and then went back to his wife's car where he armed himself with a .32 caliber revolver taken from underneath the dashboard.

He returned to the apartment, knocked on the door and entered. There was a party in progress with at least ten adult persons drinking and listening to music. The appellant's wife was sitting on a settee with the deceased, Joe Rawlings, and there was evidence that Rawlings was hugging the appellant's wife at the time he walked into the room. The appellant than shot his wife, who ultimately recovered, and shot Rawlings, who ultimately died. A few minutes later he shot a third person in the apartment, Henry Carl Stone, who also died from his wounds. There was further evidence that on the day before the murders, the appellant had warned the deceased Rawlings to stay away from his wife.

I.

It is true, of course, that it is incumbent upon the trial court, when requested in a criminal case, to give an advisory instruction on every essential question or point of law supported by the evidence, Bruce v. State, 218 Md. 87, 145 A.2d 428; and Mock v. State, 2 Md.App. 771, 237 A.2d 811, but, for purposes of this case, the emphasis is upon the words supported by the evidence. In commenting on that degree of intoxication necessary to vitiate specific criminal intent, this Court held in Michael v. State, 1 Md.App. 243, 248, 229 A.2d 145, 148:

'The accused must do more than simply raise the issue of drunkenness to establish a defense. * * * He must persuade the triers of fact that, under the circumstances, he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the specific mental intent or of possessing the mental state which is an essential element of the crime for which he is being prosecuted. To establish a valid defense, the appellant must show that he was so intoxicated that he was robbed of his mental faculties, and he will be considered criminally responsible as long as he retains control of his mental faculties sufficiently to appreciate what he is doing.'

The essential issue to be considered in those cases where voluntary intoxication is advanced in derogation of criminal responsibility was framed by Dubs v. State, 2 Md.App. 524, 540, 235 A.2d 764, 773:

'The issue in the instant case was not whether the appellant was drunk at the time of the commission of the crime; it was whether he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of forming the requisite intent.'

Under circumstances very similar to those at bar, this Court in Mock v. State, supra, considered the propriety of the refusal by the trial judge to instruct a jury in a murder case on the effect of voluntary intoxication on the formation of criminal intent. Mock, as the appellant here, was convicted of murder in the second degree. Mock, as the appellant here, requested an instruction to the effect that the influence of alcohol on the defendant's mind could be enough to negate the presence of malice and therefore to lower the felonious intent from the murderous to that supporting only manslaughter. This Court upheld the action of the lower court in Mock in not giving the requested instruction to the jury on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. In the Mock case there was testimony that the defendant there had consumed two vodka collins and eight beers within a period of ten hours before the murder. There was testimony from Mock's financee that Mock was not walking well, that his speech was slurred, that he drove his car with a flat tire on the wrong side of the road, and that 'he seemed to be in a daze'-all at a time one to two hours before the murderous assault. In the opinion of the financee, Mock was drunk. On the other hand, Mock himself testified that although he was 'feeling the beer' and was 'high', that he was not drunk. This Court concluded in 2 Md.App. at p. 775, 237 A.2d at p. 813:

'* * * we think that there was insufficient evidence of drunkenness to support the jury charge requested by appellant. The relevant test is not, as contained in the proposed instruction, whether the accused was 'under the influence of alcohol,' but rather whether 'he was so intoxicated as to be incapable of entertaining the specific mental intent or of possessing the mental state which is an essential element of the crime for which he is being prosecuted,' viz., that he was so intoxicated that he was robbed of his mental faculties to a degree that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent when the act was committed. * * *

We think such evidence, viewed in the light of appellant's actions after striking the decedent, as heretofore set forth, does not constitute evidence of drunkenness sufficient to support the requested charge.'

