Baumler v. Hemesath

Decision Date19 July 1995
Docket NumberNos. 93-1560,s. 93-1560
Citation534 N.W.2d 650
PartiesJoseph BAUMLER and Natalie Baumler, Appellees, v. Jack HEMESATH and Karen Hemesath, Appellants.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Darrell J. Isaacson of Laird, Heiny, McManigal, Winga, Duffy & Stambaugh, P.L.C., Mason City, for appellants.

Dale L. Putnam of Putnam & Strand Law Office, Decorah, for appellees.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

NEUMAN, Justice.

Plaintiff Joseph Baumler brought this action against his employers, defendants Jack and Karen Hemesath, alleging that while working on their farm he sustained injuries as a result of their negligent failure to maintain a safe working area and negligent failure to warn. The Hemesaths now appeal from a jury verdict for Baumler and his wife contending: (1) the tire rut into which Baumler fell was an open and obvious danger; (2) failure to warn should not have been submitted to the jury where Baumler had actual and superior knowledge of the danger; (3) their motion for new trial was improperly denied because the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence and erroneous evidentiary rulings denied them a fair trial; (4) the district court erred in precluding evidence of insurance-paid medical bills; and (5) the district court erred in setting the interest rate for past damages pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 535 (1993) rather than chapter 668.

Baumlers cross-appeal contending the interest rate for future damages should also have been set pursuant to Iowa Code section 535.3, not section 668.13. We affirm in part and reverse in part on the appeal, and reverse on the cross-appeal, remanding for a corrected judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Jack and Karen Hemesath operated a dairy farm in Winneshiek County, Iowa. They employed their son-in-law, Joseph Baumler, as a farmhand. Baumler twice injured his back while working on the Hemesaths' farm, first in May 1991 when he fell off a motorcycle while rounding up cows, and again in December 1991 when he slipped in a tractor tire rut while helping remove manure from a holding pit.

In July 1992, Baumler sued Hemesaths alleging the motorcycle accident resulted from Hemesaths' negligent failure to maintain safe equipment and failure to warn him of its unsafe condition. Baumler's wife, Natalie, sought damages for loss of consortium. A year later, the district court granted Baumlers leave to amend their petition to allege that Hemesaths were also negligent in failing to maintain a safe working environment and in not warning Baumler of the dangers of the work area, which resulted in his slip in the tire rut.

The Baumlers filed an application for adjudication of law points in which they asked the court to determine whether Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 97 or Iowa Code chapter 668 applies when an employee is injured in the course of employment. The district court concluded that rule 97 governed Baumlers' negligence claims. Consequently, the court granted a motion in limine to exclude evidence that Hemesaths' insurance paid for some of Baumler's medical bills.

The district court also overruled Hemesaths' motion to exclude evidence concerning seizures suffered by two of Baumlers' children. The court found such evidence relevant to the Baumlers' claim for damages.

The case proceeded to trial. The jury found the Hemesaths negligent for the May 1991 motorcycle incident but decided their negligence was not a proximate cause of Baumler's injury. The Hemesaths' negligence was found to be a proximate cause of Baumler's December 1991 fall in the tire rut. The jury awarded Baumler damages of $163,290, including past medical expenses of $7790 and future medical expenses of $5000.

Following trial, Hemesaths moved to modify the judgment, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and for a new trial. The court denied all motions. This appeal by Hemesaths, and cross-appeal by Baumler, followed.

II. Issues on Appeal.

A. Directed verdict. The Hemesaths claim the trial court erred in refusing to direct a defense verdict because the tire rut in which Baumler fell was open and obvious and did not create such an unreasonable risk of harm as to compel a warning. Our review of the court's ruling on such motions is well settled:

[W]here no substantial evidence exists to support each element of a plaintiff's claim, directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. is proper. Substantial evidence is that which a "reasonable mind would accept as adequate to reach a conclusion." Where reasonable minds could differ on an issue, directed verdict is improper and the case must go to the jury. The trial court must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. On appeal, we consider the evidence in a way most favorable to upholding the verdict.

Stover v. Lakeland Square Owners Ass'n, 434 N.W.2d 866, 873 (Iowa 1989) (citations omitted).

