Baumann v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City
| Decision Date | 03 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12-cv-01310-CMA-MEH |
| Parties | BRUCE BAUMANN, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, TROY ERICKSON, in his individual and official capacity, and TROY GIBSON, in his individual and official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendants Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City ("FRB"), Federal Reserve Law Enforcement Officer ("FRLEO") Troy Erickson, and FRLEO Troy Gibson. (Doc. # 50.) The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question) over Plaintiff Bruce Baumann's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, while 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion is denied.
The FRB is a corporation incorporated under laws of the United States. Its head office is in Kansas City, and it maintains three branch offices, including one in Denver, Colorado. The FRB comprises one of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks which,with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, make up the Federal Reserve System. Under 12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(2), the Board of Governors is empowered to "delegate authority to a Federal reserve bank to authorize personnel to act as law enforcement officers to protect and safeguard the bank's premises, grounds, property, personnel, and operations conducted by or on behalf of the bank." As a general matter, FRLEOs have authority to conduct law enforcement activities subject to certain regulations, including Federal Reserve regulations and policies and procedures issued by the reserve bank. However, the parties agree that, as employees of a corporation, FRB employees, including FRLEOs, "are not government employees."1 (Doc. # 50 at 2; Doc. # 70 at 1.)
According to the Uniform Regulations for Federal Reserve Law Enforcement Officers, FRLEOs "may only be cross-designated or deputized as state or local lawenforcement officers consistent with policies and procedures adopted by their respective law enforcement unit and based upon a determination that such cross-designation or deputation is beneficial to the performance of Federal Reserve functions and responsibilities." (Doc. # 50-14 at 3.) Defendants assert - although Plaintiff contends he is without sufficient information to admit or deny - that the FRB "has never made this determination and has never sought cross-designation or deputation of its FRLEOs as state or local law enforcement officers." (Doc. ## 50 at 4; 50-2 at 4; 70 at 2.)
On May 18, 2011, Plaintiff was demonstrating against the FRB at its Denver location. Around 12:30 p.m., Plaintiff entered the FRB. Thereafter, FRLEO Erickson and an additional FRLEO, who is not a party to this action, began speaking to another man, Ronald Lewis, who was in the vestibule of the FRB standing near Plaintiff. Erickson informed Lewis that, based on a previous incident, he was not allowed to enter the FRB. Erickson asked Lewis multiple times to leave. After Lewis refused to do so, FRLEOs physically removed him from the vestibule. Plaintiff followed Lewis, and the FRLEOs who were trying to restrain him, outside. Plaintiff then began filming the situation with his cellphone, while the FRLEOs continued to try to restrain Lewis. The parties disagree as to what happened next.
Defendants assert that FRLEO Erickson felt that Plaintiff was "uncomfortably close to him," and therefore Erickson "verbally told Plaintiff and gestured for Plaintiff tomove back toward the wall/iron fence that surrounds the Denver Branch building and away from the FRLEOs." (Doc. # 50 at 9.) Plaintiff adamantly denies that he was instructed to move toward the wall or fence and asserts that he was standing "approximately ten feet away from the officers" when Erickson turned his attention toward him. (Doc. # 70 at 6.) According to Defendants, "Plaintiff was still too close to the FRLEOs, and Plaintiff did not move against the wall as directed." (Doc. # 50 at 9.) Plaintiff asserts that he did move back "with no command to do so" having been given. (Doc. # 70 at 6.) The parties agree that FRLEO Gibson then arrived on the scene and physically detained Plaintiff by, among other means, putting him in handcuffs. However, Defendants assert that "Plaintiff was struggling and pulling away from the FRLEOs" (Doc. # 50 at 10), which Plaintiff denies (Doc. # 70 at 7).
The parties have both submitted video evidence of the encounter. (See Doc. ## 52; 60-1.) Defendants' surveillance video is silent, which renders difficult, if not impossible, the Court's ability to discern whose version of the facts is correct. (See Doc. # 52.) Plaintiff's cellphone video, which is significantly shorter than the surveillance video, contains audio, but it is not clear whether the audio captured everything that was said. (See Doc. # 60-1.) At this point in the proceedings, the Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. See, e.g., Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, given the video evidence, the Court determines that, for purposes of Defendants' summary judgment motion, FRLEO Erickson did not gesture to or tell Plaintiff to move toward thewall/iron fence that surrounds the FRB. As such, the Court necessarily determines that Plaintiff did not fail to heed Erickson's command. Further, the Court finds for purposes of the current motion that Plaintiff did not struggle or pull away from the FRLEOs when he was detained, as the video evidence does not clearly substantiate such action on the part of Plaintiff.
Once Plaintiff was handcuffed, the FRLEOs brought him back into the vestibule of the FRB. Several minutes later, officers from the Denver Police Department ("DPD") arrived. The DPD officers took custody of Plaintiff and charged him with violating three provisions of the Denver Municipal Code ("DMC"), which provide in pertinent part as follows:
(See Doc. # 50-13.) Plaintiff was then taken to the Denver County Jail, where he was later released after posting bond. (See Doc. # 70-7 at 2.)
The matter proceeded to trial before Judge J. Barajas in Denver County Court on January 19, 2012. (See Doc. # 70-8 at 2.) FRLEO Erickson testified averring, among other things, that he instructed Plaintiff three separate times to "please step against the fence and give me your ID" and that, each time, Plaintiff refused. (Id. at 38-39.) At the close of the prosecution's case, Judge Barajas granted Plaintiff's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the trespassing charge but allowed the case to go forward on the "interference with policy authority" and "resisting any police authority" charges. (See id. at 65-66.) Plaintiff - who was, of course, in the role of defendant during his criminal trial - then testified, at which point it became clear that the prosecution was not in possession of Plaintiff's cellphone, which he said had been taken from him on May 18, 2011. (See, e.g., id. at 85.) The prosecutor then asked for Judge Barajas to recess the trial, stating:
Judge, I don't want to proceed if it [i.e., the cellphone video] is exculpatory. I mean obviously if it shows that the defendant was not in violation of any of these other remaining statutes, then I certainly do not want to continue with the prosecution. So that's part of my concern is [sic] I also would like to see and consider exculpatory evidence. I certainly don't want to put on rebuttal evidence or argue for a conviction if it provides something that would lead toward dismissing it.
(Id. at 84.) The following week, Judge Barajas dismissed the case on the prosecution's motion. (See Doc. # 70-7 at 2.)
Plaintiff initiated this action on November 1, 2012. (Doc. # 1.) In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following seven causes of action: (1) violation of civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) malicious prosecution; (3) abuse of process; (4) false imprisonment; (5) assault and battery; (6) failure to train and/or supervise; and (7) extreme and outrageous conduct. (Doc. # 39.) He asserts the first cause of action against all Defendants and the sixth cause of action against only the FRB. He alleges the remaining causes of action (2-5 and 7) against FRLEOs Erickson and Gibson only. (Id.) Defendants moved for summary judgment (Doc. # 50), and the matter is now ripe for ruling (see Doc. ## 70; 79).
Summary judgment is warranted when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim under the relevant substantive law. Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001). A dispute is ...
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