Baxter v. Craney

• Decision Date: 15 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25549.,25549.
• Parties: Tracy BAXTER and Sharon Baxter, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. CRANEY and Darlene (Dollie) Craney, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

16 P.3d 263

135 Idaho 166

Tracy BAXTER and Sharon Baxter, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. CRANEY and Darlene (Dollie) Craney, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 25549.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, September 2000 Term.

December 15, 2000.

Myers, Thomsen & Larson, LLP, Pocatello, and Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, Kam & Moeller, Chtd., Rexburg, for appellants. A. Bruce Larson argued.

Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Pocatello, for respondents. Randall C. Budge argued.

WALTERS, Justice

This action was commenced by Tracy and Sharon Baxter against their neighbors, James and Darlene Craney, to quiet title to certain real property. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Craneys upon the Baxters' theories of title by adverse possession and title through boundary by agreement. After a trial before the court without a jury, the district court also found in favor of the Craneys and against the Baxters on a claim of easement by prescription. The district court then entered an order awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys as the prevailing party.

For reasons to follow, this Court affirms the order granting summary judgment on the adverse possession claim, but we vacate the order for judgment on the theory of boundary by agreement. We also affirm the judgment denying relief on the Baxters' claim to an easement by prescription. Finally, we vacate the award of attorney fees and costs in favor of the Craneys, and we remand the action for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Tracy and Sharon Baxter and James and Darlene Craney are ranchers who own adjacent parcels of real property in Bear Lake County. The Craneys and the Baxters share a common boundary of approximately one-quarter mile in length. The Craneys purchased their land in 1996 and subsequently removed a portion of a fence located between the two properties. The Baxters contend that the fence marks the actual boundary between the two parcels. The Craneys, on the other hand, contend that the fence was put up for convenience purposes and was only intended to keep cattle from wandering onto a portion of their land. They claim the range line to the east of the fence forms the boundary between the two properties as established by a number of surveys dating back to 1882.

The Baxters filed this action against the Craneys in November of 1997, claiming ownership of the land east of the fence but west of the range line under the doctrine of boundary by agreement or by adverse possession. The Baxters alternatively claimed a prescriptive easement to cross the land lying to the east of the fence for the purpose of reaching a spring to water their livestock. Later, the Baxters attempted to amend their complaint to join the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) as a defendant in the action, asserting that the BLM was an integral party. The district court, however, refused to allow the Baxters to add the BLM.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Craneys on the issues of boundary by agreement and adverse possession. The court concluded that the Baxters failed to present genuine issues of material fact regarding the existence of a boundary agreement between Tracy Baxter and Grant Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, or the payment of taxes as is required for adverse possession. A trial was held on the issue of whether the Baxters acquired a prescriptive easement to use the land east of the fence for stock watering. The district court found that the Baxters failed to prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement and awarded costs and attorney fees to the Craneys.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The Baxters raise the following issues on appeal:

1. Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion in denying the Baxters' motion to amend their complaint to add the Bureau of Land Management as a party?

2. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' adverse possession claim?

3. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' claim of boundary by agreement?

4. Was the District Court's denial of the Baxters' prescriptive easement claim at trial based on substantial and competent evidence?

5. Did the District Court properly award attorney fees and costs to the Craneys?

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Amend

A trial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. See Cook v. State Dep't of Transp., 133 Idaho 288, 296, 985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999)

. In determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test articulated in Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The three factors are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See id. at 94, 803 P.2d at 1000.

Rule 15(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Id. See also Cook, 133 Idaho at 296,

985 P.2d at 1157. This Court, on a number of occasions, however, has upheld trial court decisions to deny the plaintiff's amended complaint motion. See Dairy Equip. Co. of Utah v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301, 304, 442 P.2d 437, 440 (1968) (holding no abuse of discretion when the amended complaint was filed five days prior to trial); Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 610, 570 P.2d 284, 288 (1977) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to amend filed on the day of trial); Cook, 133 Idaho at 297,

985 P.2d at 1158 (holding no abuse of discretion for denial of an eighth amended complaint filed on the morning of trial).

The Baxters attempted to amend their complaint approximately five months after the original complaint had been filed and after the date for trial had been set. The district court concluded that given the amount of time and money the Craneys had expended in defending the action, "it would be unfairly prejudicial at this point to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to add a new party and change the dynamics of the action as it now stands." This illustrates that the district court recognized it had the discretion to allow or deny amendment of the complaint. Because Rule 15(a) requires the district court to allow amendments only when justice requires, the court's decision to deny the amendment was both within the bounds of its discretion and within applicable legal standards. In addition, the district court displayed sound reasoning for its conclusion. As the court noted, the issues the Baxters sought to resolve with the BLM were not directly related to their action against the Craneys. The BLM was neither a necessary party, nor were the Baxters unduly prejudiced by the district court's refusal to allow the Baxters to amend their complaint, as the Baxters are not precluded from bringing a separate action against the BLM. Moreover, the potential likelihood of removal to federal court upon the addition of the federal agency to the action would result in the Craneys expending more time and money so that issues unrelated to their case could be resolved. Accordingly, this Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow the Baxters to amend their complaint by adding the BLM as a party defendant.

B. Summary Judgment Motion

1. Standard of Review

In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Paine, 119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991)

; Meridian Bowling Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 105 Idaho 509, 670 P.2d 1294 (1983). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. See Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). The adverse party, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e); see also Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986). In other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Badell, 115 Idaho at 102,

765 P.2d at 127 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). With this standard in mind, we turn to whether the district court erred in dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession or by the doctrine of boundary by agreement.

2. Adverse Possession

Idaho Code section 5-210 defines the elements of adverse possession under an oral claim of right. The statute provides as follows:

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:

1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.

2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.

Provided, however, that in no case

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