Baughman v. Lumpkin
| Decision Date | 15 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-03016 |
| Parties | Steve Kurt Baughman, Petitioner, v. Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Before the Court are Petitioner Steve Baughman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Respondent Bobby Lumpkin's (“the Director”) motion for summary judgment. Dkt. 1; Dkt 14. After carefully reviewing the petition, Baughman's supporting memorandum, Dkt. 2, the Director's motion Baughman's response, Dkt. 26, the record, and the appliable law, it is recommended that the Director's motion for summary judgment be granted and that Baughman's petition be denied. It is further recommended that the Court decline to hold an evidentiary hearing and deny a certificate of appealability.
On April 2, 2014, Kurt Baughman was arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and felon in possession of a firearm. Dkt. 10-1 at 13. The indictment charged him with striking his ex-girlfriend, Machell Spear, with a firearm and threatening to kill Ms. Spear and her son, John Spear. Id. at 25. The state district court appointed an attorney to serve as Baughman's counsel. Id. at 21. But Baughman eventually requested a new attorney and filed a grievance against his original one. Id. at 28. The court then appointed Baughman a second attorney Ricardo Gonzalez. Id. at 29-30.
Baughman grew frustrated with Mr. Gonzalez's strategy and later moved to replace Mr. Gonzalez with yet another court-appointed attorney. See id. at 57-58. After filing a bar complaint against Mr. Gonzalez, see id. at 87, Baughman filed a flurry of pro se motions, complaints, and petitions for mandamus relief. See id. at 90-588.
The trial court appointed Baughman a third attorney, Terrence Gaiser. Id. at 591 (Aug. 15, 2017 appointment order). Mr. Gaiser promptly moved to have an investigator appointed. Id. at 592-93. Although the record does not indicate whether the court granted Gaiser's request, it includes numerous documents that either Gaiser or his investigator had procured-including Baughman's medical records, Dkts. 10-20-10-38.
Nevertheless, Baughman again demanded new counsel. Id. at 645-51 (Dec. 4, 2017 motion). The court immediately addressed Baughman's request at a hearing on pretrial motions. Dkt. 10-11 at 5-13. Baughman moved for a new hearing to demonstrate that he and his attorney were at loggerheads over trial strategy. See id. at 8. But the court denied this motion, explaining that Baughman's case had been pending for more than 1300 days, and that it “needs to go to trial, and it needs to go today.” Id. at 7. Ultimately, Baughman decided to proceed with Mr. Gaiser as his attorney. Id. at 13.
Baughman's trial lasted two days. The State presented four witnesses: the victims, Machell and John Spear, and two arresting officers, Deputies Maxwell and Benningfield. See Dkt. 10-13 at 16-211. Ms. Spear testified that Baughman came to her house, grew agitated, put a gun to her forehead, and threatened to kill her and her son, John, who was standing nearby. Dkt. 1013 at 111-12, 115-16, 120. John corroborated these events, further describing the weapon as a silver gun with a brown handle that Baughman had shown John on a prior occasion. Id. at 169, 174-78, 190, 208-09 (State Ex. 38). Both victims testified that Baughman used the gun to strike Ms. Spear on the back of her head after she turned to flee. Id. at 116-17, 119-20; see also id. at 18283 (John's testimony).
Ms. Spear had given a similar account of events to the officer who interviewed her at the scene. See id. at 25-27 (Maxwell's testimony). Deputy Maxwell testified that Ms. Spear was hysterical, suffering pain, and had “an egg-sized knot that had been split open and ... blood in her hair. Id. at 18, 23, 25; see also Dkt. 10-16 at 10-14 (State Exs. 8-12, photographs). About an hour after Deputy Maxwell's arrival, Baughman drove up on his motorcycle. Dkt. 10-13 at 29-30, 59. According to Deputy Maxwell, Baughman admitted to having a gun (insisting later it was a BB gun) but said he had thrown it in a ditch. Id. at 30-31. Maxwell took Baughman to the area where he claimed to have thrown the gun but found nothing there. Id. at 30-31, 34, 61, 73.
During an inventory search of Baughman's motorcycle, another officer, Deputy Benningfield, recovered two firearms-including a brown-handled pistol-from an attached saddlebag. Id. at 30-31, 35-36, 55; Dkt. 10-16 at 1638 (photos, State Exs. 14-36); Dkt. 10-13 at 83-85 (Benningfield). John Spear identified the brown-handled pistol as the one Baughman had used to strike his mother. See id. at 176-77 (identifying State Ex. 25).
The State also read into the record a stipulation concerning Baughman's prior conviction for attempted capital murder of a police officer, id. at 46, which the jury was instructed to consider only for the limited purpose of determining whether Baughman had a prior felony conviction-an element of the charge of felon in possession of a firearm, Dkt. 10-1 at 657. Over Mr. Gaiser's objection, the court also admitted a 911 call from a neighbor to whose house Ms. Spear had fled after the assault. Dkt. 10-13 at 130-32; see also id. at 127-28 ().
During the defense's case-in-chief, Mr. Gaiser put on two witnesses: Gerald Bush and Linda Pugh. Mr. Bush testified that the firearms recovered at the scene in belonged to him; Bush had left them in motorcycle after borrowing it. Id. at 217-19. Ms. Pugh, who is Baughman's mother, id. at 227-28, testified about Baughman's character and his relationship with some of the other witnesses in this case. See id. at 233-36.
The jury convicted Baughman on one count of felon in possession of a firearm and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Dkt. 1014 at 20-21. Because of Baughman's prior felony conviction, the court sentenced him to 30 years in prison. Dkt. 10-15 at 26.
Baughman appealed. Dkt. 10-1 at 728 (docket sheet). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals modified the judgment to delete duplicative court costs but otherwise affirmed. Dkt. 10-39 at 19. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) denied review. See Dkt. 11-39.
Baughman then sought state habeas relief. See Dkt. 11-25; Dkt. 11-29; Dkt. 11-32. The trial court denied his petitions, Dkt. 11-22; Dkt. 11-26; Dkt. 11-30, which decision was affirmed summarily on appeal, Dkt. 11-33. The TCCA denied review. Dkt. 11-38. Baughman timely filed the instant petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is ripe for review. Dkt. 1.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) curtails the grounds on which a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus. Relief is available for claims that were adjudicated on the merits only if the state court's decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7-8 (2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); Cobb v. Thaler 682 F.3d 364, 372-73 (5th Cir. 2012) (same). The analysis is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).
“A state court's decision is deemed contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court based on materially indistinguishable facts.” Gray v. Epps, 616 F.3d 436, 439 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08 (2000)). To constitute an “unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law, a state court's holding “must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014)). “To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.'” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).
A state court's factual determinations are “presumed to be correct” unless the petitioner rebuts those findings with “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness extends not only to express factual findings, but also to implicit or “unarticulated findings which are necessary to the state court's conclusion of mixed law and fact.” Murphy v. Davis, 901 F.3d 578, 597 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 948 n.11 (5th Cir. 2001)). A federal court “may not characterize these state-court factual determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because [it] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.'” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 313-14 (2015) (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010)). “Instead, § 2254(d)(2) requires that [a federal court] accord the state trial court substantial deference.” Id. at 314.
“Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the context of habeas corpus cases.” Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000) (...
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