Batman v. Perez

• Decision Date: 09 August 2021
• Docket Number: 20-CV-2298 JLS (MSB)
• Parties: SUSANA BATMAN, MICHAEL HENDERSON, and JOSHUA TEMORES, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID PEREZ and YUMA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

SUSANA BATMAN, MICHAEL HENDERSON, and JOSHUA TEMORES, Plaintiffs, v. DAVID PEREZ and YUMA UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendants.

No. 20-CV-2298 JLS (MSB)

United States District Court, S.D. California

August 9, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 2)

HON JANIS L. SAMMARTINO, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (“Mot., ” ECF No. 2) for Plaintiffs': (1) failure to comply with the Arizona Notice of Claim Statute (2) failure to comply with the California Government Tort Claims Statute; (3) failure to properly serve the Complaint on the District, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(2); and (4) failure to timely serve the Complaint upon Defendants. Also before the Court are Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to (“Opp'n ” ECF No. 22) and Defendants' Reply in Support of (“Reply, ” ECF No. 23) the Motion. The Court vacated the hearing on the Motion and took it under submission pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). ECF No 13. Having considered Plaintiffs' Complaint (“Compl., ” ECF No. 1-5), the Parties' arguments, and the law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.^[1]

BACKGROUND^[2]

This action begins with an accident. On September 5, 2019, Plaintiff Susana Batman (“Batman”) was traveling in her car southbound on Imperial Avenue in El Centro, California. Government Claim Form for Susana Batman (“Batman Claim, ” ECF No. 2-3) at 3. Plaintiffs Michael Henderson (“Henderson”) and Joshua Temores (“Temores”) were riding as passengers in Batman's car. Id. Defendant David Perez (“Perez”), operating a school bus as an employee of Defendant Yuma Union High School District (the “District”), rear-ended Batman's vehicle, resulting in a multi-car accident. Id. Temores suffered an injury to his back, along with abrasions. Government Claim Form for Joshua Temores (“Temores Claim, ” ECF No. 2-5) at 2. Henderson suffered neck and back injuries and complained of headaches. Government Claim Form for Michael Henderson (“Henderson Claim, ” ECF No. 2-4) at 2. Batman suffered more serious injuries to her neck, back, chest, and left arm and leg, requiring ongoing medical treatment. Batman Claim at 2; see generally Id. at 5-73.

Although all Parties agree on (or at least, do not contest) the basic facts of the accident, the suit's procedural history is murky. Defendants claim that, on February 27, 2019, Plaintiffs filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California, County of Imperial, asserting negligence against Defendants and seeking compensatory damages. Mot. at 2; Compl. at 4; see, e.g., Batman Claim at 2. Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' process server delivered “documents purporting to be ‘Government Claims'” to Gina Olivas, the administrative assistant to the Superintendent of the District, on March 3, 2020. Declaration of Gina Olivas (“Olivas Decl., ” ECF No. 2-2) ¶ 3. Finally, Defendants also assert that a process server delivered a summons and a copy of the complaint to Perez and Gina Thompson, the Superintendent of the District, on October 30, 2020. Mot. at 2; Declaration of Gina Thompson (“Thompson Decl., ” ECF No. 2-6) ¶ 3.

Plaintiffs, however, describe the procedural history differently. Plaintiffs allege that they submitted documents to Defendants on February 27, 2019, that were not the instant suit, but rather a “Notice of Claim, ” required by both California and Arizona law as a prerequisite to a suit against a public entity. See Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-821; Opp'n at 6. In addition, Plaintiffs maintain that the documents served on Olivas on March 3, 2020, were the “perfect[ion]” of the previously filed Notice of Claim. Declaration of Patrick G. Shea (“Shea Decl., ” ECF No. 22-2) ¶ 4. Finally, Plaintiffs aver that the documents served on October 30, 2020, were actually the summons and complaint in the instant suit. Id. ¶ 6.

In any event, the suit was filed in the Superior Court of Imperial County on February 27, 2020. Notice of Removal (“Not., ” ECF No. 1) at 1. The case was removed to this Court on November 25, 2020, and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction from diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441(b).^[3] Id. at 1-2. On December 2, 2020, Defendants filed the instant Motion. See generally Mot.

