Batiste v. City of Beaumont, No. 1:05-CV-109.

• Court: United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Court of Eastern District Texas
• Writing for the Court: Clark
• Citation: 421 F.Supp.2d 969
• Docket Number: No. 1:05-CV-109.
• Decision Date: 10 November 2005
• Parties: Brenda BATISTE v. CITY OF BEAUMONT, City of Beaumont Police Department, Tom Scoefield, Paul Perrit, Ray E. Beck, and Darlene Wisby

421 F.Supp.2d 969 Brenda BATISTE
v.
CITY OF BEAUMONT, City of Beaumont Police Department, Tom Scoefield, Paul Perrit, Ray E. Beck, and Darlene Wisby No. 1:05-CV-109. United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division. November 10, 2005.

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Langston Scott Adams, Attorney at Law, Port Arthur, TX, Terrence Leon Holmes, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, for Brenda Batiste.

Joseph P. Sanders, Assistant City Attorney, Frank David Calvert, Spain Calvert & Eaves, Beaumont, TX, for City of Beaumont, City of Beaumont Police Department, Tom Scoefield, Paul Perrit, Ray E. Beck, and Darlene Wisby.

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CLARK, District Judge.

The court referred this matter to the Honorable Earl S. Hines, United States magistrate judge, at Beaumont, Texas, for consideration pursuant to applicable laws and orders of this court, and particularly Gen. Order 04-07. The magistrate judge submitted three reports addressing the respective defendants' joint motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, to require a more definite statement under Rule 7, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The magistrate judge recommends granting the motion in part and denying it in part.

No objections to any of the three reports has been received or filed. Further, upon review of the reports, the court concurs with the magistrate judge's analysis in each report. Accordingly, the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate judge are correct, the reports of the magistrate judge (Docket Nos. 19-21) are ADOPTED.

By separate order, the court will implement the recommendations submitted by the magistrate judge.

So ORDERED and SIGNED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

HINES, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial proceedings. The referral order directs the magistrate judge to hear and determine matters within his dispositive authority, and to submit a report containing proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended disposition of other matters. Bmt. Gen. Order 04-07 at ¶ 12.

All defendants move for dismissal or, alternatively, for a more definite statement or Rule 7 reply. Determination of these motions is a complex exercise because requirements for stating a claim upon which relief can be granted, or, alternatively, for pleading with sufficient clarity that the sued party can frame a responsive pleading, vary significantly depending on each defendant's status. Thus, if a single report were to address every defendant's motion, the result would be a massive, unwieldy and brain-deadening document. For analytical simplicity, this report deals only with the motion of three of the defendants who are similarly situated. Subsequent reports will target the motions of the remaining defendants.

I. NATURE OF SUIT; PARTIES

This action was filed originally in the 172nd Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas. It was removed to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleges three causes of action: (1) negligence under the Texas Tort Claims Act; (2) violation of federal

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civil rights under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 ("Section 1983"), and (3) conspiracy to interfere with federal civil rights under Title 42, United States Code, Section 1985(2) and (3)("Section 1985").

Plaintiff is Brenda Batiste, a resident of Beaumont, Texas. Defendants are the City of Beaumont, Texas, the City of Beaumont Police Department, the Beaumont Chief of Police, Tom Scoefield (sic),¹ and three police officers, Paul Perrit, Ray E. Beck and Darlene Wisby. All defendants are located and reside in Jefferson County, Texas.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's state court petition contains scarce factual allegations regarding circumstances giving rise to this action. A fair reading suggests that Beaumont police officers encountered plaintiff on June 22, 2004, during a keeping-the-peace incident.² At some point, plaintiff was handcuffed, restrained and transported to a mental health medical center, Spindletop MHMR. Plaintiff alleges that officers Perrit, Beck and Wisby struck, kicked and dragged her. On more than one occasion, the officers used a taser gun.³ At the medical center, plaintiff alleges that a female officer, presumably Wisby, restrained her on the floor by sitting on her, while an unidentified officer pressed a finger into her throat.

