Baxter v. Camp

• Decision Date: 29 November 1898
• Citation: 71 Conn. 245,41 A. 803
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BAXTER v. CAMP.

41 A. 803

71 Conn. 245

BAXTER

v. CAMP.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 29, 1898.

Appeal from court of common pleas, New Haven county; James Bishop, Judge.

Action by Dwight G. Baxter against Alexander Camp for damages or other relief on a special contract. Judgment for plaintiff for $800. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

The finding showed these facts: The defendant was married after 1877 to Edith E. Smith, who then had one child, the plaintiff. She furnished him money to use in his business, and he made a will in her favor. She expressed a fear lest he might change it, and he thereupon executed and delivered to her the following paper: "Madison, June 20th, 1887. I do promise to pay my wife's son, Dwight G. Baxter, the sum of eight hundred dollars after her decease if living, if not to her next heirs to the property, without interest till after her death. Alexander Camp." Afterwards, on finding that she had a fatal disease, she gave the paper to the plaintiff, saying the defendant would pay it, and there would be no trouble about it. He gave no consideration to the defendant for it After her death, he demanded payment, which was refused. On the trial, the defendant testified that he canceled his signature to the paper immediately after it was made, and did so with his wife's consent. The paper, when produced in evidence by the plaintiff, bore on its face evidence of erasures upon that part of it covered by the signature; and also showed either that several crosses with ink had been written over the signature (or over a previous signature in the same place, which had since been retraced or rewritten), or that the present signature had been written over such crosses, it was impossible to tell which of these things had been done. The court thereupon held that the burden of proof was on the defendant to show that, after the execution and delivery of the paper to his wife, he had erased his signature with her knowledge and consent, and that he had not fulfilled that burden. In coming to this conclusion, the court took into consideration the fact that the wife gave the paper to the plaintiff, and her remark made on that occasion. As tending to show that she did authorize such cancellation, the defendant offered evidence that he had paid more than $800 for the expenses of his wife's last sickness and funeral, and also that during her last years, and ever since, he had no property except a farm in Madison, on which they lived, of small value. This evidence was excluded. He also produced a witness by whom he offered to show, to corroborate his (the defendant's) testimony about the note, that he had long before told the same story to the witness. This was also excluded. Witnesses for the plaintiff were allowed to testify, against the defendant's objection, that his wife, after learning the fatal nature of her disease, told them that she had lent money to the defendant, and that he had given her a note for it. Claims were made by the defendant, and overruled, that the paper was not a note; that no indebtedness existed from the defendant to the plaintiff; and so that, if any action would lie, it must be one by the administrator of the wife's estate.

Henry G. Newton, for appellant.

Oswin H. D. Fowler, for appellee.

BALDWIN, J. (after stating the facts). The main question in this case is whether an action upon a simple contract, by the performance of which a third party would receive a direct benefit, can be maintained by him. The general principles, upon the application of which the answer must depend, are well settled. Briefly stated, they are these: An action at law for the breach of a contract can only be brought by a party to the contract. It rests on a violation of an obligation to the plaintiff, which the defendant had assumed and promised him to perform. If the contract does not state in express terms to whom the promise is made, the law declares that it is made to the person from whom proceeded the consideration by which it is supported. Treat v. Stanton, 14 Conn. 445, 451. If it names a party to the contract as the promisee, a third party may maintain an action, the contract not being under seal, on proof that the other acted in the transaction merely as his agent; and so assumpsit may be maintained against such a party, though the contract with the agent be under seal, if the principal's interest appears upon its face, and he has accepted the benefit of its performance. Briggs v. Partridge, 64 N. Y. 357, 364. There are certain classes of cases which are often treated as establishing exceptions to these rules of decision, but which can, with at least equal propriety, be deemed illustrations of their rightful application under exceptional conditions. One class, found mainly in the older English reports, and unsupported by the later ones, springs out of contracts in the nature of marriage or family settlements, under which a direct benefit is secured to children or other near relatives. Here the unity of the family has been taken into account, and the consideration of marriage deemed to extend to its issue. Another class embraces promises of a certain kind, made to one man for the direct sole, and exclusive benefit of another. Thus, C. may sue for money paid to A. for his use by B., when it was part of their agreement that the payment and its object should be communicated to him. Here A. is in the position of a forwarding agent for C, and when the latter is informed of the transaction, and assents to it this may be properly treated as a ratification. There are other instances, including bailments in trust or to hold for a third person, under circumstances implying the assumption of a specific duty towards him, that cannot be brought under the law of principal and agent, under which an equitable action, at least, can be sustained by one not a party to a contract to secure its benefits; but the remedy can never be pressed beyond the right, and can seldom, if ever, extend to a stranger to the consideration, who is not in some relation of privity with the nominal promisee. Treat v. Stanton, 14 Conn. 445; Woodbury Sav. Bank v. Charter Oak Ins. Co., 29 Conn. 374; Clapp v. Lawton, 31 Conn. 95; Meech v. Ensign. 49 Conn. 191; National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U. S. 123; Bank v. Rice, 107 Mass. 37; Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best & S. 393; Pol. Cont. c. 5. Unguarded expressions are to be found in some of the earlier opinions of this court, which countenance the broad proposition that, where a promise is made to one man for the benefit of another, the latter may sustain a suit upon that promise; but no such doctrine has ever been applied to govern our determinations of a cause. Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 342; Steene v. Aylesworth, 18 Conn. 244, 252.

The contract which is the foundation of this suit was made between a husband and wife, who married after the act of 1877 (Gen. St. § 2796) went into effect The defendant had received money from her to use in his business. They evidently meant by this paper to state the amount for which he was to be accountable; to preclude any claim for interest upon it during her life; and to secure it upon her decease to those nearest to her in blood, who would naturally succeed to her estate. The sum thus ascertained is described as "property," and, in the event of her surviving her son, was to pass in the ordinary lines of inheritance. Such an instrument cannot be regarded as executed for the direct, sole, and exclusive benefit of the plaintiff, nor yet as in the nature of a family settlement. Its immediate object was to protect the interests of his mother. It was the adjustment of an unsettled account, followed by provisions designed to serve the purpose of a testamentary disposition. It does not appear that the parties to the agreement intended or contemplated that the plaintiff should be informed of its existence during his mother's life. It does appear from its face that he could derive no benefit whatever from its provisions should he not...