Baxter v. Lancer Industries, Inc.
Decision Date | 11 January 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 62C655.,62C655. |
Citation | 213 F. Supp. 92 |
Parties | Clarence E. BAXTER, Plaintiff, v. LANCER INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
Grossman & Grossman, New York City, for plaintiff; Louis Grossman, Herman Cahn, New York City, of counsel.
Levy & Nevins, New York City, for defendant; Saul S. Nevins, New York City, of counsel.
This is a motion by the plaintiff for summary judgment in an action to enforce a written agreement between the parties entered into on August 29, 1961 and providing as follows:
The plaintiff alleges that as of November 20, 1962 the defendant had failed to register the 19,500 shares of Lancer stock mentioned in the agreement. A formal demand for compliance with the agreement was made by plaintiff on June 1, 1962 and this suit was commenced on June 14, 1962. In regard to the registration of the shares in question the SEC has expressed itself as follows:
In opposition to the motion the defendant asserts that there are present substantial questions of fact which preclude the granting of summary judgment and, further, that as a matter of law the plaintiff cannot enforce the agreement at this time. As to the presence of questions of fact defendant contends: (1) that the 3,000 shares purchased by plaintiff from George Langley are not now in plaintiff's possession, having been pledged in some sort of loan transaction, and that plaintiff is unable to return them to the corporation; (2) that 6,500 of the shares purchased by plaintiff from Lancer have been hypothecated with various banks and are not now in plaintiff's possession and that plaintiff is unable to secure their return; (3) that the repurchase agreement does not cover the 3,000 shares purchased by plaintiff from George Langley. It would thus appear that, as to the 9,500 shares above referred to, substantial questions of fact are presented which preclude the granting of summary judgment. While the plaintiff would have the court now decide that the 3,000 shares purchased from Langley were in fact covered by the repurchase agreement this question appears to devolve on the intention of the parties. The question of the intentions of the parties to a contract may not properly be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. Empire Electronics Inc. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175 (2d Cir., 1962). Defendant further contends that, as to all of the 19,500 shares involved, it cannot at this time fulfill its obligation to repurchase since it is precluded from doing so by the governing Florida Law, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 608.13(9) (b), Lancer being a Florida corporation. Section 608.13(9) (b) provides that every corporation unless otherwise provided by law or by its certificate of incorporation, shall have power to:
"Purchase, hold, sell and transfer shares of its own capital stock, provided that no corporation shall purchase any of its own capital stock except from the surplus of its assets over its liabilities including capital. * * *"
Defendant has annexed to its affidavits a financial statement dated February 28, 1962, from which it appears that the defendant has no earned surplus as defined by statute available for repurchase of stock, although assets do exceed liabilities. The affidavit of Lancer's treasurer states that as of November 9, 1962 defendant's liabilities exceed its assets. Plaintiff strongly contests the validity and accuracy of both the financial statements and the treasurer's assertion and asserts that in fact there is sufficient surplus from which the corporation may repurchase its own stock. This, of course, presents a question of fact which the court cannot resolve on a motion for summary judgment.
The existence or non-existence of adequate surplus is not to be determined solely upon the defendant's financial statements. Were the issue to be so limited, a trial would be a sterile playlet. What little authority there is suggests that actual values, albeit...
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...likely decide the case if the state court were presented with the questions being litigated in the federal court. Baxter v. Lancer Industries, Inc., 213 F.Supp. 92 (EDNY 1963), app. denied, 324 F.2d 286 (2 Cir. 1963); Locke Manufacturing Companies v. United States, 237 F.Supp. 80 (D.Conn.19......
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In re Trimble Company, 14787.
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