Baugh v. Lane

Citation722 F. Supp. 525
Decision Date26 September 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-3121.,88-3121.
PartiesJack Ernest BAUGH, Petitioner, v. Michael P. LANE, Director, Dept. of Corrections; Steve McEvers, Warden, Logan Correctional Center, Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois

Jack Ernest Baugh, Lincoln, Ill., pro se.

Douglas K. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., Springfield, Ill., for respondents.

OPINION

RICHARD MILLS, District Judge:

Habeas corpus.

Relief denied on procedural grounds.

Baugh has moved for federal relief from his 1977 state court guilty plea and conviction for murder and unlawful use of weapons. The State of Illinois has responded to the petition, and Petitioner has replied to the response. Pursuant to Rule 8(a) of the rules governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases, we have determined that an evidentiary hearing is not required in this case, because we further hold that Petitioner has waived any entitlement to federal habeas corpus relief through a procedural default.

Accordingly, the petition is denied and the case is dismissed.

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts of this case and its procedural history are culled entirely from the petition and its accompanying exhibits. Along with the petition, Petitioner has filed excerpts from transcripts of several court proceedings, affidavits of several relatives, and letters from well-wishers and potential witnesses. Additionally, Respondent has filed complete transcripts of all the trial court hearings pertaining to Petitioner, save his sentencing.

The roots of this petition go back to the spring of 1977, when Jack Ernest Baugh resided with one Susan J. Hayes in East Peoria, Illinois. There, sometime in the evening on April 6, Ms. Hayes was murdered by means of a severe beating with some blunt instrument, possibly a cane. The police investigation focused on Baugh; the interest in Baugh stemmed as well from the fact that some 16 firearms were discovered during the investigation which apparently all belonged to Baugh — because he had a prior felony conviction, the guns placed him in violation of both state and federal law.

About a week after the murder Baugh surrendered to the police and was officially charged with Ms. Hayes' slaying. Baugh's counsel at the time he surrendered and at his arraignment and preliminary hearing was a Mr. Napoli; this attorney, however, had filed a limited entry of appearance stating that he would only represent Baugh through the preliminary hearing. Thus, following that hearing Attorney Napoli withdrew and the public defender was appointed on May 4, 1977. At some point following that, however, Mr. Napoli once again took the reins, and he represented Baugh at the time of the guilty plea on June 24, 1977.

Petitioner Baugh had been charged by the State of Illinois with four counts of murder and one count of unlawful use of weapons (3 blackjacks and 1 set of metal knuckles were also found at the scene of the murder). The guilty plea entered by Petitioner resulted from the state agreeing to dismiss three of the murder counts, leaving only one murder count and the unlawful use of weapons charge. The original plea and sentencing agreement called for a prison term of 20 to 40 years plus parole; the judge, however, rejected this plea without comment. The record reveals that "a brief recess was taken," following which the parties approached the judge with a nearly identical plea agreement which this time called for a 20 to 60 year period of incarceration, signed by Petitioner and both counsel. After expressly asking Petitioner if he had had time to review and consider both the original and the amended plea agreement, and also after being fully satisfied of the factual basis for the guilty plea, the judge accepted the plea agreement and entered a judgment of conviction on those charges. Petitioner was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement on July 6, 1977, at which time he was also advised of his right to withdraw and to appeal his guilty plea.

The firearms discovered during the murder investigation were not forgotten; Petitioner's illegal possession of these was prosecuted in federal court concurrently with the state court proceeding. The United States charged Petitioner with 7 counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(h), and on June 24, 1977, Petitioner pled guilty to those charges and agreed to be sentenced separately for each count. The total federal sentence came to 35 years, and this sentence ran concurrently with Petitioner's state sentence.

Petitioner never appealed his state court conviction, nor did he ever seek any other post-conviction remedy in the state courts. He did, however, appeal his federal conviction, and succeeded in getting 5 of the 7 counts vacated due to a defective plea agreement. United States v. Baugh, 787 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir.1986). As a result, Petitioner's federal incarceration period was substantially shortened; he has now served all his federal time, and his custody has been transferred to Illinois prison officials. Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in Lincoln, Illinois.

The mandate vacating portions of Petitioner's federal conviction was entered on April 3, 1986. As previously noted, Petitioner never sought any state review of his state conviction. The only other review of this conviction sought by Petitioner is the instant petition, filed with this Court almost 11 years following Petitioner's guilty plea and sentencing.

