Baysa v. Gualtieri

• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
• Writing for the Court: WILLIAM F. JUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Decision Date: 13 November 2018
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 8:17-cv-434-T-02SPF
• Citation: Baysa v. Gualtieri, CASE NO. 8:17-cv-434-T-02SPF (M.D. Fla. Nov 13, 2018)
• Parties: MAT S. BAYSA, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT GUALTIERI in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, CHARLES REDINGER, individually and as Pinellas County Deputy, STEPHANIE ARCHER, individually and as Pinellas County Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.

MAT S. BAYSA, Plaintiff, v. ROBERT GUALTIERI in his official capacity as Sheriff of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office,CHARLES REDINGER, individually and as Pinellas County Deputy,STEPHANIE ARCHER, individually and as Pinellas County Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.

CASE NO. 8:17-cv-434-T-02SPF

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TAMPA DIVISION

November 13, 2018

ORDER

Upon due consideration of Defendant's Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Dkt. 74) and Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (75), the Court denies the motion. In granting summary judgment, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Defendants had deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and that even if he had, Defendants would have been entitled to qualified immunity. (Dkt. 70). Defendants now move as prevailing parties to tax attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).¹

Defendants assert that they are entitled to an award of attorney's fees because Plaintiff's case was frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation, citing to Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980), and Sullivan v. School Bd. of Pinellas Cnty., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (11^th Cir. 1985). They argue that "but for" Plaintiff's inexplicable change in testimony from his criminal trial to his deposition in this case, the Court would have dismissed the case before it ever proceeded to summary judgment.²

So as not to discourage plaintiffs from bringing civil rights lawsuits, "[p]olicy concerns militate against awarding attorney's fees to defendants in civil rights cases." Sayers v. Stewart Sleep Ctr., Inc., 140 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11^th Cir. 1998). More than Plaintiff's ultimate loss is required. Bruce v. City of Gainesville, 177 F.3d 949, 951 (11^th Cir. 1999). Although a close question, the Court denies fees pursuant to the reasoning of Sayers, supra, and Perry v. Orange Cnty., 341 F.Supp.2d 1197, 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2004).

ACCORDINGLY, Defendant's Motion for Attorneys' Fees (Dkt. 74) is denied.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on November 13, 2018.

s/William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record

1. In any action to enforce the provisions of § 1983, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of its costs . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

2. The Court found that Plaintiff's testimony differed substantially and materially from his criminal trial. (Dkt. 70). At trial, he made no mention of being punched, kicked, or choked, but at his deposition he recalled quite the...