Bayonne Textile Corp. v. Am. Fed'n of Silk Workers

• Decision Date: 04 May 1934
• Docket Number: No. 77.,77.
• Citation: 172 A. 551
• Parties: BAYONNE TEXTILE CORPORATION v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF SILK WORKERS et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

172 A. 551

BAYONNE TEXTILE CORPORATION

v. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF SILK WORKERS et al.

No. 77.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 4, 1934.

Appeal from Court of Chancery.

Suit by the Bayonne Textile Corporation against the American Federation of Silk Workers and others. From an order granting an injunction pendente lite (114 N. J. Eq. 307, 168 A. 799), the defendants appeal.

Order modified in accordance with opinion, and as modified, affirmed, and cause remanded.

Joel Gross, of Jersey City, for appellants.

David L. Cole, of Paterson, for respondent.

HEHER, Justice.

Complainant, a manufacturer of broad silks and rayon, filed a bill praying relief from alleged unlawful interference with its property rights by defendants. It was averred that complainant, who is the operator of a plant at the city of Bayonne on the plan technically known as the "open shop," had conformed to the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act § 1 et seq., approved by the Congress on June 16, 1933 (15 USCA § 701 et seq.); that the wages paid to its employees met the standard prescribed by the act and the Code adopted in accordance therewith for the government of the silk industry (which, for the time being, was the Cotton Textile Industrial Code); that defendant American Federation of Silk Workers, a voluntary association of silk workers of national authority, with a branch in the county of Hudson, whose design and purpose with reference to complainant was to compel it to operate its plant as a "closed shop," and to coerce it into employing none but members of the defendant union, fomented a strike of complainant's employees, and conducted it in mode and manner calculated to intimidate complainant's employees, and thereby induce and compel them to leave complainant's service, or, failing that, to create such a state of fear and apprehension as to impair their efficiency and, to a substantial degree, the quality of the service rendered to complainant.

It was charged that insults, indecent and annoying language, and abusive epithets were hurled at complainant's employees, by pickets acting for defendants, as they passed to and from complainant's plant; that they were threatened with physical violence if they did not withdraw from complainant's service; that windows of complainant's plant, about thirty in number, were broken by defendants, or those acting on their behalf; that defendant union, through its agents and servants, "unlawfully interfered with complainant's business in encouraging, inducing and compelling persons employed by complainant, by threats, intimidation, force or violence, to refuse to perform their duties as such employees, and to' remain away from its employ": and that, by reason of the "unlawful interference and instigation of" defendant federation, all of complainant's employees joined in the strike. It was also alleged that the strike was conducted by a strike committee of the defendant union, under the supervision of the defendants Brown and Sacaroff, who were assisted by defendant Burn; that the picketing of complainant's plant consisted of the "personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing to be employed by complainant," for the purpose of coercing them into withholding their services, and thus to terminate the plant's operations; and that, as a result of the practices pursued by defendants and those associated with them in the prosecution of the strike which they declared, there was a cessation of manufacture.

It is insisted that defendants, by this course of conduct, offended against the provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the public policy therein declared, in that they thereby hindered and hampered industrial recovery and employment, and that; additionally, they interfered with complainant's property rights to the service of its employees, and to the peaceful enjoyment of its property. It is further asserted that the strike is in violation of the Recovery Act, and the Code adopted pursuant thereto, in that defendants and their co-workers did not first submit their grievances and demands to complainant through representatives of their own choosing, and did not first exhaust their remedy within the tribunals provided for in the act and Code. It is also alleged that if defendants persist in the specified unlawful conduct, complainant's business will be totally destroyed, and its property will greatly diminish in value.

A restraint pendente lite was granted, and from the order therefor defendants appeal. It is sweeping in character. It restrains not only unlawful conduct, but also that which has hitherto been regarded as lawful. It enjoins not only the intimidation and coercion of complainant's employees by violence, threats, annoyances, and other unlawful practices, but the conduct of the strike itself. It prohibits defendants "from participating, promoting, encouraging, directing, or being in anywise engaged in any strike against or picketing of the complainant, its business or factory." Affirmative action on the part of the employees is expressly limited to organizing and bargaining collectively with complainant "through representatives of such employee's own choosing, from among their own number, to seek an equitable adjustment of such grievances" as they may have against complainant "relating to labor conditions in complainant's factory."

The Vice Chancellor proceeded on the assumption that the National Industrial Recovery Act outlaws strikes. The restraining order recites that the act, and the Code adopted pursuant thereto, "manifest a public policy to put an end to strikes by workers employed in industry and trade, * * * by providing a forum for mediation of grievances between employers and employees." In his opinion the Vice Chancellor declared (114 N. J. Eq. 307, 168 A. 799, 804): "In view of the means afforded employees to effect mediation of alleged grievances against their employer before impartial mediators such as provided under N. R. A., it is inconceivable that they should be permitted to resort to strikes ad libitum against their employer. Such practices, while the aims and purposes of N. I. R. A. and of N. R. A. are sought to be effected, must be regarded as taboo." He also asserted that in view of the means thus afforded "for equitable readjustments of real or fancied grievances between an employer and its employees * * * courts of equity cannot countenance strikes against employers engaged in industrial pursuits, and picketing in connection therewith, particularly by intermeddlers, when no fair effort has been made to adjust alleged grievances by employer and employees."

But in this he was clearly in error. We do not find expressed in the recovery act a congressional purpose to deprive the employees of the right to strike where, as here, their demand for a wage increase is not complied with. It is fundamental that the intention and policy of Congress, as expressed in the enactment, should be effectuated. The act should receive a sensible construction— one that will not lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. The reason and spirit of the law should prevail over its letter. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U, S. 47, 12 'S. Ot. 517, 36 L. Ed. 340; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 39, 25 S. Ct 358, 49 L. Ed. 643, 3 Ann. Gas. 765; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 19 L. Ed. 278. This statute is an emergency measure. It is so denominated. Its general object is to effect industrial recovery. The immediate objectives, in the attempted fulfillment of the general plan and purpose, are, inter alia: (1) To promote the organization of industry for the purpose of cooperative action among trade groups; (2) to induce and maintain united action of labor and management under adequate governmental sanctions and supervision; (3) to eliminate unfair competitive practices; (4) to promote the fullest possible utilization of the present productive capacity of industries; (5) to increase the consumption of industrial and agricultural products by increasing purchasing power;

(6) to reduce and relieve unemployment; and

(7) to improve standards of labor. 15 USCA § 701.

The President is authorized, upon application made by one or more trade or industrial associations or groups, or upon his own motion, to "approve a code or codes of fair competition" for the government of the trade or industry in question, or any subdivision thereof, for the effectuation of the policy declared by the act. The provisions of such Code shall be the standards of fair competition for such trade or industry, or subdivision thereof. Ibid. § 703. Destructive wage and price cutting are contrary to the policy of the act, and, in order to guard against such practices, the President is invested with the power to license business enterprises. Ibid. § 704.

The act, in terms, confers upon employees the right to organize and bargain collectively, through representatives of their own choosing. Section 7 (a) (Ibid. § 707) provides that every such Code of fair competition, agreement, and license approved, prescribed, or issued under the act, shall contain the following conditions:

"(1) That employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." And—

"(2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own choosing."

The right to organize and bargain collectively connotes the right to strike in event that such course is deemed advisable by the employees for their...