Baumann v. Canton
Decision Date | 27 September 1968 |
Citation | 7 V.I. 60 |
Parties | CLYDE BAUMANN, Appellant v. ERIC CANTON |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
Appeal from judgment of Municipal Court dismissing plaintiff's complaint in action to recover damages resulting from automobile accident. The District Court, Maris, J., held that plaintiff's claim was barred by contributory negligence of plaintiff's driver and his claim was rightly dismissed.
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JAMES, HODGE & TONKIN (RONALD H. TONKIN), for plaintiff
GEORGE N. FOSTER, for defendant
OPINION
The plaintiff, Clyde Baumann, appeals from a judgment entered in the Municipal Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix, dismissing his complaint in an action to recover damages to plaintiff's automobile and awarding damages to the defendant on the latter's counterclaim for damages to his automobile. The evidence offered by the plaintiff at the trial tended to establish the following facts:
The plaintiff's son, Elwyn Everett Baumann, was granted permission to drive the plaintiff's automobile on December 31, 1966. That evening, about 8:15 P.M., the plaintiff's son drove the vehicle on a private driveway to its exit on the northern side of the main street which runs from West Street to the Bassin Triangle in the Western Suburb of Christiansted. As is well known, traffic in the Virgin Islands moves on the left hand side of the road. Upon reaching the exit, the plaintiff's son stopped the vehicle and looked in both directions. He wanted to make a right hand turn to drive west—out of Christiansted. Therefore, he had to cross the lane on his side of the street, where traffic was moving into Christiansted in an easterly direction, and turn right onto the south side of the street. Some automobiles were parked along the north side of the highway. No traffic was traveling west on the south side of the highway. Three vehicles were traveling east on the north side of the highway, approaching on his right. The three vehicles stopped. Emanuel Turner, the driver of the first vehicle, testified that when he passed the Moravian Church, which is located on the south side of the highway,seeing the plaintiff's automobile in the driveway he stopped and waved his hand to give the plaintiff's son a signal to come out of the driveway. The driver of the second car, Randolph Julien, also stopped when he saw Turner stop his automobile and wave. The plaintiff's son drove slowly out of the driveway, moved in front of the stopped vehicles, and started to turn right onto the south lane heading west. When the front of the plaintiff's automobile was in the center of the street, about four feet beyond the first vehicle, its right side was struck by the defendant's automobile. Neither the plaintiff's son nor the witnesses saw the defendant's vehicle prior to the time of the collision. The defendant had passed to the right of the vehicles which had stopped and collided with the plaintiff's automobile on the south portion of the highway. The highway curves from the traffic light which is located at the Bassin Triangle to the driveway of the Moravian Church. The driveway from which the plaintiff's automobile was driven was located across the highway from the Moravian Church.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendant did not offer any evidence to dispute the facts above recited and the trial judge proceeded to render his findings of fact and conclusions of law orally. He found that the plaintiff had failed to yield the right of way in emerging upon a main highway from a private driveway and that the defendant had the right of way to travel on the main highway at the rate of 20 miles per hour; that the defendant was under no duty to anticipate that the driver of the plaintiff's automobile would fail to yield the right of way, and that the courtesy extended by the drivers who had stopped did not affect the defendant's right of way. The trial judge concluded that the complaint of the plaintiff must be dismissed and that the defendant was entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in the amount of $565.00, representing the damage to his automobile and loss of itsuse, together with costs and an attorney's fee of $100.00. Judgment was entered accordingly and this appeal by the plaintiff followed.
The plaintiff contends that the uncontroverted evidence conclusively established that the defendant, as a matter of law, was guilty of negligence and hence that the trial judge erred in granting judgment in favor of the defendant on his counterclaim. For the reasons which will be stated, I am constrained to agree with this contention.
. . .
"(e) In St. Croix, the streets running east and west in Christiansted . . . are the main streets . . . for the purpose of this section." 20 V.I.C. § 495.
"The driver of a vehicle emerging from an alley, driveway, or building shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving onto a sidewalk area extending across any alleyway or driveway, and shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian as may be necessary to avoid collision, and upon entering the public street or highwayshall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on public street or highway." 20 V.I.C. § 506.
[1-5] Generally, in an action for the recovery of damages for the injuries resulting from the alleged negligence of the defendant, the plaintiff must show that there has been a failure on the part of the defendant to exercise proper care in the performance of some legal duty which the defendant owed the plaintiff under the circumstances in which they were placed and that such negligent breach of duty was the proximate cause of the injury. It is a well established rule that a motorist must operate his vehicle always with due regard for the safety of all others on the highway. He is charged with the duty of keeping his automobile under such control that he can stop within the distance on the road ahead which he can clearly see.1 The law exacts of him constant care and attention and imposes upon him certain positive duties. Virgin Islands Motor Vehicle Law, 20 V.I.C. § 301 et seq. Thus, while the Virgin Islands statute permits a maximum speed of 20 miles per hour within town limits, 20 V.I.C. § 494(b), it requires that 20 V.I.C. § 494 (a).
[6-10] These statutory provisions are not innovations in the law. It has long been the rule that on rounding a curve or approaching the summit of a hill, where the view of the road ahead is shortened, it is the motorist's dutynot to pass but to proceed in his proper lane of traffic.2 And it has been held that the statutory requirement that one traveling on a public highway has the right of way over one entering the highway from a private road is but a reaffirmation of the rule of the road.3 However, notwithstanding the possession of the right of way by the operator of a vehicle on a public road over a person entering it from a private roadway, the former must exercise his right of way in a reasonable manner. In other words, it is the duty of both parties continuously to use such care as may be required by the situation to avoid a collision. The statutory right of way is not an absolute one—the driver holding it is not relieved of his duty of using reasonable care.4 The court in Ghirardello v. Malina, 1965, 238 Md. 498, 209 A.2d 564, 569-570, aptly stated this principle, as follows:
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