Battle v. City of Florala

• Decision Date: 06 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 97-D-1612-N.,CIV. A. 97-D-1612-N.
• Citation: 28 F.Supp.2d 1331
• Parties: Gloria BATTLE Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FLORALA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

28 F.Supp.2d 1331

Gloria BATTLE Plaintiff, v. CITY OF FLORALA, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 97-D-1612-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

October 6, 1998.

Allen G. Woodard, Andalusia, AL, for Plaintiff.

Norman Gunter Guy, Jr., Montgomery, Al, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court are two dispositive motions filed by the Defendants in which Defendants argue, inter alia, that the Plaintiff's claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed.

First, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support of their Motion on November 10, 1997. Plaintiff filed a brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which the court construes as a Response ("Response"), on December 30, 1997. On July 7, 1998, the court entered an order directing Plaintiff to clarify her contentions. Therefore, on July 16, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Submission pursuant to the court's July 16, 1998 Order, which the court construes as a Response ("Response 2"). On July 23, 1998, Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff's submission, which the court construes as a Reply.¹

Second, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and a Brief in Support of their Motion on May 13, 1998. On June 3, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response ("Response 3").

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant case law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment are due to be granted in part.²

I. JURISDICTION

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and 1367. The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND³

Plaintiff filed an eight count Complaint on October 1, 1997 in the Circuit Court of Covington County, Alabama. (Pl.'s Compl. at 1.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants committed a variety of state law torts, including negligence, wantonness, assault & battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. (Id. at 1-5.) Plaintiff also alleges that she is entitled to recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants because they allegedly deprived her of her Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. at 5-6.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), Defendants removed the action to this court on November 5, 1997.

Plaintiff alleges the following specific facts to support her claims. Early in the morning of June 23, 1996, Plaintiff drove home from an evening at the "KP Hall," a local club in Florala. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 1; Pl.'s Test. at 259.) Defendant Inabinett was on duty as a police officer for the Defendant City of Florala. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 1; Def.'s Test. at 6-7.) Plaintiff claims that after she had driven a couple of blocks from the club, she noticed Officer Inabinett's blue lights in her rear view mirror. (Pl.'s Test. at 261.) She believed that the Defendant was chasing a group of young boys who were allegedly standing adjacent to the road upon which she was traveling.⁴ (Id.; Franklin's Test. at 325.) Plaintiff drove her car around an "S-shaped" curve in the road and Defendant "rear-ended" her car with his police car.⁵ (Pl.'s Test. at 324; Hobbs' Test. at 220.)

After the accident, Defendant Inabinett put Plaintiff on the ground and handcuffed her. (Def.'s Test. at 22.) Plaintiff and another witness claim that Defendant Inabinett put his knee on the back of her neck for at least ten minutes. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 3; Wallace Test. at 233; Franklin Test. at 368.) Plaintiff claims that she had trouble breathing. (Pl.'s Test. at 268.) An ambulance was called, and Plaintiff was taken to the hospital. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 3; Wallace Test. at 233.)

Plaintiff was ultimately arrested after being released from the hospital. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 2; Def.s' Ex. F.) She was charged with running a stop sign, eluding police, driving while suspended, and reckless driving. (Def.s' Ex. F.) Additionally, she was charged with DUI by Alabama State Trooper Todd Grimes. (Def.s' Ex. B and F.) On October 10, 1996, Plaintiff appeared before the Honorable Frank L. McGuire, III, District Court Judge of Covington, County Alabama, and after a trial, she was convicted of all charges. (Def.'s Ex. E.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Inabinett manufactured a case against her to cover up his own incompetence and negligence. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 1.) She claims that on the night in question, Defendant Inabinett and another officer were patrolling the area around the KP Hall and arrested a young man. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 2; Def. Inabinett's Test. at 40.) Defendant Inabinett admitted that "[w]e had one to get away from us that night," and Plaintiff theorizes that Defendant Inabinett was chasing the boys and looking for the one that got away when the accident occurred. (Pl.'s Resp. 3 at 2; Def. Inabinett's Test. at 40.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs and attorneys fees in light of Defendants' alleged conduct.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since the complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions in the file, together with affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or her] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

IV. DISCUSSION

Section 1983 Claims: Illegal Arrest

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code creates a private right of action for damages and injunctive relief against individuals and governmental bodies whose conduct under the color of state or local law deprives a plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count VIII of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Inabinett in his individual capacity because he allegedly deprived her of her constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he violated the tenets of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by using excessive force, illegally seizing her and illegally arresting her.⁶

With regard to Plaintiff's claims of illegal arrest, this court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to consider this claim. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal court "may not exercise jurisdiction to decide federal issues which are inextricably intertwined with a state court's judgment." Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir.1997). "The essence of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that `a United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings.'" Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983)).

A district court engages in impermissible appellate review when it entertains a claim that the litigants did not argue in the state court, but is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies as long as the...