Bates v. Chater

• Decision Date: 16 May 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-3411,94-3411
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14607B Jeffrey BATES, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, * Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 529

54 F.3d 529

47 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 635, Unempl.Ins.Rep. (CCH) P 14607B

Jeffrey BATES, Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security,

^*

Appellee.

No. 94-3411.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted March 15, 1995.

Decided May 16, 1995.

John August Bowman, Davenport, IA, argued (Michael DePree, on the brief), for appellant.

John Beamer, Asst. U.S. Atty., Des Moines, IA, argued (Gary L. Howard, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BEAM, Circuit Judge, FLOYD R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Jeffrey Bates appeals from the district court's ¹ order affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) to deny Bates disability insurance benefits. After reviewing the record, we affirm.

Bates applied for benefits in July 1991, and alleged that he had been disabled since he hurt his back in September 1990. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. Bates requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).

The evidence before the ALJ showed that Bates was born in 1959, was married with four children, had a GED, and had formerly worked as a truck driver, dock worker, cement truck driver, mechanic, cook, and mover. After injuring his back at work, he underwent a lumbar laminectomy to relieve herniated disks. Bates had not worked since his injury, although he went through extensive physical and vocational rehabilitation, and had looked for work as part of his vocational rehabilitation. Bates testified that he was disabled because of the combination of physical limitations on his movements and strength, and chronic pain caused by his back injury. He also testified that he was depressed and had a hard time concentrating.

At the hearing, it was uncontested that Bates could not return to his past relevant work, most of which was classified as medium to very heavy work. Thus, the key to this case is whether the ALJ properly posed the hypotheticals upon which the vocational expert (VE) based his testimony that Bates could perform sedentary work. The first hypothetical presented a claimant who was 32 years old and possessed a GED; who could lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; who could climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl on an occasional basis; and who could sit 45 to 60 minutes without interruption and walk for longer periods. Based upon this hypothetical, the VE testified that the claimant could perform sedentary, unskilled work. Bates's counsel stipulated to this conclusion. For the second hypothetical, the ALJ added the limitation that the claimant could not perform constant bending and twisting throughout the day and could only drive a maximum of 30 minutes at one time. In response, the VE testified that the claimant would still be able to perform the same unskilled sedentary jobs as before. The third hypothetical posed by the ALJ added the restriction that the claimant would have to take unscheduled rest breaks at least once a day, lasting from 15 to 60 minutes. The VE testified that this claimant would be precluded from competitive employment because he would miss too much time from work. Bates's counsel then posed a fourth hypothetical to the VE, based on the earlier three, and adding the restrictions that the claimant would need to make postural changes every hour and could not reach overhead more than occasionally; that frequent kneeling, bending, stooping, squatting, and twisting at the waist would result in excessive pain; and that pain existed such that it affected his appetite and sleep and caused depression. In response to this hypothetical, the VE testified that the claimant would be precluded from competitive employment because he could not maintain a consistent work pace and concentration.

The ALJ concluded that Bates was not disabled and thus not entitled to benefits. Evaluating Bates's complaints of pain in accordance with Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.1984), the ALJ noted that the medical evidence showed that Bates's exertional limits allowed him to perform light or sedentary work. The medical evidence also showed that Bates failed to follow his physical therapy regimen and lost strength and conditioning; and that he took painkillers and muscle relaxants to control his pain, and reported no side effects to his doctors. Further, he was able to carry things, such as groceries and his daughter, and his daily activities included helping with vacuuming, dishes, laundry, and occasionally driving and going shopping. The ALJ also noted that Bates had had a good work history in the past, and although not steadily motivated, had looked for work as part of his vocational rehabilitation, and had once decided not to even apply for a job because he felt the pay was too low. The ALJ found Bates's complaints of disabling pain were "exaggerated" and not credible. The ALJ determined that, while Bates could not return to his past relevant work, his admitted activities and the capacities described by his physicians showed he had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. Sec. 404.1567(a); and, based on the testimony of the VE, that Bates could perform unskilled, sedentary work.

The Appeals Council denied Bates's request for review, the district court affirmed, and this appeal followed.

In reviewing the Secretary's decision to deny disability benefits, we will affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1493 (8th Cir.1995). "Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the Secretary's conclusion." House v. Shalala, 34 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir.1994). Evidence that detracts from the Secretary's decision is considered, but even if inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the decision will be affirmed where the evidence as a whole supports either outcome. Chamberlain, 47 F.3d at 1493; Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 821 (8th Cir.1992). As we have stated many times, we do not reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ, e.g., Loving v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 16 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir.1994), and it is "the statutory duty of the ALJ, in the first instance, to assess the credibility of the claimant and other witnesses." Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir.1992).

It is uncontested that under the five-step burden-shifting framework...