Battle v. State

• Decision Date: 26 November 1897
• Citation: 29 S.E. 491,103 Ga. 53
• Parties: BATTLE v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

29 S.E. 491

103 Ga. 53

BATTLE v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 26, 1897

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The verdict is not contrary to the law, and is supported by the evidence.

2. The court having distinctly instructed the jury that it was incumbent upon the state to overcome, by satisfactory evidence, the presumption of innocence which the law raises in favor of accused, and to establish "his guilt upon each material allegation contained in the indictment, and beyond all reasonable doubt," there was no error in failing to define "reasonable doubt" in connection with the charge that the jury must be satisfied to a reasonable and moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.

3. When, on a trial for murder, the jury are fully instructed upon the law of reasonable fears, it will not be cause for a new trial that the judge, in reading to the jury section 73 of the Penal Code, failed to add after the phrase, "the killing of the other was absolutely necessary," the words, "or that the party killing believed in good faith it was necessary."

4. There was no error in refusing to give in charge the written request submitted, there being no evidence to warrant so much thereof as related to the principles of law which makes the commission of a felony upon property a justification for homicide; and it not being good law, as claimed in another portion of the request, that a homicide can be justified if committed merely to prevent a serious personal injury, not amounting to a felony, upon the person killing.

Error from superior court, Laurens county; John C. Hart, Judge.

Joe Battle was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and, his motion for a new trial having been overruled, he brings error. Affirmed.

Robinson & Sanders, for plaintiff in error.

H. G Lewis and Anderson, Felder & Davis, for the State.

LITTLE J.

1. The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, and made a motion for a new trial. The first three grounds in the motion were what is known as the "general grounds,"--that the verdict is contrary to the evidence; without evidence against the evidence; and is contrary to law and the principles of justice. It is not our purpose to detail the evidence in the case. The statement prefixed to this opinion contains, in brief, a synopsis of the evidence which was had on the trial. From it could not be gathered facts showing that the plaintiff in error was justifiable in taking the life of the deceased. When the final rencounter took place, the evidence shows that the accused was very willing to take part in the fight. After he went out of the gate, according to one witness, he voluntarily returned with a drawn knife. It is true that the evidence shows that the deceased picked up a piece of rail, and struck at or struck the accused; but it is evident that both intended to fight, and were armed, the accused with his knife, and the deceased with a piece of fence rail. The jury evidently believed this theory of the case when they returned a verdict for voluntary manslaughter, and we cannot say that their finding was wrong, nor that the verdict is contrary to the law or evidence.

2. The next ground of complaint, as set out in the motion for a new trial, is that the court erred in failing to plainly and explicitly define what a reasonable doubt on the mind of the jury was, upon which they should acquit the defendant, in connection with that part of his charge relating to there being no necessity on the part of the state to demonstrate with mathematical certainty the guilt of the accused. The charge which the court delivered on this point is in the following language: "On arraignment the defendant pleads not guilty, and that is the issue you are impaneled to try. Notwithstanding the indictment, the defendant enters into this trial with the presumption of innocence in his favor and that presumption rests with him throughout the trial, until the state, by satisfactory evidence, overcomes that presumption, and establishes his guilt upon each material allegation contained in the indictment and beyond all reasonable doubt. The state is not required to demonstrate with mathematical accuracy and precision the guilt of the accused, but the state is bound to satisfy you, to a reasonable and moral certainty, of his guilt." The point of exception is that the judge failed in this connection to explain the meaning of "reasonable doubt." It hardly seems to be necessary to add to the words "reasonable doubt" any other words explanatory of their meaning. Mr. Bishop, in the first volume of his New Criminal Procedure, says: "There are no words plainer than 'reasonable doubt,' and none so exact to the idea meant. Hence some judges, it would seem, wisely decline attempting to interpret them to the jury." See, also, State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129; Mickey v. Com., 9 Bush, 593; Butler v. State, 7 Baxt. 35; Schultz v. State, 20 Tex.App. 315. In the words of another author, on the subject of giving a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" when applied to "reasonable doubts," "it is trying to count what is not number, and to measure what is not space." See Bone v. State (March Term, 1897; not yet officially reported) 30 S.E. 845. In the case of Miles v. U.S. , 103 U.S. 312, Justice Woods, delivering the opinion of the court, says on this subject: "Attempts to explain the term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the jury;" and cites a number of cases in connection with this view of the subject. It would seem, therefore, to be a conclusion that the phrase ...