Baum v. Canter
| Decision Date | 04 February 1929 |
| Docket Number | No. 116.,116. |
| Citation | 144 A. 588 |
| Parties | BAUM et al. v. CANTER. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
Bill by Seymour J. Baum and others against David Canter. From order striking out bill of complaint (140 A. 226), complainants appeal. Reversed.
O'Brien & Tartalsky, of Jersey City, for appellants.
Louis Liebowiiz (Samuel Milberg, of Jersey City, of counsel), for respondent.
The bill of complaint in this case was filed by the vendors to compel the performance of an agreement for the sale by complainants to defendant of a lot of land in the township of Englewood. The bill set out the agreement to convey by warranty deed, and averred that the complainants were seized of the lot in fee simple. By way of anticipating a possible defense, it was also averred that complainants' title was derived from one Edmund Schaffer and his wife, Bessie, by quitclaim deed for a valuable consideration, and that, at the time of making the conveyance, Edmund Schaffer was seized in fee simple of the premises, and intended by the deed to convey his interest therein to the complainants. On a motion by the defendant to that end, the Vice Chancellor struck out the bill on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, and the complainants appeal.
The ground stated in the opinion and urged in the argument of respondent in this court to justify the order is that the quitclaim deed could not confer on the complainants a marketable title, and the case of Meeks v. Bickford, 96 N. J. Eq. 321, 125 A. 15, is cited to support this conclusion.
The averments of the bill for the purpose of the motion must be taken as verity and in their entirety. The legal inference to be drawn from the averment that complainants' title was derived by quitclaim deed is that it conferred on the grantee such title (but such title only) as the grantors possessed at the time of the conveyance. 18 C. J. p. 156; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297, 13 L. Ed. 703; Butrick v. Tilton, 141 Mass. 95, 6 N. E. 563; Havens v. Sea-Shore Land Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 365, 20 A. 497; 8 R. C. L. 1025, where it is said that "the modern rule may be said to be that a quitclaim deed is as effectual to convey land as any other conveyance."
The case of Meeks v. Bickford, supra, is not at variance with this statement of the law. There the grantor had already parted with his title when the quitclaim deed was made. The question involved was whether a conveyance by quitclaim deed from a grantor who had already parted with his title (through unrecorded conveyance) conferred the title which he formerly possessed on his grantee in view of such nonrecording, and it was held that it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Phx. Pinelands Corp. v. Davidoff
...of the quitclaim deed. Meeks, 96 N.J. Eq. at 324, 125 A. 15. As subsequently explained by the Court in Baum v. Canter, 104 N.J. Eq. 224, 225, 144 A. 588 (E. & A. 1929), the rationale of Meeks "was that one who takes title in that manner [by quitclaim deed] is put on notice that he gets only......
-
Palamarg Realty Co. v. Rehac
...a quitclaim deed passes the same estate to a grantee as does a deed of bargain and sale. See N.J.S.A. 46:5-3; Baum v. Canter, 104 N.J.Eq. 224, 225, 144 A. 588 (E. & A.1929); Tunney v. Champion, 91 N.J.Super. 27, 31, 218 A.2d 899 (Ch.1966); Merrill v. Peterson, 108 N.J.Eq. 79, 81, 154 A. 9 (......
-
Maihack v. Mehl
...93 N.J.Eq. 513, 518, 117 A. 483; Kuskin v. Guttman, 98 N.J.Eq. 617, 130 A. 829, affirmed 99 N.J.Eq. 887, 132 A. 922; Baum v. Canter, 104 N.J.Eq. 224, 144 A. 588; Christiansen v. Local 680, Milk Drivers, &c., 126 N.J.Eq. 508, 10 A.2d 168; State v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 133 N.J.Eq. 554, 33 A.......
-
Christiansen v. Local 680 of Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees of N.J.
...v. Maretti, 93 N.J.Eq. 513, 117 A. 483; Kuskin v. Guttman, 98 N.J.Eq. 617, 130 A. 829; Id., 99 N.J.Eq. 887, 132 A. 922; Baum v. Canter, 104 N.J.Eq. 224, 144 A. 588; New Order B. & L. Ass'n v. Landau, 156 A. 276, 9 N.J.Misc. The pleading in question is named a supplemental counterclaim becau......