Baumgartner v. Am. Standard, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2015
• Docket Number: C.A. No. PC-13-4151
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court
• Parties: DENNIS R. BAUMGARTNER and GAIL L. BAUMGARTNER, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., et al., Defendants.

DENNIS R. BAUMGARTNER and GAIL L. BAUMGARTNER, Plaintiffs, v. AMERICAN STANDARD, INC., et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. PC-13-4151

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

July 22, 2015

DECISION

GIBNEY, P.J. Before the Court is a request by Defendants, pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 9-19-3 through 9-19-6 and Super. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (Rule 44.1), that it apply the substantive law of the states of Ohio and Michigan, taking judicial notice thereof to the above-captioned case.¹ Defendants also move for summary judgment pursuant to Super. R. Civ. P. 56 (Rule 56).² The Court addresses each matter in turn.

IFacts & Travel

Plaintiffs, both of whom are Ohio residents, allege that Dennis R. Baumgartner (Mr. Baumgartner or Plaintiff) was exposed to Defendants' asbestos-containing products, which allegedly caused or contributed to his mesothelioma. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Mr. Baumgartner was exposed to asbestos-containing products during the course of hisemployment as an insulator helper and insulator at various jobsites located in Ohio and Michigan.

Mr. Baumgartner was born in Toledo, Ohio and has lived there his entire life. See Baumgartner Dep. Vol. I. 13:1-14:8, Oct. 15, 2013. On June 7, 2013, Mr. Baumgartner was diagnosed with mesothelioma at Toledo Hospital and he continues to receive treatment in Toledo. See Pl.'s Answers to Defs.' Interrog. ¶ 31. Even Mr. Baumgartner's discovery deposition occurred in Maumee, Ohio. Aside from the filing of the instant suit, there is no indication that Mr. Baumgartner has any relationship with the State of Rhode Island. Mr. Baumgartner has never lived, worked, or received medical treatment in Rhode Island.

IIStandard of Review

AChoice of Law/Judicial Notice

Pursuant to §§ 9-19-3 through 9-19-6, a party relying on foreign law may ask the court to take judicial notice of foreign statutory law and may introduce into evidence statutes or cases to prove the foreign law.³ See §§ 9-19-3 through 9-19-6. Section 9-19-3 provides that "[e]verycourt of this state shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory, and other jurisdiction of the United States." Sec. 9-19-3 (emphasis added). Furthermore, § 9-19-6 provides:

"[a]ny party may . . . present to the trial court any admissible evidence of foreign laws, but, to enable a party to offer evidence of the law in another jurisdiction or to ask that judicial notice be taken thereof, reasonable notice shall be given to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or otherwise." Sec. 9-19-6.

Our Supreme Court has held that "[w]henever there is a case . . . in which it is undisputed and agreed that the law of a sister state applies, the trial court [is] . . . required to take judicial notice of all statutes and judicial decisions of that state relevant to the issue presented under [Rhode Island's] Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act, (G.L. 1956) [§§] 9-19-2 to 9-19-8[.]" Clougherty v. Royal Ins. Co., 102 R.I. 636, 648, 232 A.2d 610, 616 (1967) (Kelleher, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). Thus, once the court has determined that the law of a foreign state shall be applied, any party may ask the court to take judicial notice of the relevant laws of that foreign state. "The determination of foreign laws shall be made by the court and not by the jury, and shall be reviewable." Sec. 9-19-5.

