Batts v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, 14285

• Decision Date: 17 April 1963
• Docket Number: 15010.,No. 14285,14285
• Citation: 316 F.2d 22
• Parties: James C. BATTS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Austin P. CANTRELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

316 F.2d 22 (1963)

James C. BATTS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Austin P. CANTRELL et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 14285, 15010.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

April 17, 1963.

Walter Harwood, Nashville, Tenn., Judson Harwood, Nashville, Tenn., on brief, for appellants.

M. D. Jones, Louisville, Ky., David M. Keeble, Nashville, Tenn., H. G. Breetz, Louisville, Ky., on brief, for appellee.

Before CECIL, Chief Judge, MILLER, Circuit Judge, and McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge.

The above appeals have been consolidated, and consolidated briefs have been filed.

In the case of James C. Batts et al., supra, an action was brought by employees of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, hereinafter referred to as L&N, who claimed to have been adadversely affected by a merger of the above-named railroad company with the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railway, hereinafter called N. C. & St. L. The District Court, in the Batts case, held that it did not have jurisdiction of the action and that such employees must submit their claims to arbitration. The court, in dismissing the employees' action, stated that it adjudicated solely the question of its lack of jurisdiction and did not determine the particular arbitration remedy or procedure which the appellants were required to follow. This case, also known as the Arnold case, because of one of the plaintiffs appellants, is reported sub nomine Arnold v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, D.C., 180 F.Supp. 429.

Almost immediately after the decision in the foregoing case, the L&N filed the complaint in the Cantrell case in which it sought a declaratory judgment in order to resolve a dispute as to the proper method of arbitration. In that suit, L&N alleged that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine the proper method of arbitration of the dispute in question, and that such arbitration was governed by an agreement between the L&N and the Union, which was the bargaining agent of the employees. The court thereafter dismissed a certain counterclaim of the employees, denied their motion for summary judgment, granted the motion of L&N for summary judgment, and decreed that any dispute as to the employees' protective benefits must be arbitrated in accordance with the provisions of the arbitration procedure, provided by the agreement between the L&N and the Union, which was the bargaining agent of the employees. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company v. Cantrell, D.C., 215 F.Supp. 229.

This controversy had its origin in an application filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission by L&N for authority to merge its properties and franchises with N. C. & St. L. After extensive hearings before the Commission, and subject to certain conditions hereinafter mentioned, the Interstate Commerce Commission approved the merger by its report and order, entitled Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, et al. Merger, etc., 295 I.C.C. 457. A direct attack on the Commission's report and order was unsuccessful when a three-judge District Court refused to annul, vacate, or set it aside. City of Nashville, Tennessee v. United States, D.C., 155 F.Supp. 98, aff. 355 U.S. 63, 78 S.Ct. 139, 2 L.Ed. 2d 106. Pursuant to the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the merger was consummated August 30, 1957.

In approving the merger, the Commission imposed certain general conditions for the protection of employees of the two railroads who might be adversely affected as a direct result of the merger. These employee-protective conditions were imposed by the Commission pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (f).¹

In its report and order, the Commission imposed, as is its general practice, the same conditions for the protection of the employees as it had imposed for the protection of employees in certain other controversies and agreements, known as the New Orleans Union Passenger Terminal Case, 282 I.C.C. 271, Oklahoma Railway Co. Trustees Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 177, and the Washington Job Protection Agreement of May 1936, an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement, which contained a schedule of financial benefits for employees adversely affected as a result of consolidations and coordinations. The Commission, however, imposed certain limitations and restrictions on the application of the Washington Job Protection Agreement. It further provided for the resolution of disputes involving entitlement of employees to the protective conditions by providing, as part of the conditions, "the procedure set forth in condition No. 8 of the conditions prescribed in Oklahoma Railway Co. Trustees Abandonment. * * * That condition provides for consideration and determination by an arbitration committee of questions regarding the eligibility for protection of persons or groups elsewhere described in the conditions. * * *" In condition No. 8 of the Oklahoma conditions, the Commission made provision for the formation of the arbitration committee, its duties, procedure, expenses, etc., by requiring the execution of implementing agreements hereinafter discussed.

On January 10, 1958, the unions, operating through System Federation Nos. 83 and 91, Railway Employes' Department, A. F. L.-C. I. O., entered into an implementing agreement with L&N. This implementing agreement was effective January 16, 1958, and provided additional benefits to employees adversely affected as the result of the merger. In the implementing agreement, provision was made, and machinery was set up, for the arbitration of disputes relative to the entitlement of employees to the protective benefits provided by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the additional benefits provided for by the implementing agreement. The above-named unions entering into the implementing agreement with L&N, had represented, long before the merger, all of the appellants in these cases, who were employees of the L&N, as well as the N. C. & St. L. employees. These unions had been certified, under the Railway Labor Act, as the duly authorized bargaining representatives of all of such employees.

The determining question in these cases is whether the employees are relegated to arbitration and representation by their duly certified bargaining agent, or whether they are entitled, as they contend, to make their claims against the merged Railroad and to bring suit on such claims if they are denied.

The provisions, in brief, of the various agreements incorporated by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its report and order approving the merger in the instant case, provide for certain payments or reduced employment of employees "affected by a particular coordination." Coordination means "joint action by two or more carriers whereby they unify, consolidate, merge or pool in whole or in part their separate railroad facilities or any of their joint operations or services previously performed by them through such separate facilities."

Appellant employees insist upon presenting their own claims to the Railroad, and the right of suing thereupon in case of refusal to pay. The Railroad maintains that disputes and controversies have arisen with respect to the entitlement of the employees in question to benefits; that these claims are subject to arbitration; and that the arbitration machinery includes as arbitrators the Railroad or its representative and the duly authorized representative of the employees. Among the reasons why the Railroad contends that all such claims are subject to arbitration is that the employees in question were not adversely affected by the merger, but rather that instead of their discharges and furloughs being the result of the merger, they were caused by loss of business, general economic decline, and other reasons not related to the merger; and that consequently such employees are not entitled to benefits upon their discharge or furlough. Moreover, the Railroad submits that the controlling statutory provision sets forth that, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, an agreement pertaining to the interests of the employees affected by the merger may be...