The Petition

Petitioner's most vigorous argument in requesting that we set him free is that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily. He claims first that he was not competent to plead guilty because from mid-April through June 22, 1977, while he was in custody pending his trial, he was given several drugs for nerve problems he was experiencing. Petitioner has submitted the affidavits of his mother, his two children, and his uncle, as well as his own, which in essence state that Petitioner's mental state was not normal during those time periods, and the affiants ascribe the abnormality to the drugs ingested. Additionally, Petitioner has submitted a letter from a doctor indicating that the drugs prescribed to Petitioner during that time might impair mental faculties.

Petitioner also claims that his plea was involuntary due to his lack of understanding of the charges, due to the lack of any factual basis for the plea, and due to the fact that he was not informed of the requisite mental state for a murder conviction and that he did not possess that mental state at the time he killed Ms. Hayes.1 Petitioner further claims that he had insufficient time in which to consider the amended plea agreement after the Court rejected the first attempt, and that the plea was entered into on bad advice of counsel in that his attorney told him that he would be paroled within 10 years. In addition, Petitioner urges that his plea was involuntary due to incompetence of counsel; he claims that the federal sentence which was subsequently vacated demonstrates his attorney's incompetence, as do other incidents.

Petitioner also attacks his conviction on the basis that the Court deprived him of the right to counsel of his choice when it allowed Mr. Napoli to withdraw and appointed the public defender to represent Petitioner following his preliminary hearing. Finally, Petitioner also argues that he was denied his right to appeal; though he claims to have been of the understanding that Mr. Napoli would appeal the conviction, no such appeal was ever filed.

Taking the Case

Our conclusion that the relief requested has been waived by Petitioner through his own procedural default is reached through an indirect route.

We begin with Respondent's assertion that this petition should be dismissed due to Petitioner's failure to exhaust state remedies in accordance with section 2254(b). Specifically, Respondent argues that state relief is available to by virtue of Ill.Rev. Stat. ch. 38, ¶ 122-1, Illinois' Post-Conviction Hearing Act, which opens the state courts' doors to claims of a substantial denial of federal constitutional rights during proceedings resulting in the claimant's conviction. Respondent notes that section 2254, by its own terms, requires that such state relief be exhausted prior to seeking federal assistance, and so this petition should now be denied.

We agree with Respondent that the claims raised in this petition would be cognizable in a Post-Conviction Hearing Act proceeding. Petitioner here failed to raise any of his claimed constitutional errors on direct appeal — in fact, one error claimed is that he was altogether denied his right to appeal. Hence, all of his claims would be presentable to an Illinois court because "the Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a separate remedy, the availability of which is not contingent upon exhaustion of any other remedy.... Thus, a party who fails to take an appeal, whether by careful choice, inadvertance, indigence, or as a result of fleeing the jurisdiction ..., may waive claims of error, but any right which may have existed to a post-conviction hearing on the constitutionality of imprisonment will remain undiminished." People v. Rose, 43 Ill.2d 273, 279, 253 N.E.2d 456 (1969).

In the ordinary course of things, then, we would be obliged to dismiss this petition pursuant to section 2254(b) to allow the state courts a first crack at ruling upon Petitioner's claimed errors. This would further the policy of comity underlying the exhaustion rule, which policy is based upon "the relations existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard and protect rights secured by the Constitution." Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 514, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1201, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (quoting Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251, 6 S.Ct....

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5 cases
  • Culberson v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi
    • 10 Diciembre 1992
    ...affected unless and until his prior conviction used as an aggravating factor is properly and successfully challenged. In Baugh v. Lane, 722 F.Supp. 525 (C.D.Ill.1989), the petitioner plead guilty to murder and was sentenced on July 6, 1977. Baugh never appealed this conviction nor sought an......
  • Harris v. DeRobertis
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 9 Mayo 1991
    ...faith argument could be made. Baptist v. O'Leary, No. 84-C-8333, 1989 WL 135248 (N.D.Ill. October 23, 1989). Finally, in Baugh v. Lane, 722 F.Supp. 525 (C.D.Ill.1989), the court held that the possibility of demonstrating a lack of culpable negligence was so exceedingly low that dismissal fo......
  • Stinnett v. Clarke
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia
    • 3 Junio 2021
    ...Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986 (illiteracy does not constitute cause); Baugh v. Lane, 722 F. Supp. 525, 531, (C.D. Ill. 1989) ("pro se status and ignorance of the law" are "insufficient to establish cause.") (collecting cases); see also United Sta......
  • Henderson v. Cohn, 89-2377
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 11 Diciembre 1990
    ...v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir.1986) (illiteracy is insufficient to establish cause); Baugh v. Lane, 722 F.Supp. 525, 531 (C.D.Ill.1989) (that petitioner was lay person not knowledgeable about law is insufficient to establish cause for ten-year delay in filing......
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