Bauer v. Cnty. of Saginaw

• Decision Date: 28 May 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 14–cv–11158.
• Citation: 111 F.Supp.3d 767
• Parties: Beth BAUER, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAGINAW, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

111 F.Supp.3d 767

Beth BAUER, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF SAGINAW, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 14–cv–11158.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

Signed May 28, 2015.

David J. Masud, Joshua J. Leadford, Richard R. Vary, Masud Labor Law Group, Saginaw, MI, for Plaintiff.

Jessica Dopierala Hite, Timothy S. Ferrand, Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho PLC, Clinton Township, MI, Russell C. Babcock, Victor J. Mastromarco, Jr., The Mastromarco Firm, Saginaw, MI, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM, DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE AS MOOT, AND CANCELLING HEARING

THOMAS L. LUDINGTON, District Judge.

On March 19, 2014, Plaintiff Beth Bauer filed suit against her former employers, alleging that Saginaw County Prosecuting Attorney John A. McColgan wrongfully terminated her employment as the Legal Office Manager of the County Prosecutor.

She alleges violations of her First Amendment right to associate, race discrimination, age discrimination, breach of contract, legitimate expectation of just-cause employment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On April 13, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of Bauer's claims. Bauer, too, moved for summary judgment; Bauer's motion was limited to her claim for breach of contract. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Bauer's claim for violation of the First Amendment will be granted because the Legal Office Manager position is one where political loyalty is appropriate to the effective performance of the elected County Prosecutor. And Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Bauer's claims of race discrimination, age discrimination, and legitimate expectation of just-cause employment will be granted because Bauer has not demonstrated a triable issue of fact for each of these claims. Moreover, Bauer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress will be dismissed because McColgan, as County Prosecutor, is entitled to absolute immunity from tort claims. Lastly, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Bauer's breach of contract claim will be granted—and Bauer's denied—because Bauer has not exhausted her administrative grievances as required by the governing collective bargaining agreement. Bauer's breach of contract claim will therefore be dismissed without prejudice so that she may exhaust her administrative remedies.

I.

Bauer was hired to be the Legal Office Manager for the County Prosecutor on April 21, 1989, by Michael Thomas, who had just been elected County Prosecutor. Before joining the County Prosecutor's Office, she worked as a legal secretary for Mr. Thomas in his law firm.

As part of her job duties as Legal Office Manager, she worked closely with County Prosecutor Thomas, Ex. A at 66, supervised and trained the secretarial staff, id., and oversaw the day-to-day operations of the support staff and operating functions of the office, id. at 76. She also took part in hiring decisions, Ex. at 77, and administered the budget, at least with respect to the day-to-day office supplies, witness fees, etc., id. at 79.

While employed as the Legal Office Manager, Bauer was represented by the UAW, Local No. 455, Unit 48, Managers (Union) and therefore at least some of her terms and conditions of employment were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) negotiated with the Union.¹ Until 2008, the CBA provided just-cause employment to the position of Legal Office Manager as well as other members of the Union. In 2008, however, Saginaw County proposed to eliminate just-cause protection for the Legal Office Manager position and replace it with a terminable at-will employment standard.

The 2008 CBA reflects this new at-will employment standard, but the CBA also reflects the compromise that the Legal Office Manager would be a just-cause position so long as Bauer occupied the position: "Legal Office Manager (at-will employee; see MOU)". Ex. C. App. A.

"MOU" refers to the Memorandum of Understanding, a document signed by the Saginaw County Controller, County Prosecuting Attorney Thomas, Saginaw County's legal counsel, the Union's International Representative David Kelly, and the Union's Steward Cheryl Jarzabkowski. The Memorandum of Understanding provides:

Contingent on ratification of a new CBA, which shall designate in its Appendix that the position of Legal Office Manager in the Prosecuting Attorney's Office is an at-will position, the Employer, Co–Employer and Union agree that the incumbent in said position, Beth Bauer, is not an at-will employee, but rather an employee subject to discipline under a just cause standard.

Ex. G. The parties dispute whether this language confers just-cause employment on Bauer. Following the creation of the Memorandum of Understanding and the renegotiation of the CBA, Bauer remained employed as the Legal Office Manager.

In 2012, Defendant McColgan ran against and defeated the incumbent County Prosecutor, Mr. Thomas. Although McColgan's first day as County Prosecutor did not begin until January 2, 2013, he offered the Legal Office Manager position to Ms. Christi Lopez, who was a secretary for Saginaw District Court Judge Christopher Boyd at the time of the election.² Ms. Lopez accepted McColgan's offer and resigned from her position as Mr. Boyd's judicial secretary on November 29, 2012. On December 10, 2012, McColgan e-mailed Bauer to inform her that he was hiring someone else for the position of Legal Office Manager: "As I am sure you are aware, I am planning on bringing in my own office manager...." Ex. I.

On January 2, 2013—McColgan's first official day as County Prosecutor—Bauer reported to the office to find Ms. Lopez at her desk. When Ms. Bauer asked whether she was fired, McColgan did not give her an answer. Bauer and her union steward contacted the Saginaw County Controller for assistance; the County Controller visited the steward's office that same day and presented Bauer a Notice of Discharge signed by McColgan, which terminated her employment effective January 16, 2013.

Bauer then filed a grievance under Article 5(A) of the CBA, asserting that her termination violated the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding. Saginaw County and the County Prosecutor denied the grievance, and the parties agreed to hold Bauer's grievance in abeyance.

II.

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the "movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of identifying where to look in the record for evidence "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party who must set out specific facts showing "a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation omitted). The Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant and determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III.

Defendants seek summary judgment on all of Bauer's claims, which allege (1) § 1983 claim for violation of her First Amendment right to political association, (2) race discrimination, (3) age discrimination, (4) breach of contract, (5) legitimate expectation of employment, and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bauer, too, moved for summary judgment, focusing on her breach of contract claim. Each of the claims will be discussed in turn.

A.

Defendants first seek summary judgment on Bauer's claim that the termination of her employment violated her First Amendment right to political association. She claims that she was terminated because of her loyalty to McColgan's predecessor (and opponent). "Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), patronage dismissals (i.e., dismissals for failure to support a particular party or candidate) have been, in general, unconstitutional." Caudill v. Hollan, 431 F.3d 900, 908 (6th Cir.2005). This rule represents the outcome of the Supreme Court's application of the strict scrutiny required by the First Amendment to the interests promoted by the party patronage system. See McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1543 (6th Cir.1996).

For a plaintiff to succeed on a political patronage case, she must first demonstrate a prima facie case that she was discharged because of her political affiliation. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). If the plaintiff succeeds in making that showing, the defendant must then show that the position is of a type that would qualify for an exception to the rule against patronage dismissals. Id.

i.

Here, Bauer claims that McColgan terminated her employment because she had worked for his predecessor Mr. Thomas for over twenty years and had supported Mr. Thomas's campaign. Indeed, McColgan admits as much: "I did not reappoint Beth Bauer to the position of Legal Office Manager because Ms. Bauer was employed by my predecessor twenty plus years." McColgan Aff. ¶ 5, Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. Ex. D.

In their motion, Defendants make much of the fact that McColgan's decision to terminate Bauer's employment was because of "Plaintiff's relationship/ loyalty to Mr. Thomas, the absence of relationship with Mr. McColgan," and not "politics." Defs.' Mot. Summ. J. 8.

But even if Defendants are correct and McColgan terminated Bauer's employment for "personal" affiliation rather than "political" affiliation, the termination could still be improper. The Sixth Circuit has held that...