Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n

• Citation: 304 So.3d 606
• Decision Date: 29 October 2020
• Docket Number: NO. 2019-CA-00862-SCT,2019-CA-00862-SCT
• Parties: BAY POINT PROPERTIES, INC. f/k/a BP Properties, Inc. v. MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION and Mississippi Department of Transportation
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

304 So.3d 606

BAY POINT PROPERTIES, INC. f/k/a BP Properties, Inc.

v.MISSISSIPPI TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION and Mississippi Department of Transportation

NO. 2019-CA-00862-SCT

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

October 29, 2020

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM ALEX BRADY, II, CHARLES S. LAMBERT, JR.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: CHRISTOPHER M. HOWDESHELL, JACK H. PITTMAN, Hattiesburg

BEFORE KING, P.J., COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ.

COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Bay Point Properties, Inc. (Bay Point), prevailed at trial: the jury found in its favor on the issue of liability. However, in a case where Bay Point sought $ 8.7 million, the jury awarded only nominal damages. Bay Point now appeals the circuit court's award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in an inverse condemnation claim pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 43-37-9.

¶2. The case originates from an action brought by Bay Point against the Mississippi Transportation Commission in which Bay Point sought damages resulting from inverse condemnation. After the verdict, Bay Point filed a motion requesting attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. The trial court awarded $500 in nominal damages and denied Bay Point's request for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. Bay Point appealed. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n , 201 So. 3d 1046, 1059 (Miss. 2016). The Court affirmed the jury's verdict, which had awarded Bay Point the encumbered value of the property, and reversed the trial court's decision to deny Bay Points's motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, stating, " Section 43-37-9 ’s mandatory language—shall determine and award—leaves no room for judicial discretion, except as to a reimbursement amount that was ‘reasonable.’ " Id. at 1058. We remanded the issue of attorneys’ fees to the circuit court. Id. at 1059. On remand, the circuit court awarded attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs in the amount of $67,277.35 to Bay Point, although Bay Point had sought considerably more. The court determined that amount to be reasonable because Bay Point only received nominal damages. Bay Point appeals.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. Bay Point owns approximately 14.3 acres of property in Harrison County, Mississippi, located east of the Highway 90 bridge across the Bay of St. Louis. On April 1, 2010, Bay Point filed an inverse-condemnation action against the Mississippi Transportation Commission and the Mississippi Department of Transportation. The trial ended on August 13, 2013. The jury entered a verdict in favor of Bay Point; however, the jury only awarded nominal damages of $500 because an easement encumbered the property.

¶4. Bay Point filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, seeking a total of $686,001.55. The trial court heard the motion for attorneys’ fees on November 21, 2013, and denied the request by order entered on January 8, 2014. Bay Point appealed, raising various issues, including attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.

¶5. On July 21, 2016, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses to Bay Point. Id. at 1058. We noted that the trial court had discretion not to grant the full amount of attorneys’ fees requested; however, it was error not to award any reimbursement at all pursuant to the language of Mississippi Code Section 43-37-9. Id. The Court remanded the issue of attorneys’ fees to the circuit court to determine an amount that was reasonable. Id.

¶6. On remand, Bay Point filed a Supplemental Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, updating the costs incurred during the litigation. Bay Point requested attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $880,171.81. The circuit court conducted a hearing to determine the proper amount of fees and awarded Bay Point attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses in the amount of $67,277.35. The amount awarded included $33,321.42 in attorneys’ fees, $5,740 for surveyor fees, and $28,215.93 for other costs, fees, and expenses incurred during the litigation. The court also awarded Bay Point postjudgment interest at the amount of 8 percent per annum. Bay Point appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7. "We will not reverse the trial court on the question of attorney's fees unless there is a manifest abuse of discretion in making the allowance ...." Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co. , 741 So. 2d 259, 269 (¶ 32) (Miss. 1999) (quoting Deer Creek Constr. Co. v. Peterson , 412 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Miss. 1982) ). Manifest means "unmistakable, clear, plain, or indisputable." Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp. , 972 So. 2d 495, 521 (¶ 81) (Miss. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mabus v. Mabus , 910 So. 2d 486, 488 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2005) ). "[W]e, as an appellate court, will affirm the decree if the record shows any ground upon which the decision may be justified .... We will not arbitrarily substitute our judgment for that of the chancellor who is in the best position to evaluate all factors ...." Mabus v. Mabus , 910 So. 2d 486, 488 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2005) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tucker v. Tucker , 453 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Miss. 1984) ).

DISCUSSION

¶8. Bay Point argues that the trial judge abused his discretion and is manifestly wrong by failing to award it the total amount of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expert appraisal fees actually incurred because of the taking of private property by the Transportation Commission. Bay Point argues it is entitled to an award of all fees and costs incurred in successfully prosecuting its inverse-condemnation lawsuit pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 43-37-9 (Rev. 2015). When the case sub judice was remanded by the Court, the Court stated,

Section 43-37-9 ’s mandatory language—shall determine and award—leaves no room for judicial discretion, except as to a reimbursement amount that was "reasonable." We conclude it was within the trial court's discretion not to grant Bay Point's request for $680,000 in full. Yet we reject the trial court's failure to award any reimbursement at all. Such a result is in direct violation of the statute and therefore manifestly wrong.

Bay Point Props., Inc. v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n , 201 So. 3d 1046, 1058 (Miss. 2016).

¶9. Pursuant to the Court's holding, it was manifest error for the trial court not to award any reimbursement. However, the Court made it clear that the trial court need not award the full amount requested. Instead, the Court directed the trial court to determine an amount that was reasonable.

I. The award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses was reasonable.

¶10. One method of calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees, the "lodestar method," was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hensley v. Eckerhart . Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp. , 972 So. 2d 495, 520 (¶ 78) (Miss. 2007) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 430, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ). The factors considered under the lodestar method include:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Hensley , 461 U.S. at 430 n.3, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp., Inc. , 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated by Blanchard v. Bergeron , 489 U.S. 87, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989) ).

¶11. The factors considered in Mississippi are listed in Rule 1.5 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. "Other than a minor rewording and reordering, these factors are virtually identical to the factors set out by the United States Supreme Court in Hensley ." Tupelo Redevelopment Agency v. Gray Corp. , 972 So. 2d 495, 521 (¶ 79) (Miss. 2007). The factors include:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Miss. R. of Pro. Conduct 1.5.

¶12. Out of all of the factors listed in Rule 1.5, the only factor that is actually in issue in the case sub judice is the amount involved and the results obtained. The trial judge made findings of fact on each of the eight factors listed in Rule 1.5 and further found that because the results obtained did not reflect the award sought, the amount of attorneys’ fees awarded should be reduced.

¶13. While the following cases do not concern attorneys’ fees, the cases do provide a good description of how factors should be considered. The Court has stated,

these factors are not variables in a mathematical formula. Nor is an Albright [v. Albright , 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983) ] analysis "premised solely on a scoring system" where findings on each factor are added and later compared to see which parent "wins." O'Briant v. O'Briant , 99 So. 3d 802, 805–06 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). Rather, the "factors exist to ensure the chancellor considers all the relevant facts" before making a decision. Id. (citations

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