Bates v. Franson
| Decision Date | 11 June 1936 |
| Docket Number | No. 51,April Term.,51 |
| Citation | 276 Mich. 79,267 N.W. 595 |
| Parties | BATES v. FRANSON. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Action by Gilbert Bates against Joseph W. Franson. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Dickinson County; Frank A. Bell, judge.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
MacAllister & Brown, of Iron Mountain, for appellant.
C. D. Dwyer, of Crystal Falls (E. J. Dundon, of Iron Mountain, of counsel), for appellee.
On June 30, 1935, at about 1:30 a. m., a 1929 Oldsmobile coach, while driven by plaintiff, its owner, in a northerly direction, collided with a 1934 Ford sedan, while driven by defendant, its owner, in a southerly direction. The collision occurred about a mile south of Channing, Mich., on M-95, a state trunk highway whose hard-packed gravel road is about 25 feet in width and without a demarcation line in the center. The night was clear, and there were no obstructions on the road. The cars collided about 200 feet south of the apex of a slight slope or hill from which the road curves to the left in a southerly course. The curve is described as long and sweeping, so that the momentum of a car going south would have a tendency to swerve it to the west of right side of the road, while a car going north would not be so affected. Plaintiff suffered severe injuries and recovered a judgment on verdict of $9,595 against defendant.
Defendant claims that the verdict was against the great weight of the testimony. Plaintiff's car was being driven at the rate of 35 to 40 miles per hour; defendant's at less than 40 miles per hour. Plaintiff asserts that he was traveling on his right or easterly side of the road, and that he drove to the very extreme right when defendant's car bore down on him. Defendant, with equal positiveness, testified to the contrary, claiming that he drove on his right side or westerly side of the road and that the collision occurred through plaintiff's driving left of the center of the road instead of remaining on the right side. Plaintiff's two passengers corroborated his testimony, while defendant's three passengers upheld his version of the accident. Defendant contends that the testimony of plaintiff's two passengers should be discredited because they were interested in the outcome of the litigation because of claims for injuries sustained in the same collision. The record does not show that they asserted such claims. Their interest as well as a contradictory statement alleged to have been previously made by one of plaintiff's witnesses and also plaintiff's claim that two of the passengers of defendant's car were seated in the rear seat and would not have noticed how defendant was driving are all fair arguments to the jury, who must judge the credibility of witnesses. If there is sufficient testimony to sustain the verdict, we may not disturb it. Defendant, however, contends that the physical facts after the accident show that he was on the right side of the road. He calls attention to testimony in regard to a rut on the west side of the road, allegedly caused by plaintiff's car, but admits that oil and broken glass from plaintiff's car were found on the east of plaintiff's side of the road. After the accident, the Oldsmobile stopped on the right side of the road facing in a northwesterly direction at about a 45-degree angle across the highway with its rear wheels on the right edge of the highway going north, while the Ford V-8 was on its right side of the highway, facing south, close to the right or west edge of the highway. Plaintiff's witnesses claim that the distance between the two cars after the collision was 25 feet, while some of defendant's witnesses estimated the distance to be from 50 to 60 feet. Witnesses for plaintiff stated they saw no such rut and others that they found none after searching for one. They all agree that both cars after the accident were incapacitated. Unfortunately, physical science does not furnish us with any satisfactory rules by which we may deduce with any certainty from physical facts after the collision just what occurred immediately prior to and during the impact. There are too many variables that must be considered, the age and condition of...
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Wright v. Barron, 12.
...Very important discussion on this subject occurs in Prove v. Interstate Stages, 250 Mich. 478, 490, 231 N.W. 41, and Bates v. Franson, 276 Mich. 79, 82, 267 N.W. 595. We cannot say that the jury could not have properly concluded that the impact of the left front corner of defendant's truck ......
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Hartley v. A. I. Rodd Lumber Co.
...testimony on her examination in chief, and contrary to the facts as stipulated by counsel. Plaintiff calls attention to Bates v. Franson, 276 Mich. 79, 267 N.W. 595, 596, where it is said: ‘Unfortunately, physical science does not furnish us with any satisfactory rules by which we may deduc......
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People v. Foster
...The interest and bias of a witness go to the question of credibility and the trier of facts determines credibility. Bates v. Franson (1936), 276 Mich. 79, 267 N.W. 595. We are not persuaded the findings objected to are clearly erroneous. GCR 1963, 517.1, and defendant did not object to call......
- Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Atherton, 149.