Baum v. Revell
| Decision Date | 01 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 1:14-cv-162 (WLS) |
| Parties | MISTIE LYNN BAUM, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT HERMAN REVELL, JR. and KEVIN SPROUL, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Before the Court are Defendant Robert Herman Revell, Jr.'s unopposed Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 19), Defendant Kevin Sproul's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 24), and Plaintiff Mistie Lynn Baum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to her claims against Defendant Sproul (Doc. 28). The Court finds that all three Motions are now ripe for review.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This action was removed from the Superior Court of Dougherty County on October 25, 2014. On November 20, 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff Mistie Lynn Baum's Motion for Class Certification. (Doc. 10.) On December 22, 2014, Baum filed an Amended Complaint with leave from the Court. (Doc. 14.) On March 6, 2015, Defendant Revell filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 19.) Baum filed no response even though she requested and was granted an extension of time to do so. (Docs. 20, 21, 23.) She did, however, file a Motion to Dismiss her claims against Defendant Revell, which the Court construed as a motion for leave to amend and denied. (Docs. 25, 30.)
On April 3, 2015, Defendant Sproul filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 24.) On April 24, 2015, Baum filed a timely response to that Motion together with her own Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to all claims against Defendant Sproul. (Docs. 27, 28.) After receiving an extension of time to reply to Baum's response and respond to Baum's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Sproul filed a timely reply and response on May 31, 2015. (Doc. 32.) On June 22, 2015, Baum filed a single brief characterized as both a reply to Sproul's response regarding her Motion and a sur-reply regarding Sproul's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 33.) The Court STRIKES this brief (Doc. 33) from the record and will not consider it in ruling on the pending Motions because it was both an untimely reply, filed more than fourteen days after Sproul's May 31, 2015 response, and a sur-reply filed without leave from the Court. M.D. Ga. L. R. 7.3, 7.3.1.
FACTUAL HISTORY
The following facts are derived from Defendant Revell's Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 19-1), Defendant Sproul's Statement of Material Facts and Plaintiff Baum's Response (Docs. 24-1, 27-2), Baum's Statement of Material Facts and Sproul's Response (Docs. 28-2, 32-1), and the record in this case. Where relevant, the factual summary also contains undisputed facts derived from the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits submitted, all of which are construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that this case does not contain a genuine dispute of material fact.
On September 13, 2014, Dougherty County, Georgia sheriff's deputies arrested Plaintiff Mistie Lynn Baum for theft by receiving stolen property, to-wit, a 2003 Mazda Tribute. (Doc. 24-7 at 8.) Upon her arrest, officials placed Baum in the Dougherty County Jail, over which Defendant Keven Sproul exercises control as the Sheriff of Dougherty County. At the time of Baum's arrest in Dougherty County, there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest issued by Sedgwick County, Kansas on August 18, 2014. On September 14, 2014, Baum attended an initial appearance hearing on the Dougherty County charge in front of Judge Victoria Darrisaw. On September 15, 2014, Dougherty County Chief Magistrate Judge Baxter Howell signed a felony theft warrant for Baum's arrest. On September 25, 2014, Baum appeared before Defendant Magistrate Judge Robert Herman Revell for a hearing where she was informed that her Georgia charge had been upgradedfrom a misdemeanor to a felony. This was the only time Baum appeared before Judge Revell in connection with the circumstances alleged in her amended complaint.
At a November 12, 2014 committal hearing, Magistrate Judge Beau Beauchamp dismissed the Dougherty County charge against Baum because the arresting officer failed to appear for the hearing. Baum remained in custody. (Doc. 14-2.) On November 17 and 18, 2014, Baum appeared for an extradition hearing before Magistrate Judge Beau Beauchamp at which Judge Beauchamp informed her of the Kansas warrant for her arrest and the charges against her, her right to petition the Governor of Georgia to intercede on her behalf and deny the request for temporary custody, her right to be taken before a court and arraigned, her right to appointment of counsel, and her right to file a habeas petition challenging her detention. (Doc. 24-7 at 98-99.) Baum requested to be released from the Dougherty County Jail, arguing that her custody was unlawful because Georgia's extradition statutes had not been followed. Judge Beauchamp denied Baum's request (Id. at 112), and Baum remained in custody. On December 17, 2014, the Governor of Kansas issued a request for Baum's extradition. (Docs. 24-1 at 3; 24-4; 27-2 at 1.) The same day, Baum was indicted by a Dougherty County grand jury on one count of Theft by Receiving Stolen Property (Doc. 24-7 at 65-66.) Also that same day, Baum filed a petition for habeas corpus in state court, which was denied on January 16, 2015.
On December 29, 2014, Superior Court Judge Willie Lockette issued a special presentment bench warrant for Baum's arrest on one count of felony theft by receiving stolen property. (Doc. 24-7 at 81-82.) On December 30, 2014, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal signed a warrant for Baum's extradition to Kansas. (Doc. 24-5.) On January 8, 2015, Baum filed a second habeas petition. The Dougherty County felony theft charge was nol prossed on January 9, 2015 (Doc. 24-7 at 133-34), and the same day Baum was released from custody on bond and under electronic restriction. On January 29, 2015, Baum voluntarily dismissed her second habeas petition, and on February 12, 2015, she was extradited to Kansas.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a party to move for summary judgment where no genuine issue of material fact remains and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Maddox v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118 (11th Cir. 2013). "A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in its favor." Grimes v. Miami Dade Cnty., 552 F. App'x 902, 904 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). "An issue of fact is 'material' if it is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case." Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "It is 'genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The movant bears the initial burden of showing, by reference to the record, that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Barreto v. Davie Marketplace, LLC, 331 F. App'x 672, 673 (11th Cir. 2009). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by demonstrating to the district court that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24. Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmoving party is required "to go beyond the pleadings" and identify "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmoving party "must do more than summarily deny the allegations or 'show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Matsuhita, 475 U.S. at 586 (citations omitted). Instead, the non-movant must point to record evidence that would be admissible at trial. See Jones v. UPSGround Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999)) ( that hearsay may be considered on a motion for summary judgment only if it "could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form"). Such evidence may include affidavits or declarations that are based on personal knowledge of the affiant or declarant. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view all evidence and factual inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and determine whether that evidence could reasonably sustain a jury verdict. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Allen, 121 F.3d at 646. However, the Court must grant summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Local Rule 56 requires the following:
The respondent to a motion for summary judgment shall attach to the response a separate and concise statement of material facts, numbered separately, to which the respondent contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Response shall be made to each of the movant's numbered material facts. All material facts contained in the moving party's statement which are not...
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