Bauer v. Sawyer
Decision Date | 22 March 1956 |
Docket Number | No. 33745,33745 |
Citation | 8 Ill.2d 351,134 N.E.2d 329 |
Parties | August A. BAUER et al., Appellees, v. P. W. SAWYER et al. (P. W. Sawyer, Appellant.) |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Werner W. Schroeder, Chicago, Eva L. Minor and Maynard R. Bissonnette, Kankakee, for appellant.
Butz, Blanke & Stith, Kankakee, for appellees.
All of the parties to this action are doctors. Prior to March 31, 1954, they were associated together in a medical partnership known as the Kankakee Clinic. On that date Dr. P. W. Sawyer, the principal defendant, withdrew from the partnership and in May of 1954 he opened offices for the practice of medicine and surgery in the city of Kankakee. Five of the eleven remaining partners instituted this action, alleging that the partnership agreement prohibited a retiring partner from practicing medicine in the city of Kankakee and seeking an injunction to restrian Dr. Sawyer from violating the agreement. The other six remaining partners were joined as defendants. They admitted the allegations of the complaint, but sought no relief against Dr. Sawyer. Dr. Sawyer also admitted the allegations of the complaint, but defended on the ground that the partnership agreement contemplated that a withdrawing partner had the alternative right to perform the agreement or to pay liquidated damages. The case was submitted upon the pleadings and a stipulation of facts. The circuit court entered a decree dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Court reversed, 6 Ill.App.2d 178, 126 N.E.2d 844, and we granted leave to appeal.
The partnership agreement provides that the interest of an individual partner may be terminated by retirement based on physical incapacity, by voluntary withdrawal, or by expulsion for unprofessional conduct or for failure to carry out the provisions of the agreement. In each instance the remaining partners are to purchase the interest of the outgoing partner at a stated percentage of its value as shown on the partnership books: 100 per cent in case of retirement for incapacity, 80 per cent in case of voluntary withdrawal, and 75 per cent in case of expulsion. By the agreement each partner covenants that after the termination of his interest he will not engage in the practice of medicine, surgery or radiology within a radius of 25 miles of Kankakee for a period of five years. The agreement also provides that if the former partner violates this covenant, he shall forfeit any unpaid protion of the purchase price of his interest. In the case of a partner withdrawing voluntarily, one half the purchase price is payable 30 days after withdrawal and the other half is to be evidenced by notes payable in one year which are to be delivered to an escrow agent, who is directed to cancel the notes upon certification by the remaining partners that the former partner has resumed practice. At the time of his withdrawal from the firm Dr. Sawyer was paid 40 per cent of the value of his partnership interest, and a note for the remaining 40 per cent was turned over to an escrow agent in accordance with the agreement.
Although Dr. Sawyer admits that he resumed practice in Kankakee in violation of the contract he contends that the contract ought not to be specifically enforced against him, (1) because it is an unreasoanble restraint of trade and contrary to public policy, and (2) because it contains a provision for liquidated damages which bars specific enforcement.
The principles governing cases of this kind were stated in Ryan v. Hamilton, 205 Ill. 191, 197, 68 N.E. 781, 783, in which a contract by a physician not to engage in practice in a specified community was enforced by injunction: See also Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184 N.E. 868; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 Ill. 75. In determining whether a restraint is reasonable it is necessary to consider whether enforcement will be injurious to the public or cause undue hardship to the promisor, and whether the restraint imposed is greater than is necessary to protect the promisee. Hursen v. Gavin, 162 Ill. 377, 44 N.E. 735; Restatement of the Law, Contracts, secs. 515, 516.
In this case the interest of the public is in having adequate medical protection, and it is of course true, as suggested by Dr. Sawyer, that if the injunction is granted the number of doctors available in the Kankakee community will be reduced. A stipulation entered into by the parties, however, shows that there are now 70 doctors serving the area. We are unable to say that the reduction of this number by one will cause such injury to the public as to justify us in refusing to enforce this contract. In any case, there is no reason why Dr. Sawyer cannot serve the public interest equally well by practicing in another community. No special hardship to Dr. Sawyer appears which would justify the denial of relief in this case. He may resume practice in Kankakee after five years and in the meantime he may practice elsewhere. The territorial limitation to the city of Kankakee and the surrounding area is not, we think, unreasonable in the light of modern methods of transportation and communication. Granger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10, 52 A.L.R. 1356. Agreements unlimited in time have heretofore been enforced, Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184, N.E. 868; Ryan v. Hamilton, 205 Ill. 191, 68 N.E. 781; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 Ill. 75, although other authorities hold that the restraint must be limited in time as well as space. Hursen v. Gavin, 162 Ill. 377, 44 N.E. 735; Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchison & Overton Clinic, 153 Tex. 363, 269 S.W.2d 798; Brecher v. Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377. We need not here consider whether a time limitation is essential, because in any event the present five-year period does not appear unreasonable. Shaleen v. Stratte, 188 Minn, 219, 246 N.W. 744.
It thus appears that the agreement is not contrary to public policy by the tests that have heretofore been employed. Dr. Sawyer contends, however, that the prior cases decided by this and other courts are distinguishable because they involve either the sale of an established prctice or the taking of a newcomer into an established practice, as employee or partner. Pointing out that in this case there was no express sale of the practice of any of the partners, and each of the partners was a practicing physician when the agreement was entered into, he argues that 'If there is no established practice sold and no newcomer as a potential usurper, there is no deed for the restraint being enforced by injunction.'
With this contention we do not agree. No case is cited which holds that the members of a partnership may not by their agreement reasonably protect themselves against the competition of an outgoing partner. Indeed such agreements are classic illustrations of reasonable restraints of trade. Crane on Partnerships, sec. 84. 'The contract of a partner not to compete with the partnership either directly or indirectly is not opposed to public policy; but such an agreement must be ancillary to the relation or contract of partnership or to a contract by which a partner disposes of his interest.' 5 Williston on Contracts, sec. 1644; Restatement of the Law, Contracts, sec. 516, comment (f). Our own decision in Storer v. Brock, 351 Ill. 643, 184 N.E. 868, enforced an agreement, entered into between two doctors upon the dissolution of their partnership, which restricted the future practice of the retiring partner. The distinction attempted to be drawn is without merit.
The most significant of the two remaining contentions of the defendant relates to the effect of the forfeiture clause. Under the partnership agreement the purchase price ot be paid to an outgoing partner is payable in equal annual installments. In the event of a retirement for incapacity, there is one installment; if there is voluntary withdrawal, as in this case, there are two installments, and in the case of an ouster there are three installments. The first installment is payable thirty days after the withdrawal and notes are issued for the other installments. Interest is payable on the outstanding balance, and the partners hae the privilege of prepayment. The notes are to be deposited with an escrow agent, who is directed to deliver them to the outgoing partner on the due...
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