Battle v. Clark Equipment, Brown Trailer Division, S81-16
| Decision Date | 21 October 1981 |
| Docket Number | S81-117,S81-79,S81-108,S81-129,S81-17,S81-148,S81-128,No. S81-16,S81-118,S81-130 and S81-165.,S81-127,S81-103,S81-78,S81-16 |
| Citation | 524 F. Supp. 683 |
| Parties | Gene BATTLE, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT, BROWN TRAILER DIVISION; UAW Local 1265, Defendants. James JONES, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT, BROWN TRAILER DIVISION; UAW Local 1265, Defendants. William CURRY, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. J. P. PARGO, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendant. Percy H. CORLEY, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Vernon D. WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Laymon E. FLY, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Jim E. HARRIS, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Willie HENDERSON, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Chris MACON, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Warren L. GEORGE, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Thomas JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. William TAYLOR, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, UAW LOCAL 1265, Defendants. Donald E. WEBB, Plaintiff, v. CLARK EQUIPMENT COMPANY, BROWN TRAILER DIVISION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
James Jones, Gene Battle, William Curry, J. P. Pargo, Percy H. Corley, Vernon D. Wilson, Laymon E. Fly, Jim E. Harris, Willie Henderson, Chris Macon, Warren L. George, Jr., Thomas Jackson, William Taylor, Donald E. Webb, pro se.
Barry A. Macey, Miles, Segal & Macey, Indianapolis, Ind., Irving J. Smith, Smith & McLaughlin, South Bend, Ind., for UAW Local 1265.
George H. Plaut, Buchanan, Mich., Timothy C. Klenk, Adrianne Mazura, Chicago, Ill., William F. McInerny, South Bend, Ind., for Clark Equipment.
Plaintiff, Gene Battle, and 13 other plaintiffs brought an action against Clark Equipment Company and against UAW Local 1265 Union alleging that the Company and the Union actions with respect to the disbursement of the Sub Plan were racially discriminating in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Presently before the Court is defendant Clark Equipment Company's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons discussed hereinafter, this Court is satisfied that defendant company's Motion to Dismiss should be granted.
This charge of discrimination arose from actions taken by the Company and the Union upon the closing of the company's Brown Trailer Division in Michigan City, Indiana. Plaintiffs were employed by the Company until January 1975. In November 1974, the Company announced that it had decided to close its Brown Trailer Division and that the entire work force would be permanently laid off. Shortly after the announcement the Company met with the Union to negotiate an agreement in eight of the plant closings. It is with respect to these negotiations, and specifically the amendments to the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Plan ("Sub Plan"), set forth in Article XXV of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, that plaintiffs allege that the Company and Union have discriminated against them.
The Sub Plan provided for regular weekly benefits to be paid to any qualified employee while he/she was laid off. During late 1974 negotiations with the Company, however, the Union requested that the Company discontinue paying any further benefits from the Sub Plan fund. The Union further proposed that, upon ratification by the membership, the Plan be amended to provide for the distribution of the Sub Plan's funds to the employees on a pro rata seniority basis. The Company acceded to the Union's demands.
On January 5, 1975 the Union called a special membership meeting to discuss the proposed action with respect to the Sub Plan. Union officials explained to the membership that unless regularly expected Sub Plan payments were frozen, the funds would be depleted through payment of unemployment benefits to those with less seniority who would be laid off during the earlier stages of the Company's phase-out of the Brown Trailer Division. The membership approved the freeze of payments and the amendment to the Sub Plan in a secret ballot election by a vote of 209 to 39.
By its terms, the amendment to pro rate distribution of the fund was not to become operative until executed by authorized representatives of the parties and at least 90% of the employees with the Sub Plan credits as of December 29, 1974, including 100% of the employees who were on layoff from the Company on the date the Union informed the Company that the agreement had been ratified. In June 1975, after all of the necessary signatures had been obtained, the pro rata distribution of the Sub Plan fund was made.
On or about July 23, 1975, the plaintiffs herein filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging the Company and Union actions with respect to the Sub Plan were racially discriminatory. Plaintiffs filed no charges with any state or local agency. Instead, sometime after July 23, the EEOC referred the charge to the Indiana Civil Rights Commission and on or about July 30, 1975, the State Agency waived the charge back to the EEOC.
On December 30, 1980, the EEOC issued its determinations with respect to each of the plaintiffs' charges. Attached to each determination was a right to sue notice, informing the plaintiffs that they must bring their actions within 90 days or their right to sue under Title VII would be lost. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed the instant actions in this Court against the Company and the Union.
There are jurisdictional prerequisites to instituting a private action under Title VII. One of these prerequisites is that a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within a certain time period after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). If a charge has not been timely filed with the EEOC a federal court has no jurisdiction over a plaintiff's claims under the Act. United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977).
Section 706(e) of the Act, with regard to the time period in which an EEOC charge must be filed specifically provides:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice ... such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)
The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed the issue of when an unlawful employment practice occurs for purposes of computing the timeliness of an EEOC complaint under Section 706(e). In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 499, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the court held that because the discriminatory act complained of was the denial of tenure, the alleged discrimination occurred, and the filing limitations period commence, at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to the plaintiff. In so holding, the court specifically noted that in determining the timeliness of a discrimination charge, "the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time which the consequences of the acts become most painful." Id. (); see Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1979).
In the consolidated cases before this Court, the plaintiffs alleged that the failure of the Company and Union to equally divide and distribute the existing Sub Plan payments was racially discriminatory. The proper focus for determining when the discriminatory act occurred is the time the decision was made regarding the payment of the Sub Plan funds and communicated to the plaintiffs, not when the effects of the act, the actual payment of funds was accomplished. Therefore, the discriminatory act, if any, occurred on January 5, 1975 when the Brown Trailer Division employees approved the freeze and the modification of the Sub Plan by an overwhelming majority. Thus, under the rule set forth in Delaware State College, the operative date for compiling the timeliness of plaintiffs' EEOC charges is January 5, 1975.
As noted above, Section 706(e) requires an aggrieved person to file a charge with the EEOC "within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice." Although Section 706(e) extends the filing period to 300 days when "the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from the alleged discriminatory practice ... upon receiving notice thereof ...", this extended period does not apply in cases, such as these, in which the plaintiffs fail to file timely charges with the appropriate state agency.
Although the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet addressed the issue, at least one district court in this circuit has recognized that an aggrieved person who has not instituted state discrimination proceedings in a timely fashion must file discrimination charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. Bottoms v. St. Vincents Hospital, 11 FEP Cases 392 (S.D.Ind.1975). Indeed, virtually every court which has faced the issue has recognized that plaintiffs who fail to file timely charges with deferral state agencies cannot take advantage of Section 706(e)'s 300 day deferral state limitation period. Dubois v. Packard Bell Corp., 470 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1972); Bennett v. Conrail, 26 FEP Cases 342,...
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