Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Farzan
| Decision Date | 03 November 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 17-1796 (FLW) (DEA) |
| Parties | BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC, Plaintiff, v. REZA FARZAN; and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., as nominee for AMERICAN MORTGAGE NETWORK, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
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Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Bayview Loan Servicing LLC's ("Plaintiff") Motion to Remand this action to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Monmouth County, as well as Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. This matter arises from a state court foreclosure action in which Plaintiff, the mortgagee, asserted that pro se defendant Reza Farzan ("Defendant" or "Farzan"), the mortgagor, defaulted on his mortgage payments.1 In support of its Motion, Plaintiff argues that remand is proper because: (i) the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case; and (ii) Defendant failed to timely remove this matter. Plaintiff also maintains that it is entitled to attorney's fees and costs, because Defendant did not have an objectively reasonable basis for removal. For the reasons set forthbelow, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is GRANTED, and its Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs is DENIED.
On May 12, 2016, Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint for mortgage foreclosure in New Jersey Superior Court, Monmouth County, Chancery Division, naming as defendants Farzan, MERS, and various fictitious parties.2 See Certification of Michael E. Blaine, Esq. ("Blaine Cert."), Ex. A. The Complaint alleges that, on February 14, 2015, Defendant executed a note (the "Note"), which was ultimately assigned to Plaintiff, in the amount of $359,650.00 and secured by real property located in Holmdel, New Jersey. Compl. ¶¶ 7-13. The Complaint alleges, however, that on August 1, 2015, Defendant defaulted by failing to make payments in accordance with the Note and various loan documents. Compl. ¶¶ 21-23. In the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to foreclose Defendant's interest in the mortgaged property and to obtain immediate possession of the property. Compl. ¶¶ 7-37.
On July 27, 2016, Defendant filed his Answer and asserted fourteen affirmative defenses and various counterclaims in the state court proceeding, including claims asserting consumer fraud, for violations of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., and for violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. See Blaine Cert., Ex. B. On January 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the state court granted on March 3, 2017. Id., Ex. F. Specifically, the state court struck Defendant's Answer, defenses, and counterclaim, and ordered that Plaintiff is entitled to foreclosure and possession of the property. Id. On March 17, 2017, two weeks after the statecourt granted summary judgment, Defendant removed this action to federal court. Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1. On April 11, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Remand and Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. ECF No. 5. Defendant has opposed those Motions.3 ECF No. 9.
The Court begins by reviewing the relevant provisions governing the removal of civil actions from state court to federal district court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a),4 "defendants may generally remove civil actions from state court to federal district court so long as the district court would have had subject-matter jurisdiction had the case been originally filed before it." A.S. ex rel. Miller v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir. 2014). The removability of a matter is determined from the plaintiff's pleadings at the time of removal. See Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 14 (1951). When the propriety of removal is challenged, the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that removal is proper. See Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007). "Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in the case void and the continuation of the litigation infederal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand." Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985).
Remand is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c),5 which provides that removed cases may be remanded: (1) within thirty days of the filing of the notice of removal, if removal was procedurally defective; or (2) at any time before final judgment, if the district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Where a plaintiff seeks remand on the basis of a procedural defect in removal, and the case is otherwise removable under § 1441(a), "the plaintiff must identify a provision that prohibits removal." SmithKline Beecham, 769 F.3d at 208.
Here, while Plaintiff does not expressly challenge Defendant's removal on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, because this Court's jurisdiction is a threshold question, I turn first to the issue of whether Plaintiff's Complaint was originally removable. In his Notice of Removal, Defendant asserts that this matter is removable on the basis of both federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as well as under theCivil Rights Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). Pursuant to § 1331, district courts have federal question jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For diversity jurisdiction to exist under § 1332, each party must be of diverse citizenship from each other and the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see Grand Union Superm. of the Virgin Isl., Inc., v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003).
First, the Court finds that it lacks federal question jurisdiction, because Plaintiff's Complaint does not present a question of federal law. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see Green Tree Servicing LLC v. Dillard, 88 F. Supp. 3d 399, 401 (D.N.J. 2015) (). For that reason, ordinarily, neither defenses nor counterclaims provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction; rather, "federal question jurisdiction [must] be established squarely within the four corners of the [] complaint for removal purposes." Palmer v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 605 F. Supp. 2d 624, 633 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2009); see, e.g., Hudson City Sav. Bank, FSB v. Barrow, No. 16-4190, 2017 WL 701381, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2017) (). Here, Plaintiff's Complaint relies exclusively upon state law in asserting a cause of action to foreclose a mortgage, and therefore, provides no basis for federaljurisdiction.6 See Jpmorgan Chase Bank v. Farah, No. 16-3056, 2016 WL 8674607, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2016) () To the extent that Defendant relies on federal causes of action asserted in his counterclaims as the basis for federal question jurisdiction, those arguments are misplaced. See Dillard, 88 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (). Accordingly, because the face of Plaintiff's Complaint does not identify a federal question, this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction, irrespective of any federal counterclaim asserted by Defendant.
Second, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of establishing the existence of diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. Importantly, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2), commonly referred to as the "forum defendant" or "home state" rule, provides that "[a] civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). In other words, "the forum defendant rule precludes removal based on diversity where a defendant is a citizen of the forum state—the state in which the plaintiff originally filed the case." Sullivan v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 575 F. Supp. 2d 640, 642 (D.N.J. 2008). Here, even assuming that the Complaintsatisfies the amount in controversy and complete diversity requirements, there is no dispute that Plaintiff initially filed this action in New Jersey state court, and that Defendant is a citizen of New Jersey. See Compl. ¶ 6; Not. of Removal. Accordingly, removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction is barred under § 1441(b)(2).
In his Notice of Removal, Defendant also argues that removal is proper under the Civil Rights Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). Section 1443(1) provides a limited exception to the general removal rule, permitting removal to federal court where the state court action is pending "[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof." 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). The Third Circuit has...
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