Batiz v. State

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: COHEN, J.
• Citation: Batiz v. State, 286 So.3d 841 (Fla. App. 2019)
• Decision Date: 25 October 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 5D18-1831
• Parties: Yovany BATIZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

286 So.3d 841

Yovany BATIZ, Appellant,

v.STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D18-1831

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed October 25, 2019

Rehearing Denied December 9, 2019

James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Andrea K. Totten, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

COHEN, J.

Yovany Batiz, a Honduran citizen, was convicted by a jury of lewd or lascivious molestation of a person less than sixteen years of age.¹ On appeal, Batiz raises a number of issues. We affirm and write only to address Batiz's arguments related to state special maritime criminal jurisdiction pursuant to section 910.006, Florida Statutes (2018).

Batiz was a cabin steward on a cruise ship. The alleged incident leading to the charges against Batiz occurred while the cruise ship was in international waters.² However, the State alleged in the information that the events occurred in Brevard County, Florida. At Batiz's trial, following the State's case-in-chief, Batiz moved for judgment of acquittal, asserting for the first time that the State failed to invoke the maritime criminal jurisdiction of the trial court because the information alleged that the events occurred in Brevard County, which was indisputably incorrect.³ He alternatively argued that the State failed to prove jurisdiction pursuant to section 910.006. The trial court denied Batiz's motion.

On appeal, Batiz maintains that the information did not invoke the maritime criminal jurisdiction of the trial court because the State failed to allege, pursuant to section 910.006, a maritime occurrence in the charging document.⁴ He also maintains that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove that the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to that statute.

In enacting section 910.006, the Florida Legislature found that "Florida is a major center for international travel and trade by sea" and "has an interest in ensuring the protection of persons traveling to or from Florida by sea." § 910.006(1)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat. The statute establishes maritime criminal jurisdiction in Florida courts to hear charges based on acts or omissions on board ships outside the state in delimited circumstances. Id. § 910.006(1)(e). The circumstances provided are:

(a) There is a suspect on board the ship who is a citizen or resident of this state or a state which consents to the jurisdiction of this state.

(b) The master of the ship or an official of the flag state commits a suspect on board the ship to the custody of a law enforcement officer acting under the authority of this state.

(c) The state in whose territory the act or omission occurred requests the exercise of jurisdiction by this state.

(d) The act or omission occurs during a voyage on which over half of the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to finally disembark in this state, without regard to intermediate stopovers.

(e) The victim is a Florida law enforcement officer on board the ship in connection with his or her official duties.

(f) The act or omission is one of violence, detention, or depredation generally recognized as criminal, and the victim is a resident of this state.

(g) The act or omission causes or constitutes an attempt or conspiracy to cause a substantial effect in this state that is an element of the offense charged.

(h) The act or omission is one with respect to which all states may exercise criminal jurisdiction under international law or treaty.

Id. § 910.006(3)(a)–(h).

The cases Batiz cites supporting his main assertion—that the State must allege the "essential elements" of maritime criminal jurisdiction or else violate fundamental due process—relate to the requirement that a charging document allege the elements of the charged crime, not the essential elements of jurisdiction.⁵ Batiz also asserts that "[t]he charge in the indictment determines the jurisdiction." Winburn v. State, 28 Fla. 339, 9 So. 694, 695 (1891) (citing McLean v. State, 23 Fla. 281, 2 So. 5 (1887) ). While this is a correct statement of law, the cases Batiz relies on involve allegations that a charge was addressed in the improper court, such as a misdemeanor tried before a circuit court lacking jurisdiction over misdemeanor charges.⁶ Those cases are inapplicable because Batiz does not contend that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try the lewd or lascivious molestation charge.

Taken to its logical conclusion, Batiz's argument would require the State, in all cases, to allege the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, all felony charges would necessitate an allegation within the charging document that the circuit court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 26.012(2)(d), Florida Statutes, and article V, section 20(c)(3) of the Florida Constitution. However, neither section 910.006 nor Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(3)⁷ mandates that the charging document allege the statute or constitutional provision serving as the basis for jurisdiction in the trial court. The State is required to allege the essential elements of the crime charged, not the essential elements of jurisdiction. We find that no requirement existed for the State to allege maritime criminal jurisdiction pursuant to section 910.006 within the body of the information in order to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction.⁸ The Brevard County circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear felony charges based on acts or omissions on board a ship outside the state, so long as the facts of the case fell under the penumbra of section 910.006. Accordingly, we reject Batiz's argument that the State was required to invoke the trial court's maritime criminal jurisdiction within the charging document.⁹

Alternatively, Batiz maintains that the State's proof failed to establish that the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 910.006. We agree with Batiz that the State must prove the court's jurisdiction over the defendant. Deaton v. Dugger, 635 So. 2d 4, 7 (Fla. 1993). "[T]erritorial jurisdiction must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt rather than by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 6. "Upon the request of the defendant, the court should instruct the jury on jurisdiction when the evidence is in conflict on the issue."¹⁰ Id. at 7. Thus, we must analyze the proof adduced at trial to determine whether the State met that burden.

The State contends that it proved that the trial court had jurisdiction pursuant to the effects doctrine as well as section 910.006(3)(b), (d), and (f). We address these arguments seriatim.

Initially, we reject the State's argument that the effects doctrine constitutes an independent basis for jurisdiction. That common law doctrine provides that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him within its power." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285, 31 S.Ct. 558, 55 L.Ed. 735 (1911) (citations omitted). In its answer brief, the State relies on State v. Stepansky, 761 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 2000), and contends that the trial court may exercise criminal jurisdiction over acts committed at sea, outside of its jurisdiction, when the acts have an intrastate effect.

Stepansky was charged in Brevard County with attempted sexual battery of a child and burglary based on events allegedly occurring on a cruise ship in international waters. Id. at 1029. As in the instant case, the cruise ship departed from and returned to Port Canaveral, located in Brevard County. Id. Stepansky challenged Florida's constitutional authority to exercise jurisdiction over him pursuant to section 910.006. Id. at 1030. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the maritime criminal jurisdiction statute did not conflict with federal law because "the structure of section 910.006 ensures that it will not violate the constitution, that it will not conflict with the exercise of jurisdiction by federal courts, and that it will not interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system." Id. at 1034 (citing Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1422 (9th Cir. 1990) ). It also ruled that section 910.006 was a reasonable application of the effects doctrine. Id. at 1036–37. The supreme court did not express a broad, undefined basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime criminal occurrences pursuant to the effects doctrine. The statute is clear that maritime criminal jurisdiction exists in the delimited circumstances of section 910.006(3)(a)–(h). Accordingly, we reject the State's argument that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Batiz's case pursuant to the effects doctrine.

Next, section 910.006(3)(b) provides jurisdiction if "[t]he master of the ship or an official of the flag state commits a suspect on board the ship to the custody of a law enforcement officer acting under the authority of this state." The State presented no evidence related to the identities of officials of the ship's flag state or the master of the ship, much less whether any of those officials committed Batiz to the custody of a Florida law enforcement officer. We recognize that following the alleged incident, state law enforcement officers boarded the ship, conducted an investigation, and ultimately took Batiz into custody. However, while this might constitute circumstantial evidence of jurisdiction pursuant to section 910.006(3)(b), without more, such evidence was insufficient to prove jurisdiction beyond a reasonable doubt.

Third, section 910.006(3)(d) provides jurisdiction if "[t]he act or omission occurs during a voyage on which over half of the revenue passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to finally disembark in this state, without regard to intermediate stopovers." The State's evidence...