Bazaldua v. Hanrahan, 12143
| Decision Date | 26 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 12143,12143 |
| Citation | 1979 NMSC 25,592 P.2d 512,92 N.M. 596 |
| Parties | Ruben BAZALDUA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Michael HANRAHAN, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Appellee Bazaldua was indicted by a Texas Grand Jury for aggravated robbery. The Governor of Texas issued a requisition for the extradition of appellee from the State of New Mexico to the State of Texas to stand trial for the crime, alleged by the Texas Governor to have been committed in Texas. Appellee was arrested in Albuquerque, New Mexico, on a warrant issued in Dallas County, Texas, and was subsequently arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the New Mexico Governor directing his rendition to the State of Texas.
Appellee filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was not a fugitive from justice because he was not present in the State of Texas at the time the alleged offense was committed.
The district court held a hearing on the writ. Five witnesses testified under oath to the effect that appellee could not have been in the State of Texas at the time the alleged offense was committed. The five witnesses were related to, or friends of, appellee. After hearing testimony from the witnesses, the trial court granted the writ and released appellee to the custody of his brother. But, the court allowed the State fifteen days within which to produce Eduardo Sanchez, the victim of the alleged crime, to testify in court. The State did not produce Sanchez or any other evidence. The court, by final order and judgment, sustained the writ of habeas corpus and ordered appellee discharged from custody.
The State argues that it proved its prima facie case after it presented the extradition documents, including an affidavit from the victim of the crime. Further, the State argues that appellee has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not in Texas and therefore not a fugitive at the time the alleged crime was committed. The documents produced from the demanding state made out a prima facie case and this was not overcome by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the subject of extradition, Article IV, § 2, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
Congress has implemented the constitutional provision. The relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182 reads:
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a Fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person has fled Shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and Shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. (Emphasis added.)
New Mexico has adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, §§ 31-4-1 through 31-4-30, N.M.S.A.1978 (formerly §§ 41-19-1 through 41-19-30, N.M.S.A.1953). Section 31-4-2 of the New Mexico Act provides:
Subject to the provisions of this act (31-4-1 to 31-4-30 N.M.S.A.1978), the provisions of the constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all Acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the governor of this state to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has Fled from justice and is found in this state. (Emphasis added.)
In Michigan v. Doran, --- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521, decided by the United States Supreme Court on December 18, 1978, the respondent had been arrested in Michigan and charged with a crime. Michigan had notified Arizona and Arizona charged respondent with theft. An Arizona justice of the peace issued an arrest warrant which recited that there was "probable cause" to believe that respondent had committed the crime. The Governor of Arizona issued a requisition for extradition accompanied by an arrest warrant, supporting affidavits and the original complaint. The Governor of Michigan issued an arrest warrant and ordered extradition. Upon arraignment on the Michigan warrant, respondent petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the extradition warrant was invalid because it did not comply with the Michigan Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. After reviewing the constitutional provision, the Act of Congress and Michigan's Uniform Extradition Act, the Court, through Chief Justice Burger, set out the intent and purpose of the extradition clause of the Constitution The Extradition Clause was intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed. Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 132-133, 38 S.Ct. 41, 42, 62 L.Ed. 193 (1917); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227, 27 S.Ct. 122, 123, 51 L.Ed. 161 (1906). The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from the justice of another state and thus "balkanize" the administration of criminal justice among the several states.
The Clause never contemplated that the asylum state was to conduct the kind of preliminary inquiry traditionally intervening between the initial arrest and trial.
Under Art. IV, § 2, the courts of the asylum state are bound to accept the demanding state's judicial determination since the proceedings of the demanding state are clothed with the traditional presumption of regularity. In short, when a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of...
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