Batton v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of New Jersey

• Decision Date: 02 March 1908
• Citation: 75 N.J.L. 857,69 A. 164
• Parties: BATTON v. PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

69 A. 164

75 N.J.L. 857

BATTON

v. PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 2, 1908.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Supreme Court.

Action by Clark H. Batton administrator, etc., of his deceased wife, Laura Batton, against the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey. Judgment for defendant, and the administrator brings error. Reversed, and new trial awarded.

William C. French, for plaintiff in error. E. A. Armstrong, for defendant in error.

TRENCHARD, J. This writ of error brings under review a judgment entered in the Supreme Court upon a nonsuit at the Camden circuit. The plaintiff is the administrator of his deceased wife, Laura Batton, and brought suit under the death act (Gen. St. p. 1188, § 11) to recover for the pecuniary injury resulting to the next of kin from the death of the wife, alleged to have been caused by a fall from a trolley car negligently operated by the defendant, the Public Service Corporation of New Jersey. The learned trial judge nonsuited the plaintiff upon the grounds (1) that the fall was not the proximate cause of death; and (2) that there was no proof of pecuniary loss to the next of kin. We think that both questions should have been submitted to the jury.

First. That the accident occurred, that it was due to the negligence of the defendant, and that in the fall the deceased ruptured her spleen, and was otherwise injured, is not disputed. But it is contended by the defendant that the fall from the car was not the proximate cause of her death. It is familiar law that the wrongful act, neglect, or default must have been the proximate cause of death in order to give a right of action therefor. See 13 Cyc. 319, and cases there cited. The proximate cause is the efficient cause; the one that necessarily sets the other causes in operation. The causes that are merely incidental or instruments of a superior or controlling agency are not proximate causes and the responsible ones, though they may be nearer in time to the result. Ætna. Fire Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 130, 24 L. Ed. 395; Wiley v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 44 N. J. Law, 247; Collins v. West Jersey Exp. Co., 72 N. J. Law, 231, 62 Atl. 675, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 373. In the present case it is established beyond controversy that prior to her fall from the trolley car the deceased enjoyed perfect health; that the fall ruptured her spleen, and that "she never had a well day after the fall"; that the spleen has to do with the blood-making processes of the body, and after the accident it did not perform its functions; that her "color was bad"; that the wound never more than partially healed, and that about nine weeks after the accident she had an internal hemorrhage, was taken to the hospital in a state of collapse, was there operated on by surgeons, and died two days thereafter.

But it is contended by the defendant that the hemorrhage which immediately preceded death was caused by a strain to which Mrs. Batton subjected herself, and that, therefore, the negligent act of the defendant was not the proximate cause of death. It is true that the post mortem examination showed that the wound which had only begun to heal had been freshly torn. It further appeared that some time during the day before she was removed to the hospital Mrs. Batton had lifted a wash boiler off the stove, and there is testimony tending to show that this might have broken open the healing wound; but this did not justify the court in holding as a matter of law that the wrongful act of the defendant was not the proximate cause of death. It appeared in the case that, though the deceased was sick continuously from the time of the accident, yet nevertheless she continued to attend to her...