Baumler's status as an employee made him Hemesaths' business invitee. Konicek v. Loomis Bros., 457 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Iowa 1990). Thus Hemesaths, as owners of land, were under a duty of care to keep the premises in a reasonable condition. Id.; accord Schnoor v. Deitchler, 482 N.W.2d 913, 916-17 (Iowa 1992). This duty requires the landowner to use reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises. The duty also requires making the area reasonably safe or giving warning of the actual condition or risk involved. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618.

A landowner, however, is not liable when the injuries sustained by a business invitee are caused by a known or obvious danger. Schnoor, 482 N.W.2d at 917; Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618. An obvious danger means that both the condition and the risk are apparent to, and would be recognized by, a reasonably prudent person. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618.

According to testimony at trial, the tractor rut presented an open and obvious risk of which Baumler was aware. Furthermore, Baumler was an experienced farm worker knowledgeable of the possible dangers present in working around a slippery twelve-inch-wide, twelve-inch-deep rut. These facts, however, do not automatically relieve the Hemesaths of their duty towards him. As we noted in Konicek, a possessor of land will not always be relieved of liability for injuries caused by a known and obvious danger. Konicek, 457 N.W.2d at 618. If the landowner can and should anticipate that the dangerous condition will cause physical harm to the business invitee despite its known or obvious danger, the possessor still owes the invitee a duty of care. Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A, cmt. b). Under these circumstances, the owner must either warn the invitee or make the condition reasonably safe. Id.

The record shows that Hemesaths were aware of the ruts before Baumler's accident. Jack Hemesath's son, Russell, advised Jack of the danger of the ruts and asked him to fill them with gravel. While working around similarly deep ruts the year before, Jack had spread gravel in them to minimize the danger. Testimony at trial also revealed that another of Jack Hemesath's sons, Douglas, had slipped in the ruts prior to Baumler's accident.

It appears from this proof that Hemesaths could have anticipated the dangerousness of the condition and the safety risk it posed for their employees. However, they gave no warning to Baumler nor was any effort made to minimize the hazard. Under this state of the record, a reasonable jury could find that the Hemesaths acted negligently toward Baumler. We therefore affirm the district court's decision to deny Hemesaths' motion for directed verdict.

B. Failure to warn. The Hemesaths also argue the trial court erred in submitting failure to warn as a separate specification of negligence. The duty to warn is dependent upon superior knowledge and arises when one may reasonably foresee danger of injury or damage to one less knowledgeable unless forewarned of the danger. Krueger v. Noel, 318 N.W.2d 220, 225 (Iowa 1982). Hemesaths claim the court should find as a matter of law that Baumler had greater knowledge than they of the actual condition of the ruts.

Like most questions bearing on negligence, whether the particular circumstances demand notice of warning is ordinarily for the jury. Lakatosh v. Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1973). Our task on appeal is simply to review the evidence to determine whether reasonable minds could differ on the fact question posed. See Stover, 434 N.W.2d at 873. As already noted, the facts reveal that Jack Hemesath received warnings about the danger of the tire ruts as well as suggestions that he level the ruts with gravel before Baumler's accident from his sons Russell and Douglas. Furthermore, in at least one prior year, Hemesaths had in fact filled similar tire ruts with gravel to reduce the risk of harm. This proof gave the court sufficient evidence to send the question regarding Hemesaths' failure to warn to the jury. Moreover, the trial court properly submitted failure to warn as a separate specification of negligence. See Rinkleff v. Knox, 375 N.W.2d 262, 266 (Iowa 1985) (noting purpose of requiring jury to consider "specification of negligence" is to limit determination of factual questions arising in negligence claims to those acts or omissions on which claim is based and on which court has made a determination of sufficiency of evidence to generate jury question).

C. Motion for new trial. The Hemesaths next argue the trial court erred by failing to grant them a new trial. They urge reversal on two grounds. First they claim the jury's verdict is "incredible" and "contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence." Second, they claim the cumulative effect of erroneous evidentiary rulings prevented a fair trial. We find no merit in either contention.

Our decision on the sufficiency-of-evidence question is driven by our analysis in divisions A and B above. The jury was faced with a factual contest over the hazards posed by the...

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