Baughman v. South Carolina Ins. Co.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Citation: 152 S.E.2d 733,249 S.C. 106
• Docket Number: No. 18603,18603
• Parties: Larry BAUGHMAN, by his Guardian ad Litem, Vetron Baughman, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, F. L. Augustine and Murl Augustine, of whomF. L. Augustine and Murl Augustine are, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 09 February 1967

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152 S.E.2d 733 249 S.C. 106 Larry BAUGHMAN, by his Guardian ad Litem, Vetron Baughman, Respondent,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE COMPANY, F. L. Augustine and Murl
Augustine, of whomF. L. Augustine and Murl
Augustine are, Appellants. No. 18603. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Feb. 9, 1967.

[249 S.C. 108]

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Dufour & Dufour, Aiken, for appellants.

Henry Busbee, Aiken, for respondent.

[249 S.C. 109] BUSSEY, Justice:

The minor plaintiff-respondent, Larry Baughman, sustained quite serious personal injuries as a result of a collision, between a Triumph automobile and a school bus, at the intersection of Barnwell Avenue and Horry Street, in the City of Aiken. Baughman was a passenger in the Triumph automobile, owned by appellant, F. L. Augustine, and operated at the time by his son, the appellant Murl Augustine, as a family purpose automobile. Action was against the insurer of the school bus and the two Augustines, and trial resulted in a verdict of $5,000 against the school bus insurer, and $10,000 against the Augustines. Only the Augustines appealed.

Both Barnwell Avenue and Horry Street are dual roadway streets, the dual roadways of each of said streets being separated by parkways. Barnwell Avenue runs east and west, and Horry Street runs north and south and dead ends in the premises of Schofield School on the north side of Barnwell Avenue. At the time of the collision between the two vehicles, the school bus had just left the school grounds and was proceeding in the southbound roadway of Horry Street, while the Triumph automobile was proceeding in the eastbound roadway of Barnwell Avenue.

While the evidence would indicate that there is at least a grave question as to whether plaintiff was a guest in the Triumph automobile within the contemplation[249 S.C. 110] of Section 46--801 of the 1962 Code, the case was tried and submitted to the jury, without objection on the part of the plaintiff, on the theory that he was such a guest. Apparently in tacit recognition of the fact that plaintiff was not such a guest, the appellants here contend that 'under the law of this case' there was insufficient competent evidence to support a finding that appellants were guilty of reckless and willful misconduct, or that such was a proximate cause of the collision. A conclusion that there is no merit in this contention of the appellants requires no detailed discussion or analysis of the evidence, which, together with the reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, has to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

In brief, the evidence viewed in such light, discloses that the school bus stopped before entering the westbound roadway of Barnwell Avenue, and stopped again before proceeding to cross the eastbound roadway thereof. Although the applicable speed limit was 35 miles per hour, the Triumph automobile approached the intersection at a speed of between 40 and 50 miles per hour and did not reduce speed upon

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approaching and entering the intersection. Photographs in evidence indicate that the left front corner of the Triumph automobile struck the right end of the front bumper of the school bus, which was half-way across the...