Baxter v. Brown

• Decision Date: 15 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 2:13-cv-00309-JMS-WGH,2:13-cv-00309-JMS-WGH
• Parties: WILLIAM BAXTER, Petitioner, v. RICHARD BROWN, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

WILLIAM BAXTER, Petitioner, v. RICHARD BROWN, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. 2:13-cv-00309-JMS-WGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

January 15, 2016

Entry Discussing Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Petitioner William Baxter was convicted by a jury in an Indiana state court of several offenses. He is currently serving a fifty-four year sentence for these crimes. Mr. Baxter now seeks a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel.

For the reasons explained in this Entry, Mr. Baxter's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied and the action dismissed with prejudice. In addition, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability should not issue.

I.Background

District court review of a habeas petition presumes all factual findings of the state court to be correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See Daniels v. Knight, 476 F.3d 426, 434 (7th Cir. 2007). On post-conviction appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals summarized the relevant facts and procedural history as follows:

The facts underlying Baxter's convictions were related by this court in its disposition of Baxter's direct appeal:

In the early morning hours of September 29, 2007, T.R. was walking down a street in Indianapolis when she came into contact with three men: Baxter, Dion Stewart, and a third person known only as "Slim." Tr. p. 63. The three men began walking with T.R., and Stewart eventually offered some cocaine to T.R., which she sniffed off of his driver's license. T.R. then accompanied the three men to an abandoned house, although she was expecting to go to one of the three men's house. Stewart and T.R. began kissing at the side of the house, and then he removed his penis from his pants and asked T.R. to touch it. T.R. refused and said she wanted to go home.

When T.R. said this, the three men accused her of stealing their "stuff" (i.e., cocaine). Id. at 71. T.R. began walking away, and one of the men directed her to a purported "shortcut" to her residence down an alley. When she reached the alley, someone said, "Now," and Stewart put his arm around T.R.'s neck from behind and began choking her. Id. at 78. Baxter and Stewart then began hitting her about the head with closed fists, trying to knock her out. They then pulled her pants down, while Slim stood watch. Slim forced T.R. to perform oral sex on him while either Baxter or Stewart had vaginal intercourse with her. Baxter and Stewart then alternated forcing T.R. to submit to oral, vaginal, and anal intercourse with them. After about thirty minutes, the three men began to leave and took T.R.'s cell phone and keys from her pants pocket. When T.R. protested that they were taking her house keys, Stewart punched her in the mouth. The punch caused a laceration to T.R.'s lip that required plastic surgery and left a scar. T.R. was able to summon help after the three men left. When taken to the hospital, T.R. was given morphine for her pain.

Baxter v. State, No. 49A02-0905-CR-461, slip op. at 1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2010) [("Baxter I")]. When DNA samples collected from T.R. were submitted to the CODIS database, two of the samples were found to match Baxter and Stewart. A cheek swab collected from Baxter confirmed the CODIS match.

The State charged Baxter with two counts of Class A felony rape, four counts of Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, one count of Class A felony robbery, one count of Class C felony battery, and one count of Class D felony theft. After a jury trial held on April 15-16, 2009, Baxter was found guilty as charged on all counts. At the sentencing hearing on May 1, 2009, the trial court entered judgments of conviction for the following: one count of Class A felony rape, two counts of Class B felony criminal deviate conduct, one count of Class C felony robbery, and one count of Class A misdemeanor battery.

Id. Stewart and Baxter were tried together after the trial court denied Baxter'smotion to sever. On May 1, 2009, the trial court sentenced Baxter to an aggregate sentence of fifty-four years of incarceration. Following direct appeal, in which Baxter challenged only his rape conviction, this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 3. In 2010, Baxter filed a petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), and he filed an amended petition on February 17, 2011. On April 20, 2012, the post-conviction court denied Baxter's PCR petition in full.

Baxter v. State, 985 N.E.2d 371, 2013 WL 1276014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) ("Baxter II").

The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. See Baxter II, 2013 WL 1276014, at *5. Mr. Baxter filed a petition to transfer with Indiana Supreme Court on April 25, 2013. The Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer on May 30, 2013. See Baxter v. State, 988 N.E.2d 796, 2013 WL 2403293 (Ind. 2013). Mr. Baxter timely filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court.

II.Applicable Law

A federal court may grant habeas relief only if the petitioner demonstrates that he is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1996). The petitioner filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). His petition, therefore, is subject to AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997).

"Under the current regime governing federal habeas corpus for state prison inmates, the inmate must show, so far as bears on this case, that the state court which convicted him unreasonably applied a federal doctrine declared by the United States Supreme Court." Redmond v. Kingston, 240 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Morgan v. Krenke, 232 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2000)). Thus, "under AEDPA, federal courts do not independently analyze the petitioner's claims; federal courts are limited to reviewing the relevant state court ruling on the claims." Rever v. Acevedo, 590 F.3d 533, 536 (7th Cir. 2010)."A state-court decision involves an unreasonable application of this Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies this Court's precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 131, 141 (2005) (internal citations omitted). "The habeas applicant has the burden of proof to show that the application of federal law was unreasonable." Harding v. Sternes, 380 F.3d 1034, 1043 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002)).

In addition to the foregoing substantive standard, the parties dispute whether the petitioner procedurally defaulted certain claims. See Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1458 (7th Cir. 1992) (procedural default "occurs when a claim could have been but was not presented to the state court and cannot, at the time that the federal court reviews the habeas petition, be presented to the state court"). "Inherent in the habeas petitioner's obligation to exhaust his state court remedies before seeking relief in habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), is the duty to fairly present his federal claims to the state courts." Lewis v. Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004). To meet this requirement, a petitioner "must raise the issue at each and every level in the state court system, including levels at which review is discretionary rather than mandatory." Id. at 1025-26. A federal claim is not fairly presented unless the petitioner "put[s] forward operative facts and controlling legal principles." Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 594 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "A habeas petitioner who has exhausted his state court remedies without properly asserting his federal claim at each level of state court review has procedurally defaulted that claim." Lewis, 390 F.3d at 1026.

III.Discussion

Mr. Baxter raises three ineffective assistance of trial claims in his habeas petition, some of which the respondent contends are procedurally defaulted. After setting forth the legal standardsgoverning habeas review of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the Court will address each claim in turn.

A defendant has a right under the Sixth Amendment to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). For a petitioner to establish that "counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal," he must make two showings: (1) that counsel rendered deficient performance that (2) prejudiced the petitioner. Id. With respect to the performance requirement, "[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). "[T]o establish prejudice, a 'defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. at 534 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

When the deferential AEDPA standard is applied to a Strickland claim, the following calculus emerges:

Establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable under § 2254(d) is . . . difficult. The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both "highly deferential," [Strickland] at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n.7 (1997), and when the two apply in tandem, review is "doubly" so, Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. The Strickland standard is a general one, so the range of reasonable applications is substantial. 556 U.S., at 123. Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential

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