Batterson v. Chicago & G.T. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1882
• Citation: 13 N.W. 508,49 Mich. 184
• Parties: BATTERSON v. CHICAGO & GRAND TRUNK RY. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

13 N.W. 508

49 Mich. 184

BATTERSON v. CHICAGO & GRAND TRUNK RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 11, 1882

A party suing for negligent injury is bound to set forth in his declaration the material facts relied on as his cause of action and to prove the same combination of circumstances.

Pleadings are for the purpose of informing the parties and the court of the precise subject of the controversy; their wording must be precise.

Declarations are construed with reasonable intendments and their terms are read and applied in the natural and usual sense and without supposing qualifications which, though possible, are not fairly indicated.

A declaration for negligent injury to a brakeman while coupling cars set forth that it was occasioned by a deep hole between the rails. The evidence was that it was between the rails of a side track. Held that the declaration would naturally be construed to refer to the main track, and that the variance was material, especially when taken in connection with other variances as to the nature of the hole and the extent of the injury.

A master's liability for injuries to his servant from defective arrangements is not that of an insurer or guarantor if the defect was apparent to ordinary observation. It is a question of reasonable care and diligence in providing against it.

The law does not impose impracticable rules of duty, but is satisfied with what is fairly reasonable under the circumstances.

In an action against a railway company for negligent injury to an employe from a defect in a roadway which has just come under its control from another company, there can be no presumption that defendant had had sufficient time to remedy the defect.

Exemplary damages cannot be allowed where there was no willfullness or malice. Held that in an action by a railway employe against the company for negligent injury, the damages could not properly exceed the measure of strict compensation, and that an instruction to the jury that they might consider the "mortification" which the injured person endured was misleading.

Error to Ingham.

Conely & Lucking, for plaintiff.

E.W Meddaugh, for defendants and appellants.

GRAVES, C.J.

On and for some time prior to January 2, 1880, Batterson was in the service of the Northwestern & Grand Trunk Railroad Company as a brakeman between Battle Creek and Flint. And on the morning of that day and about dawn and while trying to couple cars at Hamilton his hand was caught between the draw-bars and badly injured. April 6, 1880, the Northwestern & Grand Trunk Railroad Company and their lines were consolidated into one organization and which is the present defendant, and in January, 1881, this suit was brought against it for the injury in question, and it then stipulated for the purpose of the trial that it had succeeded to the liabilities of the Northwestern & Grand Trunk Company.

1. A question of variance is raised. The case shown by the evidence was very different, it is said, from the case stated in the declaration and denied by the plea. It was incumbent on the plaintiff to specify the grievance of which he complained. He was bound to set out the combination of material facts relied on as his cause of action and follow up his allegations by evidence pointing out and proving the same combination of circumstances. Flint & P.M. Ry. Co. v. Stark, 38 Mich. 714; Marquette, H & O.R. Co. v. Marcott, 41 Mich. 433; [S.C. 2 N.W. 795;] Smith v. Tripp, R.I.Sup.Ct., Dec., 1880. By resorting to two counts he described his case in two ways but he claims now that the recovery was had on the last count. And according to his view of that count it only differs from the other in alleging that the hole in question had existed from the first construction of the track and that the road-bed itself had never been made properly. Both counts are given below. ^[*]

The subject to be first referred to is the meaning of the declaration. How was the language to be understood by the defendant and the court below? Every system of judicial altercation has for its object the accomplishment of two ends. The first to apprise the parties, and the second to apprise the court of the precise subject of the controversy. And these ends imply the necessity for precision in the use of words in order to avoid equivocation and guard against the mischief and injustice of misleading statements. In construing the language of a declaration the course is to make reasonable intendments and read and apply the terms in the natural and usual sense and without supposing this or that qualification which, though possible, is not fairly indicated. 1 Chit.Pl. (16th Am., 7th Eng.Ed.) 261, 258; Mason v. Morewood, 5 Sandf. 557.

Now reading the words of declaration in their obvious and prima facie sense, the meaning is clear that the hole into which the plaintiff stepped was a small sink in the otherwise ordinary even surface between the rails of the main or through track, and that plaintiffs injury consisted of a literal severance of his hand from the arm. The inherent force of the declaration to convey the idea that the hole specified was in the main track was aided by independent considerations. It is matter of common knowledge that there is generally but one track, and here there was nothing to suggest that there existed a second one at the place of the accident. It was not to be intended that there was one without anything to imply it. Hence, the statement was to be understood as referring to the main or through track. But in case it had actually appeared on the face of the pleading that there was a side track at the point in question it would still have been natural and proper to consider the description as referring to the regular track, and not to one laid and used exclusively for exceptional purposes. In short it was not admissible in view of the language of the declaration to refer the alleged negligence to a place outside of the regular track.

Having ascertained the meaning of the descriptive terms made use of by the plaintiff to specify the circumstances of the wrong complained of, the consequence is clear that the state of facts submitted to the jury was materially variant. (1) The testimony fixed the theater of the imputed negligence and the place of the injury on an unballasted side track laid in November, 1877, and more than a year subsequent to the construction of the general or ordinary track and being from 30 to 40 feet distant therefrom. (2) It identified what the declaration denominates as a hole or rut, as a natural sag or depression 20 or 30 feet wide and running off to a lot and nowise connected with the main track, but touched by this side track which was laid across the "north corner." (3) The plaintiff's hand was not "crushed off." He swore that his "fingers were...