Battle v. Corizon, LLC
| Decision Date | 30 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-403-WC |
| Parties | CAROLD BATTLE, Plaintiff, v. CORIZON, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
On June 8, 2015, Carold Battle ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint (Doc. 1) alleging that Corizon, LLC1 ("Defendant") violated provisions of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2611, et seq. Plaintiff alleged both an interference claim and a retaliation claim under the FMLA. Doc. 1. Before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29) and its Brief in Support (Doc. 29-1); Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34); and Defendant's Reply (Doc. 41). For the reasons that follow, the court finds that Defendant's motion is due to be GRANTED.
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a reviewing court shall grant a motion for "summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).2 Only disputes about material facts will preclude the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings,depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing the non-moving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of her case on which she bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-23.
Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [her] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. In doing so, and to avoid summary judgment, the non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The parties must support their assertions "that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed" by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations[], admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials" or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) & (B).
If the nonmovant "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact" as required by Rule 56(c), then the court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion" and "grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) & (3).
In determining whether a genuine issue for trial exists, the court must view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). Likewise, the reviewing court must draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion." Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Furthermore, "[a] mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 () (internal citations omitted).
A reviewing court is restrained during summary judgment proceedings from making the sort of determinations ordinarily reserved for the finder of fact at a trial. See Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 54 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations and quotations omitted) ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict."). After the nonmoving party has responded to the motion for summary judgment, the court must grant summary judgmentif there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Pursuant to the court's scheduling order, the parties have jointly agreed that the following facts are uncontested for purposes of Defendant's motion for summary judgment:
Defendant has a contract with the Alabama Department of Correction ("ADOC") to provide health care related services to inmates incarcerated within Alabama state correctional facilities. Defendant has held the contract with the ADOC since November 1, 2007. As part of that contract, Defendant has certain obligations that are monitored by the ADOC, and Defendant is regularly audited by the ADOC to ensure compliance under the contract.
Plaintiff worked as a dental assistant for Defendant at the Bullock Correctional Facility from 1998 to August 2014. In September 2013, Plaintiff developed knee problems. Due to her knee issues, Plaintiff initially sought and was approved for FMLA leave beginning on December 10, 2013, expiring January 10, 2014, with Plaintiff returning to work at the Bullock Correctional Facility on January 13, 2014. Plaintiff thereafter sought further FMLA leave and was provided with FMLA leave beginning on May 21, 2014, and extending through July 11, 2014. On July 11, 2014, Plaintiff's protected twelve weeks of FMLA leave expired. However, Plaintiff's FMLA leave, at Plaintiff's request, was extended from May 21, 2014, through August 2, 2014. Plaintiff was never denied FMLA leave.
Plaintiff returned to work at the Bullock Correctional Facility on Monday, August 4, 2014. On August 5, 2014, personnel from the ADOC's offices of health services met with Defendant's management personnel and informed them that there were issues with respect to the logs of dental tools and instruments at the Bullock Correctional Facility that needed to be addressed immediately. At that meeting, the ADOC officials informed Defendant of certain issues with the dental instrument count logs that the ADOC had discovered during its audit.
Stephanie Caldwell ("Caldwell"), Paulette Perryman ("Perryman"), and Dr. Wehby ("Wehby") were not on FMLA leave during June, July, and August of 2014. Prior to Plaintiff's termination, none of those individuals were questioned or interviewed about the issues with the dental logs.3 None of those individuals were terminated for falsifying or failing to inform Defendant that the logs were inaccurate. On August 6, 2014, Defendant's personnel terminated Plaintiff, after recommendation for termination from Jessica Duffell ("Duffell"), for allegedly falsifying the Daily Dental Instrument Count Logs. During the meeting in which Plaintiff was terminated, Plaintiff was informed that she was being terminated because she had falsified documents, which she disputed.
Apart from the above uncontested facts, the court has carefully considered the pleadings in this case and all documents submitted in support of, and in opposition to, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The submissions of the parties, viewed inthe light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party, establish the following relevant facts:
Plaintiff's statutorily-protected FMLA leave ended on July 11, 2014. She was granted an extension until August 2, 2014. Plaintiff requested a second extension on July 30, 2014, but was denied. On that same day, one week prior to Plaintiff's termination, Defendant discussed, via email, terminating Plaintiff if she was unable to return to work. In that email, Defendant's employee, Cindy Johnson ("Johnson"), stated that she could "no longer accommodate [Plaintiff's] position being open." Plaintiff returned to work on Monday, August 4, 2014.
Defendant and the ADOC have policies which require the Dentistry Department to record the use of the dental instruments utilized by the dentist. Even when the dental assistant is not at the facility, it remains Defendant's responsibility to protect inmates from getting dental sharps that could hurt someone. Thus, the dentist, or anyone else working in the Dentistry Department on any particular day, should complete the daily instrument log if procedures are performed using particular dental tools. As such, the daily responsibility for the...
To continue reading
Request your trial