Battle v. Cherry, Civ. A. No. 15228.

• Citation: 339 F. Supp. 186
• Decision Date: 02 February 1972
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 15228.
• Parties: Myrtice BATTLE et al., Plaintiffs, v. James D. CHERRY, Superintendent of DeKalb County School System, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

339 F. Supp. 186

Myrtice BATTLE et al., Plaintiffs, v. James D. CHERRY, Superintendent of DeKalb County School System, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 15228.

United States District Court, N. D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

February 2, 1972.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

A. C. Latimer, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff.

Murphey Candler, Jr. and Gary M. Sams, Decatur, Ga., for James D. Cherry, Supt. & Members of DeKalb County Bd. of Ed.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Ga., for Nix, Blackmon, Bolton, Davis, Burson, Hendricks, Griffin, Smith, Whaley, Rice, Kilpatrick, Stewart, Dewar, Neville and Huseman.

Before MORGAN, Circuit Judge, and EDENFIELD and FREEMAN, District Judges.

EDENFIELD, District Judge:

By this purported class action suit,¹ plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief respectively with regard to the constitutionality and enforcement of a portion of the Georgia Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act of 1964. Ga.Code Ann. § 32-601 et seq. This action is brought by plaintiffs in their dual capacities as taxpayers residing within the independent school district² of DeKalb-Atlanta³ and as parents of minor children in the independent school system of DeKalb-Atlanta. The challenged portion of the Act (italicized below) and the statutory context within which it must be considered provide:

"Section 22. Calculation According to Local Financial Ability of Amount Required for Local Support of Minimum Foundation Program.

"(a) The State Board of Education shall calculate annually the amount of funds that each local unit of administration shall be required to raise to support its Minimum Foundation Program of Education. Effective for the 1971-72 school year, beginning July 1, 1971, and for each year thereafter, the amount of such funds to be raised by each local unit of administration shall be calculated by multiplying the formula .29 of 1% times the following:

* * * * * *

(2) For a county with independent school systems located within the county or counties, the formula shall be applied to the total equalized adjusted school property tax digest of the county or counties. For the 1971-72 and the 1972-73 school years, beginning July 1, 1971, this amount shall be prorated between the systems by adding 33 1/3 per cent to the county equalized adjusted school property tax digest of all property located within the territory of the independent school systems. ...

* * * * * *

"(b) The amounts determined in accordance with the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be the amounts to be raised by each local unit of administration in support of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education. The amount of the costs of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education remaining after deducting the total amount to be raised by all local units of administration shall be paid entirely from State funds." (Ga. Laws 1971, pp. 574-576.)

We need not expound upon the labyrinths of complicated computations necessary for the implementation of the Minimum Foundation Program of Education Act. For our purposes here it is sufficient to note that the Act represents the efforts of the Georgia General Assembly to provide a scheme of educational funding, which will insure a minimum educational program for all elementary and high school children in the State of Georgia. Since the funding of this program is shared by the state and local governments,⁴ the Act specifically prescribes the method by which a county's required local effort is to be computed. Ga.Laws 1971, pp. 574-576.

By their action, plaintiffs challenge the method used to determine a county's required local effort in situations where a county contains an independent school system or systems within its territorial limits. Where no independent school system is involved, a formula, established by the Act, is applied to a county's total equalized school property tax digest⁵ to determine that county's required local effort. However, where an independent school system lies within the territorial limits of a county, the tax responsibility for raising the county's required local effort is prorated between the taxpayers of the independent school system and the taxpayers of the county school system. This proration is achieved by adding 33 1/3 % to that portion of a county's equalized adjusted school property tax digest representing property located within the territory comprising the independent school system; thereby causing the tax digest for the independent system to be weighted at 133 1/3 %, while the tax digest for property located within the territorial limits of the county school system is weighted at 100%. Plaintiffs alleged that the effect of this proration is to cause them, as taxpayers, to bear a proportionately higher tax burden than those taxpayers within the county school district. As parents, plaintiffs allege that their children are discriminated against in that they receive proportionately less benefits from the Minimum Foundation Educational Program than those children in the county school system, even though plaintiffs pay proportionately more for the program. It is the above disparity in fiscal treatment which plaintiffs contend violates equal protection rights.

Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.⁶ While there is serious question as to whether plaintiffs' jurisdictional allegations are sufficient to enable them to maintain this action in their capacity as taxpayers,⁷ plaintiffs may maintain the action as a civil rights suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based upon allegations as parents that the Act arbitrarily discriminates against plaintiffs' children by reason of the fact that they receive proportionally less financial benefits from the program established by the Act. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.Supp. 870 (D.Minn., 1971).

Having determined that the court has jurisdiction over the controversy before it, at least insofar as plaintiffs allege that the Act discriminates against their children, the question becomes whether we can or should consider the merits to determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to the relief which they seek. This consideration of necessity causes us to examine defendants' motions and defenses which assert that res judicata and the anti-injunction provisions of 28 U.S. C. § 1341 bar plaintiffs' action. Not only do we believe that defendants' contentions are well taken, but we also firmly believe that the totality of the circumstances surrounding this action compel dismissal.

Under the doctrine of res judicata, if a previous judgment is valid, final, and on the merits, it is an absolute bar in another case on the same cause of action between the same parties and their privies "not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in the earlier proceeding, `but also as respects any other available matter which might have been presented to that end.'" Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378, 60 S.Ct. 317, 320, 84 L.Ed. 329 (1940), citing Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U.S. 470, 479, 50 S.Ct. 374, 74 L.Ed. 972 (1930); Acree v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 390 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1968). Needless to say the doctrine must be judiciously applied. While it should not be applied so restrictively as to deny a party his day in court, neither should it be applied so liberally as to allow a party several opportunities to litigate the same claim. See Exhibitors Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Service Corp., 421 F.2d 1313, 1316 (5th Cir. 1970). In the case at bar plaintiffs have simply already had their day in court.

In 1966 several actions were instituted in the Fulton and DeKalb County Superior Courts of Georgia challenging the constitutionality and application of the additional 33 1/3 % valuation provision of which plaintiffs now complain. On appeal the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the validity of the challenged provision and its applicability to the Atlanta and Decatur independent school districts. Ingram v. Payton, 222 Ga. 503, 150 S.E. 2d 825 (1966); Rice v. Cook, 222 Ga. 499, 150 S.E.2d 822 (1966). Instead of seeking review in the United States Supreme Court, plaintiffs in the state court followed the suggestion of the Georgia Supreme Court and took their cause to the Georgia General Assembly. In 1971 these legislative efforts proved partially successful and the Act was amended to gradually phase out over a four-year period the additional 33 1/3 % valuation applicable to the independent school systems.⁸ Apparently not satisfied with a piecemeal victory, the action now under consideration was instituted.

In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971), the Supreme Court indicated approval of the criteria employed by Justice Traynor in Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), in considering whether an application of res judicata was appropriate. The criteria are stated as follows:

"In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?

Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?" 402 U.S. at 323-324, 91 S.Ct. at 1440.

Under the circumstances of this case we find that these three questions must be answered in the affirmative. Clearly the 1966 decisions of the Georgia Supreme Court were adjudications on the merits. From our review of the decisions we are equally satisfied that the issues litigated in 1966 are the same issues which plaintiffs now seek to litigate here and that the parties involved in the 1966 litigation were substantially the same parties as are now before the...