III. CLAIMS

Plaintiff asserts that defendants Perritt, Beck and Wisby are liable under the Texas Tort Claims Act because they were negligent in misusing their taser guns and handcuffs. Plaintiff also pleads negligence per se, but does not cite a statute imposing a specific duty of care. Finally, plaintiff invokes the common-law tort doctrine of respondeat superior, presumably to impose vicarious liability on the city and its police department.

Under Section 1983,⁴ plaintiff asserts that defendants Perritt, Beck and Wisby acted under color of state law as employees of the Beaumont Police Department, and at the direction of Tom Scofield. Collectively, they allegedly violated a laundry list of unspecified constitutional rights. Plaintiffs list, reprinted verbatim in the note,⁵ is re-characterized for meaningful analysis as follows:

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 Constitution Section Right Allegedly Violated
                FIRST AMENDMENT • Freedom of speech and press;
                 • Peaceable assembly and association;
                 • Petition government for redress of grievances;
                FOURTH AMENDMENT • Freedom from illegal seizure of person, papers,
                 and effects;
                SIXTH AMENDMENT • Freedom from unlawful arrest;
                 • Freedom from illegal detention and imprisonment;
                 • Timely and effective assistance and advice of
                 counsel;
                FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT • Freedom from physical abuse, coercion, and
                (due process) intimidation;
                FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT • Participate in or enjoy any benefit or service
                (equal protection) provided by the federal or state government.
                

For her causes of action under Section 1985, plaintiff avers no specific facts. She simply tracks language of the statute and avers that defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).⁶ Plaintiff contends that defendants "did conspire and agree between themselves and with the other person or persons, whose names are presently unknown to plaintiffs, for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating the due course." Pl.'s Pet. at ¶ 37. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants violated Section 1985(3)⁷ by denying her equal protection of the law due to her race, because they injured plaintiff and deprived her of "having and exercising her rights and privileges under the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas." Pl.'s Pet. at ¶ 38.

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IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTION

Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act against the individual defendants because Texas law precludes Tort Claims Act suits against individual employees of governmental units when a plaintiff files suit against the governmental unit. Defendants rely on Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.106(a), (e) (Vernon Supp.2004) as support for their contention that dismissal of the negligence based cause of action against defendants Scofield, Perrit, Beck and Wisby is proper.

Defendants argue that plaintiff's civil rights claims under Sections 1983 and 1985 should be dismissed because plaintiff's factual averments do not overcome their defense of qualified immunity. Additionally, defendants contend these claims should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because plaintiff asserts only conclusory allegations.

Unfortunately, plaintiff's response—filed after the court first granted two extensions of time within which to respond— does not address any of defendants' arguments directly. Rather, it consists of general platitudes about rules of pleading (e.g., pleadings construed liberally; complaints need only provide short and concise statement of facts; orders requiring more definite statements disfavored, etc.). Specifically, plaintiff does not address (1) defendants' contention that the Texas Tort Claims Act bar against suits against the government entity and its employees, (2) defendants' contention that civil rights plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to overcome qualified immunity, or (3) defendants' argument that the civil rights complaints fail to state a claim when they contain only conclusory allegations.

IV. PRINCIPLES OF ANALYSIS

A. Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 101.106

The Texas Tort Claims Act requires plaintiffs to choose between suing either a governmental entity or a governmental employee. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.106(a) (Vernon Supp.2004). The provision, applicable to suits brought after September 1, 2003, provides:

The filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against any individual employee of the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.

Id. The statute provides for enforcement by way of dismissing governmental employees from suit:

If a suit is filed under this chapter against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.

Id. § 101.106(e).

B. Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows dismissal when the complaining party fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must decide whether the facts alleged, if true, would entitle plaintiff to some legal remedy. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d...