Bateson v. Bateson

Decision Date06 September 1940
Docket NumberNo. 23.,23.
Citation294 Mich. 426,293 N.W. 705
PartiesBATESON v. BATESON et al.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Suit by Samuel R. Bateson against George R. Bateson, individually and as trustee, and others to set aside a trust deed, on ground that it was procured by fraud, and on ground that one of its provisions suspended power of alienation beyond two lives in being, and, therefore, was void by statute. From an adverse decree, the defendants appeal.

Decree in accordance with opinion.

NORTH, J., BUSHNELL, C. J., and McALLISTER, J., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery; Homer Ferguson, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Atkinson, Donnelly & Lyon, of Detroit, for appellants.

Charles F. Meyler and Leo F. Covey, both of Detroit, for appellee.

WIEST, Justice.

This is a bill by a father to set aside a deed of trust to his son, defendant George F. Bateson, on the ground that it was procured by fraud and one of its provisions suspended power of alienation beyond two lives in being, and, therefore, void by statute. Comp.Laws 1929, §§ 12934, 12935, Stat.Ann. §§ 26.14, 26.15.

The circuit judge found no fraud and that the deed expressed the then intention of plaintiff but inasmuch as one provision was void and the full purpose of plaintiff was rendered abortive thereby set the deed aside.

Upon review we do not find the alleged fraud established by the proofs, and in that respect the decree is affirmed. The court was in error in holding the valid provisions in the deed void by reason of the invalid provision.

Defendants, granted claimed valid rights in the deed of trust, appealed and claim the rule applied to testamentary trusts applies in this case, and grants in the deed, not in violation of the statute, are separable and not rendered void by the invalid provision.

Plaintiff was 76 years of age at the time he executed the deed in December, 1936, was a widower, and practically blind, but of sound mind, had two living sons of mature years, and a grandson, the son of a deceased son, and was desirous of disposing of his real estate, with retention of the income during his lifetime. December 14, 1936, plaintiff, by deed, conveyed his real estate holdings to his son George F. Bateson, trustee, who was to pay the net income from the trust property, after provision for charges and expenses, to the grantor for and during his life. At the death of the grantor the deed provided that the trustee: (a) Convey an undivided 4/10th interest in the fee of said property to grantor's son, George F. Bateson, and thereupon as to such 4/10th portion this trust shall cease. If George F. Bateson should die prior to the death of grantor, then the successor trustee shall upon death of grantor convey the above referred to undivided 4/10th interest of all the described property in equal shares of 1/2 each to Jennie Wooley Bateson, his wife, and George F. Bateson, Jr., his son, whereupon this trust as to such portion shall cease. If either be not then living then the survivor shall receive conveyance of the entire 4/10 interest.'

The grant in the deed of trust to his son Samuel R. Bateson was as follows: (b) Hold in trust an undivided 4/10 interest in the fee of said trust property and pay the net income from said 4/10 interest after paying the costs and expenses of carrying out this trust as to such share, to grantor's son, Samuel R. Bateson, Jr., for and during his life. Upon the death of the said Samuel R. Bateson, Jr., this fee of 4/10ths of the original trust property shall be conveyed in equal shares of 1/3 each to Hattie Bateson, his wife, and Harriet and Dorothy Bateson, his daughters, or the survivor or survivors of them, whereupon this trust as to such portion shall cease. If the said Samuel R. Bateson, Jr. should die prior to the death of the grantor, then the trustee or successor trustee shall upon the death of the grantor convey this fee is 4/10 of the original trust property in equal shares of 1/3 each to Hattie Bateson, his wife, and Harriet and Dorothy Bateson, his daughters, or the survivor or survivors of them, whereupon this trust as to such portion shall cease.'

The grant in the deed of trust to the grandson, James Bateson, was as follows:

(c) Hold in trust an undivided 2/10 interest in the fee of said trust property and pay the net income from said 2/10 interest after paying the costs and expenses (and any taxes) of carrying out this trust as to such share, to grantor's grandson, James Bateson, for and during the period of 15 years from date of grantor's death, at the end of which time the trustee shall convey this fee of said 2/10 or original trust property to said James Bateson and thereupon this trust as to such portion shall cease. If said James Bateson should die within the above referred period of 15 years from date of grantor's death without leaving a wife and/or child or children, then the trustee shall convey 1/2 of this undivided 2/10 interest in the fee of said trust property to the grantor's son, George F. Bateson, and thereupon as to 1/10 portion this trust shall cease. The remaining 1/10 portion shall be held in trust by the trustee for disposition to the persons mentioned in paragraph B of this instrument and under exactly those same terms and conditions and at the conclusion of these duties this trust as to such 1/10 portion shall cease. If the same James Bateson should die prior to the death of grantor, then the trustee shall upon death of grantor dispose of this undivided 2/10 interest in all of the above described property to the same persons and in the same manner as provided for above, in the event he died during the above referred period of 15 years.

‘If however the said James Bateson should die within the above referred to period, 15 years from date of grantor's death, leaving a wife and/or child or children, then the fee of 2/10 interest upon which income only was therefore paid to him, shall thereupon be by the trustee hereunder conveyed in equal shares to such wife and/or child or children or survivors of them outright.'

If the needs of the grantor so required, the trustee was empowered to sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise deal with the trust property to the same extent as the grantor could if still the owner thereof.

The trust deed grant of the 2/10 interest suspended the power of alienation during the lifetime of the grantor and for 15 years thereafter. The grantor is still living. Upon execution of the deed there were no persons in being by whom an...

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3 cases
  • Armington v. Meyer
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1967
    ...of the execution of the trust instrument is controlling on the question of whether one grant is severable from another. Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705. The general rule favors severability. As the court said in Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 257, 5 A. 687, 'But the princ......
  • Kunce v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 14, 1985
    ...of the execution of the trust instrument is controlling on the question of whether one grant is severable from another. Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705. The general rule favors As the court said in Bristol v. Bristol, 53 Conn. 242, 257, 5 A. 687, 692: "But the principle to b......
  • In re Dingler's Estate
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • October 13, 1947
    ...264. Plaintiffs, however, contend that the will confers upon the trustee a mere right and not a power of sale, and cite Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705, as authority for the proposition that the power of alienation has here been suspended. Even so, the suspension cannot exce......

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