Baye v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.
| Decision Date | 09 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 17–4789 |
| Citation | 272 F.Supp.3d 898 |
| Parties | Joan BAYE v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC., et al |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Katherine Zabetti Crouch, Crouch Law, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Joan Baye
Matthew W. McDade, Balch & Bingham, LLP, Gulfport, MS, for Midland Credit Management, Inc., et al
SECTION "F"
Before the Court is Midland Credit Management, Inc. and Midland Funding, LLC's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
This lawsuit arises out of alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
Joan Baye alleges that Midland Funding and Midland Credit Management (MCM) buy expired debts from creditors and then attempt to collect payments on these expired debts from debtors. Specifically, Baye alleges that MCM and Midland sent her three collection letters on expired debts it purchased from creditors. Baye contends that the letters are in violation of the FDCPA standards. The letters included language to entice a debtor into paying these time-barred, or old, debts. For example, the letters include "offers" for 40% off debt and other payment options. In a letter sent to Baye for an old Target debt, the letter also stated:
Importantly, each of the letters Baye received included the following language:
The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt and how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not sue you for it or report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau.
This language appeared below the signature block of the debt collector in normal-sized font.
In response to these letters, Baye files this lawsuit against MCM and Midland Funding for alleged violations of the FDCPA. Baye alleges that MCM and Midland Funding violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f. Baye alleges that the letters were deceptive because the letters sought to have debtors pay on old debts without warning debtors that payment would "revive" the old, time-barred debts. Baye also contends that the letters were harassing because MCM and Midland sent three different letters, all pertaining to time-barred debts.
In response to Baye's complaint,1 MCM and Midland file this motion to dismiss, contending that Baye fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Such a motion is rarely granted because it is viewed with disfavor. See Lowrey v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982) ).
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).
Thus, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accepts ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’ " See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) ). But, in deciding whether dismissal is warranted, the Court will not accept conclusory allegations in the complaint as true. Kaiser, 677 F.2d at 1050. Indeed, the Court must first identify allegations that are conclusory and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A corollary: legal conclusions "must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Assuming the veracity of the well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must then determine "whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. It is well established that
Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
" ‘To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations and footnote omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (). This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ " thus "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents that are essentially "part of the pleadings." That is, any documents attached to or incorporated in the plaintiff's complaint that are central to the plaintiff's claim for relief. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000) ). Also, the Court is permitted to consider matters of public record and other matters subject to judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Tex. Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 2003).
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the FDCPA by sending collection letters that were deceptive and coercive. These actions, according to the plaintiff, violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f. In response, the defendants contend that the plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a viable FDCPA claim.
"The FDCPA seeks to eliminate ‘abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices’ by regulating the type and number of contacts a ‘debt collector’ can make with a debtor." Brooks v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, No. 11-67, 2011 WL 2710026, at *5 (E.D. La. July 12, 2011) (Vance, J.); 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a). The FDCPA defines "debt collector" as:
any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.... For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.
15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA regulates debt collectors by prohibiting harassment or abuse in connection with the collection of a debt, prohibiting false or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a debt, and prohibiting unfair or unconscionable means to collect a debt. Id. at §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f.
Baye first alleges in Counts I and II of her complaint that MCM and Midland violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, which prohibits debt collectors from engaging "in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt." Id. § 1692d. "Congress adopted this general language to enable the courts, where appropriate, to proscribe ... improper conduct which is not specifically addressed [in § 1692d(1) - (6) ]." Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F.Supp. 1456, 1465 (C.D. Cal. 1991) (internal citations omitted) (alteration in original). "The statute also sets out examples of harassment or abuse, including ‘[t]he use of obscene or profane language,’ and ‘[c]ausing a telephone to ring ... repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.’ " Brooks, 2011 WL 2710026, at *7 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(2), 1692d(5) ) (internal citation omitted). Notably, "[t]he FDCPA does not prohibit a debt collector from contacting a debtor multiple times in an attempt to collect a legitimate debt." Brooks, 2011 WL...
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