ANALYSIS

I. Choice of Law

Plaintiffs and Defendants disagree on whether California's or Arizona's notice statute applies in this case, see Mot. at 2-4; Opp'n at 6-8, but the Court must first decide on whether federal procedural law or state substantive law applies. If state substantive law controls, then the Court must decide whether California or Arizona law controls.

For the reasons given below, the Court finds that Arizona's notice statue applies in this case.

A. Whether a Notice Requirement Functions as Procedural or Substantive Law

First, the Court must determine whether notice requirements function as a procedural requirement or as substantive law. “[F]ederal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965). A federal court applies state tort law, including any notice requirements mandated by that state's statutes. See Ball v. City of Peoria, No. CV-09-635, 2009 WL 2971102, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2009), aff'd, 426 Fed.Appx. 481 (9th Cir. 2011). In California, “statutes or ordinances which condition the right to sue the sovereign upon timely filing of claims and actions are more than procedural requirements. They are elements of the plaintiff's cause of action and conditions precedent to the maintenance of the action.” Willis v. Reddin, 418 F.2d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Redlands High Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 125 P.2d 490 (Cal. 1942); Illerbrun v. Conrad, 31 Cal.Rptr. 27 (Ct. App. 1963)). In other words, California treats notice requirement statutes for suits against public entities as substantive law, rather than procedural law. Therefore, this Court will apply the notice requirements as state substantive law.

B. Whether California's or Arizona's Notice Law Controls

Because both California, where the alleged tort occurred, and Arizona, where Defendants reside, have their own notice statutes for tort actions, the Court must decide which state's statute controls. See Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-821.01. “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 1. On matters that a State is competent to legislate, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require the State to apply another state's statutes. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003). For example, a State is competent to legislate on tort actions occurring within the State's borders. See id.; see also Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955) (“The State where the tort occurs certainly has a concern in the problems following in the wake of the injury.”). However, a California state court will apply another state's notice statute as long as it does not go against the public policy behind California's notice statute. See Or. State Univ. v. Super. Ct., 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 31, 37 (Ct. App. 2017). Therefore, the Court must examine whether the California and Arizona notice of claims statutes share the same public policy goals.

The purpose of section 911.2 of the California Government Code is to confine potential governmental liability to promote settlement prior to litigation, not to expand the rights of plaintiffs. See Or. State Univ., 225 Cal.Rptr.3d at 47; DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 289 P.3d 884, 888 (Cal. 2012). Likewise, the purpose of title 12, section 821 of the Arizona Revised Statutes is to “allow the public entity to investigate and assess liability, to permit the possibility of settlement prior to litigation, and to assist the public entity in financial planning and budgeting.” Martineau v. Maricopa Cnty., 86 P.3d 912, 915-16 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2004).

Given California's and Arizona's shared public policy goals, the Court finds that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the Court to apply Arizona's statute. See Or. State Univ., 225 Cal.Rptr.3d at 37. Although California is certainly competent to legislate torts that occur within its own borders, see Hyatt, 538 U.S. at 494, both California's and Arizona's statutes share a purpose of, at least, permitting and promoting settlement prior to litigation, Or. State Univ., 225 Cal.Rptr.3d at 37; accord Martineau, 86 P.3d at 915- 16. California's and Arizona's public policies may not be completely orthogonal, but they clearly overlap.

Although Plaintiffs assert that California's strong public policy in favor of resolution of claims on their merits opposes the policy underlying Arizona's torts statutes, this argument misses the mark. See Opp'n at 8. The cases cited by Plaintiffs may show that courts applying California's statute prefer to allow plaintiffs leeway with curing deficient notice. See generally Id. at 8-10 (citations omitted). However, at issue is the public policy guiding section 911.2 specifically, and section 911.2 does not have a purpose of expanding the rights of plaintiffs. See DiCampli-Mintz, 289 P.3d at 888. Just because California's and Arizona's statutes do not use an identical method to accomplish their goals of promoting settlements does not mean that they do not share the same policy goals.^[4] To rule that California's statute must control would render the Full Faith and Credit Clause toothless.

Finally it is unclear why section 911.2 would apply to a public entity of the State of Arizona. Section 900.4 of the California Government Code defines a local public entity as “a county, city, district, public...