The posture of the case at bar, as of the Mock case, is significantly different from that in Avey v. State, 249 Md. 385, 240 A.2d 107, reversing Avey v. State, 1 Md.App. 178, 228 A.2d 614. In the Avey case the critical question was the internal adequacy of the charge on intoxication itself, and not whether a sufficient factual predicate had been laid to require a charge on intoxication in the first instance. Avey furthermore was dealing with the crimes of assault with intent to murder and storehouse breaking, both crimes requiring a specific criminal intent whereas murder in the second degree requires a mere general criminal intent. In Avey as well, the defendant described his alcoholic intake in the five or six hours immediately proceding the crime as including 'a pint of moonshine,' and 'nine or ten beers-maybe more.' Avey further described his own condition as 'quite intoxicated,' 'still under the influence,' and 'pretty well plastered.'

In the case before us, the appellant did not take the stand to describe his condition at all. Six eyewitnesses to the murders were called by the State and none of them noticed any indication of any drinking at all on the part of the appellant, let alone intoxication. A witness, Edith Haines, stated that the appellant did not seem drunk and was not out of his head. A witness, John Hall, described the appellant's very articulate demeanor as he entered the apartment where the party was in progress and his well-controlled actions after the shootings. The host of the party, Jerry Harbaugh, described in detail the appellant's well-articulated greeting to him as the appellant entered the apartment as well as the appellant's conversation after the shootings as the appellant probed to find out who had organized the party and was 'responsible' for it. A witness, Billy Hutchins, testified that right after the shootings, he asked the appellant if the appellant knew what he was doing and that he received the reply, 'Yes, I know what I'm doing.'

Detective Sergeant Baeschlin testified that when he arrived at the appellant's home within an hour of the shootings, the appellant was telephoning his sister to have her provide for his children. (In Mock we found a rational post-shooting telephone call to a hospital of significance in negating any debilitating degree of intoxication. Mock, supra, 2 Md.App. p. 775, 237 A.2d 811) The appellant asked the sergeant if he had a warrant. The appellant then informed the sergeant of the whereabouts of the murder weapon. The sergeant along with Detective Flaherty was with the appellant for several hours during a ride to police headquarters and an interrogation session in which the appellant gave a full version of the evening's events, although he insisted that neither written notes nor a tape recording be made of the conversation. The sergeant testified that the appellant appeared sober and sane and well-oriented. It was only in the course of the cross-examination of Detective Flaherty about the oral statement given by the appellant that any mention was made of the appellant's drinking. The detective recounted that appellant had said he had had some beer and some vodka at some time before lying down and going to sleep on the evening of December 13. The only other testimony dealing with the appellant's drinking anything at all was by an employee of Johnnie's Tavern who testified that the appellant was in the tavern between 4:30 and 6:00 p. m. on December 13 and during that time had two cans of beer.

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13 cases
  • Evans v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • November 25, 1975
    ...where the evidence, by whomsoever produced, is not legally sufficient to generate a legitimate jury issue in that regard. Bateman v. State, 10 Md.App. 630, 272 A.2d 64; Mock v. State, 2 Md.App. 771, 237 A.2d 811. We have held that an instruction should not be given on the subject of insanit......
  • Bey v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 26, 2001
    ...denied, 326 Md. 661, 607 A.2d 6 (1992); Jones v. State, 37 Md.App. 511, 378 A.2d 9, cert. denied, 281 Md. 739 (1977); Bateman v. State, 10 Md.App. 30[630], 272 A.2d 64, cert. denied, 261 Md. 721 (1971). Judge Moylan suggested the following doctrinal explanation: Intoxication can negate any ......
  • Cox v. State
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    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • December 5, 1986
    ...He cites Biggs v. State, 56 Md.App. 638, 649, 468 A.2d 669 (1983), cert. denied, 299 Md. 425, 474 A.2d 218 (1984); Bateman v. State, 10 Md.App. 630, 637, 272 A.2d 64, cert. denied, 261 Md. 721 (1971); Mock v. State, 2 Md.App. 771, 774-75, 237 A.2d 811 cert. denied, 250 Md. 732 (1968), in su......
  • Tripp v. State
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    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 13, 1977
    ...should be given where the evidence is not legally sufficient to generate a genuine jury issue as to intoxication. Bateman v. State, 10 Md.App. 630, 272 A.2d 64; Mock v. State, 2 Md.App. 771, 237 A.2d 811. Insanity would extinguish the mens rea completely but no instruction on that issue sho......
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