Bayliss v. Barnhart
Decision Date | 02 November 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 04-35634.,04-35634. |
Citation | 427 F.3d 1211 |
Parties | JANA M. BAYLISS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David B. Lowry, Portland, OR, for the plaintiff-appellant.
Joanne E. Dantonio, Social Security Administration, Office of the General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for the defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Ann L. Aiken, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-03-01431-AA.
Before FISHER, GOULD, and BEA, Circuit Judges.
Jana Bayliss appeals the district court's affirmance of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., 1381 et seq. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found that Bayliss retained the capacity to perform a wide range of light work, and thus that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council declined review, and the district court affirmed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.1
Bayliss asserts that her due process rights were violated. She contends that the ALJ was preoccupied with whether her attorney properly disclosed a doctor's report, and thus that the ALJ did not impartially assess the evidence. To succeed in this claim, Bayliss must show that "the ALJ's behavior, in the context of the whole case, was `so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment.'" Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994)). We must begin with a presumption that the ALJ was unbiased. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195, 102 S.Ct. 1665, 72 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (). Bayliss can rebut this presumption by showing a "conflict of interest or some other specific reason for disqualification." Id.
The ALJ prepared a detailed, forty-five-page opinion in which he carefully examined Bayliss's medical history and addressed the opinion of each reviewing doctor. In the opinion, the ALJ posited that Bayliss's counsel had withheld medical records from experts in an effort to garner records and testimony that would support Bayliss's claim.2 For example, the ALJ noted: "Given that counsel withheld all relevant medical records from Dr. Manfield, it is obvious that he had no means of independently verifying the claimant's grossly exaggerated subjective descriptions of her status since the motor vehicle accident." In finding that questionnaire responses provided by Ms. Baptiste, a social worker who conducted mental health counseling for Bayliss, were not supported by the record, the ALJ wrote: "It is reasonable to presume that counsel did not provide relevant treating source medical records for Ms. Baptiste to review...."
The ALJ also took exception to the self-assessment forms submitted by Bayliss's counsel. The ALJ first noted that, in general, such assessments provide little assistance in determining whether claimants are disabled because claimants lack the requisite medical expertise. He then stated: "Counsel's submission of `medical source' self-assessments completed by this particular claimant, however, amounts to a mockery of the goals of evidentiary integrity and due process that are the foundation of the ... disability hearing system."
The ALJ had previously conducted an extensive hearing. In his opinion resolving the case, the ALJ determined, based on substantial evidence, that Bayliss was not credible. The ALJ found that objective medical evidence contradicted several of the doctors' reports submitted in support of Bayliss's claim. He documented his findings and opinions in a detailed and reasoned opinion. In this context, the ALJ's statements attributing misconduct to Bayliss's counsel are not so extreme as to show that the ALJ could not render a fair judgment. Compare Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858 ( ), with Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902-04 (3d Cir.1995) ( ).
Applying the standard from the Supreme Court's Liteky decision, our sister circuits, like our circuit in Rollins, have rejected allegations that due process was violated when isolated parts of an ALJ's conduct were challenged but the record as a whole showed fundamental fairness for the litigants. See, e.g., Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 500 (5th Cir.1999) ( ); Puckett v. Chater, 100 F.3d 730, 734 (10th Cir.1996) ( ); Ginsburg v. Richardson, 436 F.2d 1146, 1151 (3d Cir.1971) ().
In light of the ALJ's detailed and reasoned written grounds for ruling against Bayliss, we conclude that the statements in the ALJ's opinion in which the ALJ expressed displeasure with the conduct of Bayliss's counsel are not sufficient to establish bias. See Rollins, 261 F.3d at 858 () (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147). We affirm the district court's determination that Bayliss's due process rights were not violated.
Bayliss next argues that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of several doctors. To reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir.1995). If a treating or examining doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. Also, when evaluating conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2001).
The ALJ rejected Dr. Tobin's statement that Bayliss could stand or walk for only fifteen minutes at a time. Dr. Tobin took clinical notes on the same day that he made this statement. These notes, and the doctor's other recorded observations and opinions regarding Bayliss's capabilities, contradict Dr. Tobin's statement assessing Bayliss's ability to stand or walk. Such a discrepancy is a clear and convincing reason for not relying on the doctor's opinion regarding Bayliss's limited ability to stand and walk. See Weetman v. Sullivan, 877 F.2d 20, 23 (9th Cir.1989). The ALJ's rejection of Dr. Tobin's opinion is supported by substantial evidence and was based on a permissible determination within the ALJ's province.
Substantial evidence also supports the ALJ's treatment of Dr. Sweet's determination that Bayliss has difficulty paying attention, concentrating, and organizing herself without getting overwhelmed. The ALJ agreed with Dr. Sweet's conclusions, but the ALJ determined that the conditions Dr. Sweet identified would not affect Bayliss's ability to work. Bayliss has faced these limitations since at least 1995, before her 1998 accident, and they have not prevented her from completing high school, obtaining a college degree, finishing a Certified Nurses' Aide training program, and participating in military training.
Bayliss also contends that the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Manfield's psychological assessment and Dr. Freeman's opinion that Bayliss suffers from bipolar disorder. Dr. Manfield concluded that Bayliss suffered from several mental conditions,3 but he based this assessment on Bayliss's complaints and information submitted by her family, her friends, and a former counselor. He did not review objective medical data or reports from treating physicians or counselors. Similarly, Dr. Freeman's opinion was not supported by clinical evidence and was based on Bayliss's subjective complaints. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision not to rely on the opinion of either doctor. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2002) ().
Bayliss further asserts that the ALJ should have recontacted Drs. Tobin, Sweet, and Manfield before rejecting parts of their opinions. "The claimant bears the burden of proving that she is disabled." Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir.1999). An ALJ is required to recontact a doctor only if the doctor's report is ambiguous or insufficient...
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Table of Cases
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