Baugh v. Moore

• Decision Date: 19 December 1913
• Citation: 89 A. 404,122 Md. 149
• Parties: BAUGH v. MOORE. [d1]
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

89 A. 404

122 Md. 149

BAUGH v. MOORE. ^[d1]

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 19, 1913

Appeal from Superior Court of Baltimore City; Chas. W. Heuisler Judge.

"To be officially reported."

Action by Edwin C. Moore against Edwin P. Baugh. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed.

Arthur R. Padgett and John Philip Hill, both of Baltimore, for appellant.

Emmet Wallace White, of Baltimore, for appellee.

STOCKBRIDGE J.

This suit, as originally instituted, contained two counts, the first in slander, and the second in libel. By the ruling of the court below, the count in libel was withdrawn from the consideration of the jury, and is not involved in this appeal. The present suit, therefore, is simply an action for slander, based upon the first count of the declaration, and arises out of the following circumstances:

In the latter part of 1910 the appellee was employed by the appellant as manager of the latter's farm in Anne Arundel county, and continued as such during the ensuing winter, but in May, 1911, was discharged by the appellant. About a month after the termination of this employment Mr. Baugh, the appellant, being at a hotel in Baltimore, dictated to a public stenographer in the hotel a letter, which he mailed to Moore, the appellee, and some of the language in which constitutes the alleged slander; the alleged slanderous words being: "There are scarcely any small tools on the place. I don't know what you did with them; but I gave you the money for them. Rubber boots, coats, etc., have all disappeared--after costing me in the neighborhood of $5,000 and giving the place a bad name through your gross incompetency and neglect--to walk off with my property, even if it is a sheet of paper, I won't stand, and I want everything belonging to me instantly returned. You are the first person I have ever had in my employ that has not brought the inventory and his accounts to go over with me to prove they were right before leaving. You did not do this. The inventory is not of what is on the place, but rather of what should be on the place. I now understand why you did not bring your accounts, etc., to me."

Following the language quoted in the narr. is the innuendo "meaning thereby that the said plaintiff had been guilty of embezzlement." A general demurrer was filed to the declaration, which was overruled. The demurrer, of course admits that the words were written by the defendant, and that they were false and malicious; but it does not admit that the words in themselves are actionable per se, nor does it admit that they are, when read by themselves, or in connection with the colloquium, capable of the meaning ascribed to them in the innuendo. If it be conceded that the words as interpreted by the innuendo are actionable, the question whether the innuendo is good, that is to say, whether it is fairly warranted by the letter, when read in connection with the inducement and colloquium, still remains as a matter of law for the court. It is the office of the innuendo to explain the words of the alleged slander, and to give them their true meaning. It cannot, however, introduce new matter, or enlarge or add to the sense of the words declared on, or properly impute to them a meaning not justified, either when taken alone or in connection with the inducement and colloquium. Lewis v. New, 81 Md. 466, 32 A. 246, 29 L. R. A. 59; Dorsey v. Whipps, 8 Gill, 462; Haines v. Campbell, 74 Md. 158, 21 A. 702, 28 Am. St. Rep. 240; Avirett v. State, 76 Md. 510, 25 A. 676, 987; Barnes v. State, 88 Md. 347, 41 A. 781; Goldsborough v. Orem, 103 Md. 681, 64 A. 36; Weeks v. News Pub. Co., 117 Md. 126, 83 A. 162.

Taking the language as used in the declaration, together with the admissions necessarily made by the demurrer, and the allegation that the plaintiff had been injured thereby, the demurrer was properly overruled.

The case then proceeded to trial. The sole exception reserved was the exception of the defendant to the ruling of the court on the prayers, and the important ruling was the refusal of the defendant's first prayer, by which the...