However, prior to taking judicial notice of a foreign state's laws, this Court must first determine if the laws of a foreign state are to be applied. In order to do so, this Court must conduct a choice-of-law analysis. Such a choice-of-law analysis consists of two steps. First, the Court must determine whether the laws of the forum and that of the foreign state are in conflict, i.e., a "true conflict" exists. See Nat'l Refrigeration, Inc. v. Standen Contracting Co., 942 A.2d968, 973-74 (R.I. 2008) (noting that it is well established that "[a] motion justice need not engage in a choice-of-law analysis when no conflict-of-law issue is presented to the court"); Peavey Co. v. M/V ANPA, 971 F.2d 1168, 1171 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that "the first inquiry [in a choice-of-law analysis] is whether there is a true or false conflict of interest"). On one hand, a "true conflict" exists when each state retains an interest in the application of its contradictory laws. Peavey Co., 971 F.2d at 1172. On the other hand, a "false conflict[]" is present when either "(1) there is no true conflict of laws because only one state is interested in the application of its law or (2) the laws of the two states are found to be compatible." Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 19 n.26 (1st Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). If a false conflict is found, i.e., there is no conflict, then the law of the interested state shall prevail.⁴ However, if the laws are found to be in "true conflict," then this Court shall apply Rhode Island's "interest-weighing approach." See Peavey Co., 971 F.2d at 1172 (finding that a "true conflict" exists when each state retains an interest in the application of its contradictory laws); Erwin v. Cotter Health Ctrs., 167 P.3d 1112, 1120 (Wash. 2007) (concluding that "[i]f the result for a particular issue is different under the law of the two states, there is a 'real' conflict").

In Harodite Indus., 24 A.3d at 534, the majority of the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the "interest-weighing approach" with respect to choice of law questions. In doing so, the majority reaffirmed its holding in Cribb v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997), that thelex loci delicti conflict-of-law doctrine⁵ had been abandoned in Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 299, 243 A.2d 917, 923 (1968).⁶ Under the "interest-weighing approach[,] . . . an action is separated into its various elements and each individual element or issue is governed by the law of the jurisdiction that has the most significant contacts relative thereto." Harodite Indus., 24 A.3d at 536.

In applying the "interest-weighing approach" this Court "'look[s] at the particular . . . facts and determine[s] therefrom the rights and liabilities of the parties in accordance with the law of the state that bears the most significant relationship to the events and the parties.'" Id. at 534 (quoting Cribb, 696 A.2d at 288). In an action sounding in tort, the following four factors shall be taken into account:

(1) the place where the injury occurred;

(2) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;

(3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of corporation and place of business of the parties; and

(4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. SeeHarodite Indus., 24 A.3d at 526; Brown v. Church of the Holy Name of Jesus, 105 R.I. 322, 326-27, 252 A.2d 176, 179 (1969).

In addition, the policy considerations which must be taken into account in making this determination are as follows:

"(1) [P]redictability of result;

"(2) [M]aintenance of interstate and international order;

"(3) [S]implification of the judicial task;"(4) [A]dvancement of the forum's governmental interests; and

"(5) [A]pplication of the better rule of law." Id.

Moreover, our Supreme Court has held, "'in an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship . . . .'" Najarian v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 768 A.2d 1253, 1255 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 146).

BSummary Judgment

"[S]ummary judgment is an extreme remedy that warrants cautious application." Gardner v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 952 (R.I. 2005). Pursuant to Rule 56(c), "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court determines that there are no issues of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001).

Once a summary judgment motion is made, "[t]he burden rests upon the nonmoving party 'to prove the existence of a disputed issue of material fact by competent evidence; it cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" Mut. Dev. Corp. v. Ward Fisher & Co., 47 A.3d 319, 323 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Hill v. Nat'l Grid, 11 A.3d 110, 113 (R.I. 2011)). Thus, "by affidavits or otherwise[,] [opposing parties] have an affirmative duty to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact." Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co., 705 A.2d 969, 971 (R.I. 1998). Accordingly, in order for a plaintiff to survive a defendant's summary judgment motion as to a particular claim, the plaintiff must "produce evidence that would establish a prima facie case for [that] claim . . . ." DiBattista v. State, 808A.2d 1081, 1089 (R.I. 2002). Conversely, summary judgment is proper where the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case. Kelley v. Cowesett Hills Assocs., 768 A.2d 425, 430 (R.I. 2001).

IIIAnalysis

AChoice-of-Law Analysis/Judicial Notice

To resolve the procedural snarl that is this case's conflicts-of-law question, this Court shall address four issues. First, this Court will examine whether Rhode Island has adopted the doctrine of depecage and, if so, whether the doctrine would permit the application of different state laws to different Defendants named in this suit. Second, this Court must determine whether Rhode Island's laws are in conflict with those of Ohio and Michigan. Third, if the laws are found to be in conflict, the Court shall apply Rhode Island's "interest-weighing approach" by separating the instant action into its various elements and then determining which state law bears the most significant relationship to the Plaintiffs' case. Fourth, and finally, the...