Baum v. State
| Citation | 269 Ind. 176,379 N.E.2d 437 |
| Decision Date | 11 August 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 278S23,278S23 |
| Parties | Edwin Paul BAUM, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Indiana |
Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender, Susan K. Carpenter, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Victoria R. Van Duren, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by this Court. Baum v. State (1976) 264 Ind. 421, 345 N.E.2d 831. Appellant then filed a petition for post-conviction relief. This appeal is taken from the trial court's denial of that relief.
Appellant claims the trial court erred at his original trial in failing to conduct a hearing on his competency to stand trial. Rule P.C. 1, § 8, reads in part as follows:
"Any ground finally adjudicated on the merits or not so raised and knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or sentence, or in any other proceeding the petitioner has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent petition, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original petition."
Under the circumstances of this case, the above-quoted portion of the rule is applicable; however since the petition, among other things, claimed incompetence of the trial counsel, the judge hearing the post-conviction relief petition determined that he would hear all allegations on their merit. We will do likewise.
Appellant argues that when he filed a plea of insanity the trial court should have considered that plea as "reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be insane." He claims the trial court should have conducted a hearing on his competency to stand trial pursuant to IC § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1975).
The right to a hearing on the issue of competency is not absolute but is dependent upon the presence of reasonable grounds for believing the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Brown v. State (1976) 264 Ind. 484, 346 N.E.2d 559. Standing alone, the plea of insanity is not a sufficient indicator of reasonable grounds. The failure to hold a hearing upon the filing of this plea was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. We therefore hold the trial court did not err in not conducting a hearing on appellant's competence to stand trial.
Appellant also claims the trial court erred in refusing to reread four of the instructions to the jury at the jury's request. He further claims the trial court erred in failing to advise the jury regarding the possibility of parole. At the time of the request for the rereading of the instructions the trial court stated it was improper to reread specific instructions, but offered to reread all of the instructions. The jury declined the offer. The trial court did not err. The proper procedure upon a request for a reinstruction is to reread all the instructions. Woods v. State (1973) 159 Ind.App. 92, 304 N.E.2d 817.
Nor did the court err in refusing to instruct the jury on the possibility of parole. In Feggins v. State (1977) Ind., 359 N.E.2d 517, this Court held that when there is a request for instructions on the subject of parole the best approach is to instruct the jury (1) that the State is authorized by law to confine the defendant for the full length of the sentence; (2) that the actual length of the sentence may be modified by parole, pardon or good time; and (3) that consequently the jury should exclude consideration of such devices. That case does not stand for the proposition that a refusal to so instruct would Per se be reversible error. As recognized in Feggins, the subject of parole is not a proper matter for consideration by the jury. 359 N.E.2d at 523-4. The trial judge in the case at bar followed ruling precedent at the time in refusing to enlighten the jury on the possibilities of parole and committed no error in doing so.
Appellant claims the second degree murder statute, IC § 35-1-54-1 (Burns 1975), is unconstitutional because it fails to provide adequate guidelines to regulate the jury's discretion in deciding whether to impose a life sentence or 15 to 25 years. He further claims a life sentence for second degree murder is cruel and unusual punishment. This Court, in Emery v. State (1973) 261 Ind. 211, 301 N.E.2d 369, held that the statute does not prescribe cruel and unusual punishment and therefore is constitutional. Matters of criminal punishment are primarily for the legislature. This Court will...
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Cobb v. State, 778S142
...benefit or detriment in order to reach a certain number of years of imprisonment." (emphasis in original) See Baum v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 176, 379 N.E.2d 437; Turner v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 91, 257 N.E.2d 825. The trial court correctly withheld information regarding the possible senten......
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Denton v. State
...the parties. "The proper procedure upon a request for a reinstruction is to reread all the instructions." Baum v. State (1978), 269 Ind. 176, 179, 379 N.E.2d 437, 439. While this Court does not condone the practice of sending written instructions into the jury room, Henning v. State (1985),......
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Fryback v. State
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