Battle v. Com. of Pa.
| Decision Date | 15 July 1980 |
| Docket Number | 79-2188,Nos. 79-2158,s. 79-2158 |
| Citation | 629 F.2d 269 |
| Parties | Patricia Sue BATTLE, by her parents and next friend June E. Battle and Donald E. Battle and June E. Battle and Donald E. Battle in their own right, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Caryl M. Kline, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education, The Abington School District, Dr. Carl B. Hoffman, Superintendent of the Abington School District, The Woods Schools, Dr. Harold S. Barbour, President of the Woods Schools. BERNARD, Natalie, a minor, by her parents and natural guardians Bernard, Clara M. and Bernard, Robert A. in their own right, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Kline, Caryl, Secretary of Education, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Education, The Marple Newtown School District, Sanner, Glenn, Superintendent of the Marple Newtown School District, Elwyn Institute, Clard, Dr. Gerald R., President of the Elwyn Institute. ARMSTRONG, Patricia and John, Individually and on behalf of their minor child, Gary Armstrong and Norma H., Individually and on behalf of her minor child, Richard H., on behalf of themselves and all those similarly situated v. KLINE, Caryl, Secretary of Education of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Individually and in her official capacity, The School District of Philadelphia, Michael Marcase, Individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the School District of Philadelphia and Arthur W. Thomas, Mrs. Edward Oberholtzer, Augustus Baxter, Mrs. Lawrence Boonin, Robert Sebastian, Mrs. Michael Stack, George Philip Stahl, Jr., and Dr. Nicholas Trolio, Individually and in their official capacities as members of the Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia. to 79-2190, and 79-2568 to 79-2570. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Allen C. Warshaw, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice (argued), Edward G. Biester, Jr., Norman J. Watkins, John Alzamora, Harrisburg, Pa., for appellants in Nos. 79-2188 and 79-2568-79-2570.
Janet F. Stotland, Philadelphia, Pa. (argued), for appellees, Armstrong, et al.
Sylvia Meek, Philadelphia, Pa. (argued), for appellees, Battle and Bernard.
Michael I. Levin (argued), William Fearen, Cleckner & Fearen, Harrisburg, Pa., for amicus curiae for Pennsylvania School Boards Association.
Gwendolyn H. Gregory (argued), Thomas A. Shannon, August W. Steinhilber, Washington, D.C., Richard S. Cohen, Waldemar G. Buschmann, Augusta, Me., for amicus curiae for State of Maine and National School Boards Association.
Frank D. Allen (argued), Joan Z. Bernstein, Ann Marie Reilly, Drew S. Days, III, Peter F. Vaira, Brian K. Landsberg, Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae for United States of America.
Roger A. Akin, Wilmington, Del., for amici curiae for the State of Delaware and Board of Education, State of Delaware.
Robert T. Lear, Legal Department, Philadelphia, Pa., for School District of Philadelphia.
Eleanore O'N. Kolodner, Robert A. MacDonnell, Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, Philadelphia, Pa., for Abington School District.
Vram Nedurian, Newtown Square, Pa., Lewis B. Beatty, Butler, Beatty, Greer & Johnson, Media, Pa., for Marple Newtown School District.
Before HUNTER, VAN DUSEN, and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976), requires that every state which elects to receive federal assistance under the Act provide all handicapped children with the right to a "free appropriate public education," id. § 1412, and establishes detailed procedures for implementing that right. Id. § 1415. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, a recipient of aid under the Act, has established an administrative policy which sets a limit of 180 days of instruction per year for all children, handicapped or not. We are called upon, in this case of first impression, to examine the scope and purpose of this recent act and to decide whether Pennsylvania's policy and the statute may coexist. We conclude that they may not.
This case is before us on interlocutory appeal from the grant of declaratory and injunctive relief ordered pursuant to a finding by the district court that the 180 day rule deprives the members of the plaintiff class of a free appropriate public education and violates their right to procedural safeguards under the Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
The case began as three class actions which were filed in January of 1978 by five handicapped children and their parents. The actions were consolidated for trial on their common injunctive and declaratory issues and the class of "(a) ll handicapped school aged persons in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who require or who may require a program of special education and related services in excess of 180 days per year and the parents or guardians of such persons" was certified. Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F.Supp. 583, 586 (E.D.Pa.1979). 1
The plaintiffs sued numerous defendants, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Department of Education, the state Secretary of Education, the local school district in which each named plaintiff resides, and the superintendent of each district. The complaint alleged that policies of the defendants, specifically the Commonwealth's 180 day rule, the school districts' refusal to fund the provision of more than 180 days of educational programming, and the statutory provisions which set an annual ceiling on per student expenditures, Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 24, §§ 13-1376, 13-1377 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80), violate the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 & Supp. II 1978), the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and various state laws. At this stage of the proceeding, however, the district court has only passed upon the validity of the 180 day rule under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. We shall, therefore address only that question, leaving the other issues to the district court in the first instance.
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1420 (1976), represents an attempt by Congress to assist the states in meeting the burdens imposed upon them by the widespread judicial recognition 2 of the right of handicapped children to a free public education appropriate to their needs. S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in (1975) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 1425, 1429-33. The Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism which sets requirements which must be complied with in order for states to be eligible to receive financial assistance. A number of these requirements are relevant to the instant case. First, each state seeking assistance must have "in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free appropriate public education," 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976), and must develop a plan which details the policies and procedures which insure the provision of that right. Id. § 1412(2). Each state must also establish the requisite procedural safeguards, id. § 1412(5), and must insure that local educational agencies in the state will establish the individualized educational programs required by the Act, id. § 1412(4). Compliance is enforced by the requirement that the state plan must be submitted to and approved by the Commissioner of Education before the state is entitled to assistance. Id. § 1413.
At the center of the controversy in this case is the definition of "free appropriate public education." According to the Act, "free appropriate public education" means
special education and related services which (A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the state educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the state involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized educational program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id. § 1401(18). "Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." Id. at § 1401(16). "Related services" are those services which "may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education . . . ." Id. § 1401(17). These include transportation and developmental, corrective, and supportive services such as speech pathology, audiology, recreation, psychological services, certain medical services, 3 physical therapy, occupational therapy, and counseling services. Id.
The individualized educational program (IEP) provides the vehicle for giving content to the required "free appropriate public education." The IEP is a
written statement for each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educational services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs, (D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration...
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