Batiste v. Furnco Const. Corp.
Decision Date | 19 September 1974 |
Docket Number | Nos. 73-1255 and 73-1256,s. 73-1255 and 73-1256 |
Citation | 503 F.2d 447 |
Parties | 8 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 746, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9683 Narcisse BATISTE et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross Appellees, v. FURNCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee, Cross Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Judson H. Miner, Chicago, Ill., for Narcisse Batiste.
Joel H. Kaplan, Chicago, Ill., for Furnco Const.
Before CLARK, Associate Justice, * CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. *0
Both the plaintiffs and the defendant have appealed from an order of the district court which held this cause to be a class action, allowed the addition of a named plaintiff and granted summary judgment for plaintiffs while denying them all relief other than Four Hundred Dollars ($400.00) in attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., alleging that plaintiffs, who are Negro bricklayers, were denied employment by Defendant Furnco Construction Corporation because of their race. They requested that the cause be treated as a class action and they sought injunctive relief as well as back pay and attorney's fees.
After they had been denied employment in 1969, plaintiffs had filed timely complaints with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission (F.E.P.C.), and the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.). Extensive hearings were held before a hearing examiner of the F.E.P.C. who issued a recommendation on February 3, 1971, that the complaints be dismissed. On February 8, 1971, the E.E.O.C. advised plaintiffs of their right to file suit in the appropriate federal District Court, and plaintiffs then instituted this action. Defendant Furnco Construction Corporation filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that plaintiffs' action was barred by the doctrine of election of remedies. Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment and an application for leave to add an additional party-plaintiff, Sylvester Williams, who had participated in the action before the F.E.P.C. and the E.E.O.C., but who had not been named in the original complaint.
Meanwhile, on August 26, 1971, the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission rejected the hearing examiner's recommendation and entered an order directing the defendant to cease and desist the unfair labor practices complained of, and to offer to employ the plaintiffs as bricklayers on the next job defendant performed in Illinois. Finally, the Commission awarded lost wages to the plaintiffs. Defendant appealed this order to the appropriate State Circuit Court (where the cause is still pending), thus staying the order of the Commission.
On October 30, 1972, the U.S. District Court issued a 'Memorandum Opinion and Judgment Order' in the instant cause of action. See Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corporation, 350 F.Supp. 10 (N.D.Ill. 1972). The district court granted plaintiffs leave to proceed as a class, representing all who are or might become victims of defendant's racially discriminatory employment practices, and granted plaintiffs leave to add Sylvester Williams as a party-plaintiff in this action. Furthermore, relying on the determination of the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on their complaint, but limited recovery to the only relief that the F.E.P.C. had not granted plaintiff, namely, attorney's fees. Thereafter, plaintiffs submitted a verified petition requesting $12,987.00 for 288.6 hours spent on the federal court action. The court awarded plaintiffs $400.00 in attorney's fees, noting that plaintiffs' request was clearly excessive. Thereafter, both parties instituted appeals from the district court's ruling.
This court is presented with many issues in this action. First, both parties have challenged the district court's award of summary judgment. Defendant asserts that plaintiffs were not entitled to summary judgment, while plaintiffs contend that once the court granted summary judgment it should not have limited recovery to attorney's fees, but provided the injunctive relief and back pay requested.
In this appeal defendant asserts that the doctrines of election of remedies, res judicata and full faith and credit, bar plaintiffs from bringing their action to federal court after the F.E.P.C. adjudicated plaintiffs' claims. Although plaintiffs were required by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c) to first present their claims to the appropriate state authority for 60 days, defendant argues that by continuing to allow the state authority to adjudicate the action instead of removing it at the end of the 60-day period, plaintiffs have elected their remedy and are barred from bringing their action to the federal courts. Noting that the F.E.P.C. is afforded res judicata by the Illinois courts, defendant contends that the federal courts should give the Commission's decision full faith and credit whether it had been favorable or unfavorable to plaintiffs or whether or not it might later be reversed.
We must agree with the ruling in Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972) where the court squarely rejected the application of the doctrines of election of remedies and res judicata to Title VII actions where plaintiffs had litigated their charges to final adjudication in state proceedings. There is a strong Congressional policy that plaintiffs not be deprived of their right to resort to the federal courts for adjudication of their federal claims under Title VII. Recently, Congress amended Title VII to explicitly provide that:
In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by State or local authorities in proceedings commenced under State or local law pursuant to the (deferral) provisions of subsections (c) and (d). 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b), Pub.L. 92-261; 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
While this provision is addressed to the E.E.O.C. rather than the courts, it is strongly indicative of the Congressional policy that final responsibility for the administration of Title VII rests within the federal system. 1 See Cooper, supra, 464 F.2d at 12. It is also apparent that if federal actions are barred by the application of election of remedies and res judicata, then the statutory scheme of deferral to state proceedings will be frustrated by requiring that the plaintiff, who desired to bring an action in federal court, first commence state proceedings but abandon them quickly before an adjudication is made.
Defendant also argues that full faith and credit should be afforded to the state determination, thus barring the subsequent Title VII action in federal court. Defendant asserts that the courts have never considered this question before. However, full faith and credit implemented by federal statute (28 U.S.C. 1738) is the means by which state adjudications are made res judicata. Lynne Carol Fashions, Inc. v. Cranston Print Works Co., 453 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3rd Cir. 1972). And 'other well-defined federal policies, statutory or constitutional, may compete with those policies underlying section 1738.' American Mannex Corporation v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 409 U.S. 1040, 93 S.Ct. 524, 34 L.Ed.2d 489. It had been determined that the Congressional policies embodied in Title VII require that res judicata not be applied to state adjudications. Cooper, supra; Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corporation, 452 F.2d 889 (2nd Cir. 1971) and Young v. Sough Side Packing Company, 369 F.Supp. 59 (E.D.Wis.1973).
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...must therefore determine what effect the prior state and local proceedings should have on the instant suit. In Batiste v. Furnco Construction Co., 503 F.2d 447 (7 Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1127, 43 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975), plaintiffs brought a complaint before the Illinois......
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...rejected by state agencies would be pointless if the federal courts were bound by such agency decisions. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450, n. 1 (CA7 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1127, 43 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975). Nor is it plausible to suggest that Congress intend......
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...241, 253-254 (N.D.Ill.1980). Although the ultimate coercive power is lodged in the national courts, Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corporation, 503 F.2d 447, 449-451 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 928, 95 S.Ct. 1127, 43 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975), Title VII is a deployment of a mix of persu......
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...in similar situations in other circuits. See, e. g., Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1972); Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp., 503 F.2d 447 (7th Cir. 1974); Voutsis v. Union Carbide Corp., 452 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1971). Nor is the decision of the Court of Appeals for th......