Bates v. Morris

• Decision Date: 02 May 1893
• Citation: 13 So. 138,101 Ala. 282
• Parties: BATES v. MORRIS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

13 So. 138

101 Ala. 282

BATES v. MORRIS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 2, 1893

Appeal from city court of Birmingham; H. A. Sharpe, Judge.

In an action by Mary Morris against W. E. Bates judgment was rendered for plaintiff, and garnishment was issued and served upon supposed creditors of defendant. Cora Bates instituted a claim to the money held under the garnishment. Judgment was rendered in favor of the judgment creditor, and claimant appeals. Reversed.

On February 18, 1887, W. E. Bates became indebted to the plaintiff, and, on failure to pay said indebtedness, Mary Morris, the plaintiff, brought suit against him, and obtained judgment thereon in the sum of $100 on April 26, 1890. Execution being returned "No property found" on July 21, 1891, garnishment was issued on the judgment, and served on St. Pierre Bros., and in their answer the garnishees acknowledged indebtedness to W. E. Bates, and suggested that the money in his hands was claimed to be the property of Cora W. Bates. After having been duly served with notice, Cora W. Bates instituted a claim to the money in the hands of the garnishees. The claimant claimed the money in the hands of the garnishees, and based her claim upon the following facts, which her testimony tended to show: Prior to 1887 the claimant earned certain money by her own labor, and with her husband's consent was allowed to have and enjoy the proceeds thereof. This money, together with other money loaned her by her brother, amounting to $3,500, she loaned to her husband, W. E. Bates, defendant in the original suit. On February 25, 1889, her husband, W. E. Bates, being unable to pay her the money borrowed, and being, as she testified, an intemperate and improvident man, he conveyed to her in satisfaction of said indebtedness his undivided one-half interest in the leasehold interest and rights to the premises which had been rented to St. Pierre Bros. There was some testimony for the claimant that the debt was the full value of W. E. Bates' interest in the leasehold estate. There was other testimony going to show that the property interest conveyed exceeded in value the amount of the indebtedness. The claimant was in possession of her half interest of the leasehold estate from said 25th day of February, 1889, down to the time of this litigation, and it was shown that the lease had yet to run a little less than six years from the date of the trial. There was evidence introduced for the plaintiff in the original suit tending to show that at the time of making the deed to his wife of the leasehold interest W. E. Bates was insolvent, but this fact was not known to his wife. The plaintiff in the original suit introduced one Miles, who, after having testified that he was acquainted with the market value of real estate in Birmingham when the conveyance was made to claimant by W. E. Bates, was asked this question: "What, on February 28, 1889, was the market value of the leasehold interest in the premises, made and referred to by the witnesses as belonging to the claimant, running nine years, and bringing in a rental of $1,424 net, for half interest, with buildings belonging to lessee at termination of lease?" The claimant objected to the introduction of this question, and duly excepted to the court's overruling her objection. Upon the witness answering, "$12,000," the claimant objected to the answer, and duly excepted to the court's overruling her objection. W. E. Bates, the husband of the claimant, and the defendant in the original suit, was present during the trial of the present cause, but was not called to testify by either party, and he did not testify. Upon the introduction of all the evidence the claimant requested the court to give, among others, the following charges: "(5) The court charges the jury that the mere fact that claimant failed to introduce her husband as a witness in this case is not to be considered by the jury as a circumstance against her, but it is a circumstance that can be considered by the jury for or against her, as they may see fit under all the evidence in the case." "(7) Even if the jury believe from the evidence that in making a conveyance to his wife, which was introduced and read to the jury, W. E. Bates intended to defraud his creditors, this would not affect the claimant to the property so conveyed unless she participated in the fraud." The court refused to give each of these charges and the claimant duly excepted. The court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave the following written charges to the jury, and the claimant separately excepted to each of them as given: (1) "The jury are charged that before the plaintiff can be defeated in this action the claimant must show that the transaction between the claimant and her husband, namely, the conveyance made by him to her of the property in controversy, was for a fair and valuable consideration, and that in determining whether such transaction was fair and just they can look to the fact that W. E. Bates was not examined as a witness in this trial." (2) "I charge you, gentlemen of the jury that if you believe from the evidence that the transfer of the property in controversy made by W. E. Bates to his wife (the claimant) was made for the purpose of hindering delaying, or defrauding the creditors of W. E. Bates, you must find for the plaintiff."

Lane & White, for appellant.

Guegg & Thornton, for appellee.

STONE C.J.

The issue formed between the parties questioned the bona fides as to the creditors of the husband of the appellant of the transfer he had made to her of his right and interest in the lease executed to him and Beasley by James Wilson and Minnie Constantine. The transfer purports to have been made in consideration and for the payment of an antecedent indebtedness of the husband. If the debt was real, the pivotal inquiry was whether there was such disparity between its amount and the value of the leasehold interest as to be indicative of fraud; whether the appellant had bargained for and received overpayment, or payment in excess of her just demand. Bank v. Smith, 93 Ala. 97, 9 South. Rep 548; Pollock v. Meyer, (Ala.) 11 South. Rep. 385. To this inquiry the evidence of the witness Miles was directed, and we do not perceive that it is subject to any just objection. If the question eliciting the evidence was in form objectionable, or if its hypothesis was, as is here insisted, broader than the evidence to which it refers, this was matter of special objection, which, if it had been made,...